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Résumé
Résumé
Cette thèse porte sur les jeux d’évolution et de congestion.
Après une revue des études sur les jeux de congestion dans les réseaux dans le chapitre 1,
nous étudions la relation entre la composition des joueurs (non-atomiques, atomiques, com-
posites) et les coûts d’équilibre dans les chapitres 2 et 3. En particulier, l’impact de la
formation des coalitions est examiné.
Les chapitres 4 et 5 introduisent le comportement de délégation dans les jeux composites
et les jeux divisibles en entiers. Plusieurs jeux et processus de délégation dans des contextes
différents sont définis et étudiés.
Enfin, nous nous penchons sur l’aspect dynamique des jeux. Le chapitre 6 est consacré à
une dynamique à deux échelles qui modélise le phénomène de sélection à niveaux multiples.
La thèse est conclue par une revue des études sur les dynamiques de type réplicateur dans
le chapitre 7.
Mots-clefs
jeu de congestion, réseau, joueur non-atomique, joueur atomique, jeu composite, équi-
libre composite, coalition, délégation, jeu de délégation à un coup, processus de délégation
à meilleures réponses alternatives, joueur divisible en entiers, jeu de délégation, chaine com-
patible de paiements d’équilibre, sélection à niveaux multiples, dynamique réplicateur
Contributions to Evolutionary and Congestion Game Theory
Abstract
This thesis is contributed to evolutionary games and congestion games.
After a survey of the studies on network congestion games in Chapter 1, Chapters 2 and 3
consider the relation between the composition of the players (nonatomic, atomic, composite)
and the equilibrium cost. In particular, the impact of the formation of coalitions is examined.
8Chapters 4 and 5 introduce the behavior of delegation in composite games and integer-
splittable games. Several delegation games and a delegation process are defined and studied
in different contexts.
Finally, dynamic aspects in games are considered. Chapter 6 focuses on a two-level
dynamics which models the phenomenon of multilevel selection. The thesis is concluded by
a survey of the studies on the dynamics of replicator type in Chapter 7.
Keywords
congestion game, network, nonatomic player, atomic player, composite game, composite
equilibrium, coalition, delegation, one-shot delegation game, alternating best reply delegation
process, integer-splittable player, delegation game, consistent chain of delegation equilibrium
payoff, multilevel selection, replicator dynamics
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Introduction
Cette thèse porte sur les jeux de congestion et les jeux de population.
Afin de fixer l’idée, nous considérons les jeux de congestion dans les réseaux finis. Un
joueur contrôle un stock à envoyer de son origine à sa destination. Le joueur est non-atomique
(resp. atomique) si son stock est infinitésimal (resp. de poids strictement positif). Un joueur
atomique est divisible (resp. non-divisible) s’il peut (resp. ne peut pas) diviser son stock
en plusieur parties et les envoyer par des chemins différents. Dans un jeu de congestion
composite, les joueurs sont atomiques divisibles ou non-atomiques. Le coût d’un chemin
dépend du poids de stock sur chacun de ses arcs. L’espace de stratégies d’un joueur non-
atomique ou atomique non-divisible est fini, tandis que celui d’un joueur atomique divisible
est un continuum, en fait, un simplexe. Plus généralement, on appelle jeux de population
une situation interactive où le paiement de chaque joueur dépend de son choix/type et de la
distribution des choix/types des autres joueurs.
C’est dans ce contexte que cette thèse est effectuée. Elle est composée de sept chapitres.
Chaque chapitre est issu d’un article (accepté, soumis ou en cours) de l’auteur (seule pour
les chapitres 1 à 4, en collaboration pour les chapitres 5 à 7). Afin de conserver la structure
et la logique de ces travaux, ils sont reproduits ici sans modification. Les notations et la
mise en page ont été homogénéisées. Par ailleurs, trois paragraphes initialement retirés sont
rajoutés dans le chapitre 2 comme appendice.
Le chapitre 1 est issu de l’article soumis « Jeux de congestion : modèles et propriétés ».
Il présente les jeux de congestion dans un cadre général. Différents modèles et leurs pro-
priétés sont traités. Après avoir introduit les jeux de congestion à la Rosenthal, un modèle
avec stocks discrets qui est une des origines des jeux de congestion, nous nous focalisons
sur les modèles avec stocks continus : non-atomiques, atomiques divisibles et composites.
Nous détaillons la définition, la caractérisation, l’existence et l’unicité des équilibres dans
différentes circonstances avant de mentionner deux passages d’approximation d’un nombre
fini de joueurs à un continuum de joueurs. Ensuite, nous nous penchons sur l’efficacité des
équilibres au niveau social comme au niveau individuel, leurs différentes mesures et les pro-
blématiques associées. Enfin, nous résumons des études sur des processus dynamiques dans
les jeux de congestion dans différents modèles.
Le chapitre 2 est issu de l’article « Coalitions in network congestion games » à paraître
dans le journal Mathematics of Operations Research. Il est consacré aux propriétés statiques
des jeux de congestion composites. En nous restreignant aux réseaux composés de deux
sommets reliés par deux arcs parallèles, nous nous intéressons à l’impact de la formation
des coalitions entre les joueurs sur les coûts en équilibre. Sous une hypothèse standard sur
la convexité des fonctions de coût, nous montrons que la formation des coalitions entre les
joueurs non-atomiques réduit le coût social comme celui de chaque joueur. Rappelons que
le coût des membres d’une coalition est défini comme la moyenne du coût de la coalition.
Dans le cas d’une seule coalition, le coût des joueurs non-atomiques, le coût moyen de la
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coalition et le coût social diminuent tous par rapport à la taille de la coalition. Dans le cas de
multiples coalitions, si un groupe de joueurs non-atomiques forme ou rejoignt une coalition,
le coût des joueurs non-atomiques diminue.
Le chapitre 3 est issu de l’article « Composition of the players in two-singleton-choice
congestion games ». Nous poursuivons l’analyse du chapitre 2 en étudiant comment les coûts
d’équilibre évoluent en fonction de la composition des joueurs. En nous restreignant aux
réseaux composés de deux sommets reliés par deux arcs parallèles, nous montrons que, si
un joueur atomique divisible est remplaçé par un ensemble composite de joueurs, à savoir
des joueurs atomiques divisibles et/ou des joueurs non-atomiques, dont le poids total est le
même que celui qui est remplaçé, alors le coût social et le coût des autres joueurs augmentent
à l’équilibre.
Le chapitre 4 est issu de l’article « One-shot delegation games and delegation processes ».
Dans ce chapitre, nous introduisons la notion de délégation aux jeux de congestion com-
posites. On dit qu’un joueur atomique divisible délègue s’il divise son stock en plusieurs
parties puis les confie à des joueurs indépendants, et son coût est la somme des coûts de ses
délégués. Remarquons qu’un délégué atomique divisible peut lui aussi déléguer. Nous nous
plaçons toujours dans un réseau de deux sommets reliés par deux arcs parallèles. D’abord,
nous montrons que, face aux autres joueurs atomiques divisibles et/ou non-atomiques, un
joueur atomique divisible dispose toujours de meilleure réponse en termes de délégation (ce
qui n’est pas évident car l’espace de ses choix est le produit d’un nombre dénombrable de
simplexes). En particulier, toutes ses stratégies de délégation sont faiblement dominées par
les stratégies dites uni-atomiques, à savoir celles qui désignent un seul délégué atomique en
dehors des délégués nonatomiques. Puis, nous établissons l’existence des équilibres de Nash
purs dans les jeux de délégation à un coup, dans le cas où il y a deux joueurs atomiques
divisibles et les fonctions de coût des deux arcs sont affines. Enfin, nous considérons un pro-
cessus de délégation dans lequel les joueurs atomiques divisibles délèguent alternativement.
Nous étudions sa vitesse de convergence et l’ensemble de ses issues, afin de comparer ces
issues avec les équilibres du jeu de congestion initial et ceux du jeu de délégation en un coup.
Le chapitre 5 est issu de l’article soumis « Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-
splitting games » en collaboration avec Sylvain Sorin. Nous considérons le comportement de
délégation dans les jeux de congestion dits divisibles en entiers, à savoir que le poids du stock
de chaque joueur est un nombre entier et il ne peux le diviser qu’en plusieurs parties de poids
en nombre entier. Contrairement au chapitre 4, un joueur ne dispose que d’un nombre fini
de stratégies de délégation, et le processus de délégation ne peut pas durer infiniment. Ce
jeu est aussi différent des jeux sous forme normale et des jeux extensifs bien connus, car
les joueurs sont crées au fur et à mesure. Nous étudions d’abord ses propriétés statiques.
Nous construisons le jeu par une structure d’arbre et nous définissons les coûts d’équilibre et
les coûts d’équilibre compatibles. Puis, nous cherchons son lien avec la sélection d’équilibre,
l’induction en amont et l’induction en aval.
Le chapitre 6 est issu de l’article « A dynamical model of a two-scale interaction » en
collaboration avec Mario Bravo. Dans ce chapitre, nous modélisons un phénomène nommé
« sélection à multiples niveaux » en biologie mais aussi courant dans la société humaine.
Supposons qu’il y a un ensemble de groupes dont chacun est composé d’individus de deux
types : C (coopérateur) etD (défecteur). Au sein d’un groupe, le typeD a toujours une fitness
supérieure à celle de type C, quelle que soit la composition du groupe. En revanche, la fitness
d’un groupe croît avec la proportion de type C qu’elle contient. Ces deux effets pourraient
se compenser. Dans un état stationnaire, tous les groupes dans la société pourraient avoir
des propositions de type C identiques ou différentes. Ce phénomène peut être modélisé de
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manières variées. Nous commençons par un processus dynamique avec un nombre fini de
proportions possibles de type C et en temps discret. Nous montrons qu’un état stationaire
existe et la dynamique converge vers un état où les groupes ont différentes proportions de
type C. Une variante du modèle dans laquelle les individus de type D pourraient muter en
devenant de type C est également étudiée.
Le chapitre 7 est issu de l’article « Replicator dynamics in game theory » en collaboration
avec Mario Bravo et Sylvain Sorin. Il consiste en une revue de la dynamique réplicateur
dans les jeux. Nous prenons les jeux de congestion comme un cas particulier et comparons
les mêmes équations de la dynamique réplicateur dans plusieurs contextes distincts. Plus
précisément, nous étudions ses différentes formes d’application dans les jeux de (une ou
multiples) population(s) non-atomique(s) avec auto-interaction (au sein d’une population)
ou externe-interaction (entre les populations), les jeux matriciels, et les jeux à un nombre
fini de joueurs si les espaces de stratégies sont des espaces compacts.
This thesis investigates the congestion games and the population games.
To fix the idea, let us consider network congestion games. Each player holds a stock
to be sent from its origin to its destination. The player is nonatomic (resp. atomic) if her
stock is infinitesimal (resp. of strictly positive weight). An atomic player is splittable (resp.
unsplittable) if she can (resp. cannot) divide her stock into several parts and send them
by different paths. In a composite congestion game, the players are atomic splittable or
nonatomic. The cost of a path depends on the total weight of the stocks on each of the arc
component of the path. The strategy space of a nonatomic player or an atomic unsplittable
player is finite, while that of an atomic splittable player is a continuum or, in fact, a simplex.
More generally, a population game describes an interactive situation where each player’s
payoff depends on her choice/type and the distribution of the choices/types among the other
players.
It is in this framework that the thesis is written. It is composed of seven chapters.
Each chapter is based on a paper (which is accepted or submitted or finished but not yet
submitted) of the author (by herself for the first four chapters, and in collaboration with
others for the rest). In order to keep the structure and the logic of these works, they are
reproduced here without modification. The notations and the formatting are homogenized.
Besides, three paragraphs initially removed from Chapter 2 are restored as appendices.
Chapter 1 is based on the submitted paper “Jeux de congestion : modèles et propriétés”. It
presents congestion games in a general framework. Different models and their properties are
treated. After the introduction of Rosenthal congestion games (a model with discrete stocks
which is one of the origins of congestion games), it focuses on the models with continuous
stocks: nonatomic, atomic splittable and composite. The definition, the characterization, the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria in different settings are provided in detail, and
two approximations of a continuum of players by a large number of players are mentioned.
Then, it discusses the efficiency of the equilibria at the social level as well as at the individual
level, their different measures and the associated topics. Finally, it summarizes the studies
on the dynamical processes in congestion games in different models.
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Chapter 2 is based on the paper “Coalitions in network congestion games” which is
to appear in the journal Mathematics of Operations Research. It is contributed to the
static properties of composite congestion games. In a network composed of two vertices
connected by parallel arcs, the impact of the formation of coalitions between the players
on the equilibrium costs is considered. Under a standard assumption on the convexity of
the cost functions, it is shown that the formation of coalitions between nonatomic players
reduces the social cost as well as each player’s cost. Recall that the cost to the members of
coalition is defined as the average cost to the coalition. In the case of a unique coalition, the
nonatomic players’ common cost, the average cost to the coalition and the social cost are
strictly decreasing with respect to the size of the coalition. In the case of multi-coalition, if
a group of nonatomic players form or join a coalition, the nonatomic players’ common cost
is reduced.
Chapter 3 is based on the paper “Composition of the players in two-singleton-choice
congestion games”. It extends the analysis in Chapter 2 by studying how the equilibrium
costs evolve with respect to the composition of the players. In a network composed of two
vertices connected by two parallel arcs, it is shown that, if an atomic splittable player is
replaced by a composite set of players, namely, a set of atomic splittable players and/or
nonatomic players whose total weight is the same as that of the replaced player, then the
social cost and the cost to the other players are increased at the equilibrium.
Chapter 4 is based on the paper “One-shot delegation games and delegation processes”.
It introduces the notion of delegation in composite congestion games. An atomic splittable
player is said to delegate if she divides her stock to several parts and commits them re-
spectively to independent players, so that her cost is the sum of the costs to her delegates.
Notice that an atomic splittable player can also delegate. This chapter is always restrained
to two-terminal two-parallel-arc networks. First, it is shown that, facing the other atomic
splittable and/or nonatomic players, an atomic splittable player always has a best reply in
terms of delegation (This result is not evident because the set of such choices is the product
of a countable number of simplices.). In particular, all her delegation strategies are weakly
dominated by the so-called single-atomic strategies, i.e. those that appoint a single atomic
delegate in addition to nonatomic delegates. Then, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is
established in one-shot delegation games, in the case where there are two atomic splittable
players and the cost functions of the two arcs are affine. Finally, it considers a delegation
process where the atomic splittable players delegate in turn. The convergence speed and the
set of the outcomes of the process are studied. And these outcomes are compared with the
equilibria of the initial congestion game and the equilibria of the one-shot delegation game.
Chapter 5 is based on the submitted paper “Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-
splitting games” in collaboration with Sylvain Sorin. It considers the behavior of delegation
in integer-splittable congestion games, namely, the congestion games where each player’s
weight is an integer and she can only divide her stock into several parts of integer weights.
Unlike in Chapter 4, a player has only a finite number of delegation strategies, and the
delegation process cannot continue infinitely. This game is also different from the well-know
normal form games or extensive form games, because the players are created gradually. The
static properties of such an integer-splitting delegation game are first studied. The game is
constructed by a tree structure. The definition of equilibrium costs and that of consistent
equilibrium costs are given. Then, the links of this model with the selection of equilibria,
forward induction and backward induction are discussed.
Chapter 6 is based on the paper “A dynamical model of a two-scale interaction” in
collaboration with Mario Bravo. It models the phenomenon called “multi-level selection”
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in biology which is also quite usual in human society. Suppose that there are a family of
groups. Each of them is composed of individuals of one of the two types: C (cooperator)
and D (defector). Within a group, type D always has a higher fitness than type C, whatever
the composition of the group is. On the contrary, the fitness of a group increases with the
proportion of type C in it. These two effects might compensate each other. At a stationary
state, all the groups in the society might have the same proportion or different proportions
of type C. This phenomenon can be modeled in different ways. Here, one begins by a
dynamical process in discrete time with a finite number of possible proportions of type C.
It is shown that a stationary state exists and the dynamics converges to a state where the
groups have different proportions of type C. A variant of the model where the individuals
of type D can mutate by becoming type C is also studied.
Chapter 7 is based on the paper “Replicator dynamics in game theory” in collaboration
with Mario Bravo and Sylvain Sorin. It is a survey on replicator dynamics studied in game
theory. It takes congestion games as examples and compares the same equations of replicator
dynamics in different contexts. Explicitely, it studies different forms of the application of
replicator dynamics in (one or multiple) nonatomic population games with self-interaction
(within each population) or external-interaction (between the populations), in matrix games,
and in N -player games where the action spaces are compact sets.

Notations
Rd+ = {x ∈ Rd |xi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ d}.
R++ = {x ∈ R |x > 0}.
R¯ = R ∪ {+∞}.
N = {0, 1, 2, · · · }.
N∗ = {1, 2, · · · }.
For m,n ∈ N, Jm,nK = {m,m+ 1, . . . , n− 1, n}.
For x,y ∈ Rd, 〈x ,y 〉 = ∑di=1 xiyi, i.e. the inner product of x and y.
For x = (xi)di=1 and y = (yi)di=1 ∈ Rd, x ≥ y means that xi ≥ yi for i = 1, . . . , d.
For x ∈ R, x+ = max{x, 0}, x− = min{−x, 0}, and |x| = max{x+, x−}, i.e. the absolute
value of x.
For x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖∞ = max1≤i≤d{|xi|}, i.e. its uniform norm in Rd.
For any set A, |A| is the cardinality of A.
∆d−1 = {x = (xi)di=1 ∈ Rd |xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , d,
∑d
i=1 xi = 1}, i.e. the simplex of
dimension d− 1.
For any finite set A, ∆(A) = ∆|A|−1.
For any matrix A, AT is the transpose of A.

Chapter 1
Network congestion games: models
and properties
This chapter is translated from the paper Jeux de congestion : modèles et propriétés
particularly for the English version of this PhD thesis.
Abstract. This paper provides a survey of some important results on network congestion
games. Rosenthal congestion games, the associated potential games and a nonatomic version
of them, as well as the classical counter-examples or paradoxes are introduced. Network
congestion games are discussed for different versions of actors. The definitions of equilibrium
and their static properties such as characterization, existence and uniqueness are provided.
The inefficiency of the equilibria is discussed at both the social level and the individual level.
Some results on dynamic processes are presented.
1.1 Introduction
This work presents a survey of the important results on network congestion games. It
begins by Rosenthal congestion games, the associated potential game, a nonatomic version
and the classical counter-examples or paradoxes. Next, the congestion model with different
versions of actors are developed: a finite number of atomic players with unsplittable stocks,
atomic players with splittable stocks and/or nonatomic players who control each an infinites-
imal quantity of stock. The definitions of equilibria in these games will be formulated, then
their static properties, such as their characterization, their existence and their uniqueness,
will be discussed. Two approximation models from a finite number of players to a continuum
of players are mentioned. Then, we study the efficiency of the equilibria in terms of the social
cost as well as the individuals’ costs, their different measures and the associated problems.
Finally, the studies on the dynamical processes in congestion games in the different models
mentioned above are reviewed.
1.2 Congestion games: definition, proprieties, examples
1.2.1 Rosenthal congestion games
Rosenthal [74] introduced a class of strategic games with a finite number of players and
strategies. Their structure is very rich. In particular, they possess Nash equilibria in pure
strategies.
22 Chapter 1. Network congestion games: models and properties
Definition 1.1. A Rosenthal congestion game, Γ
(
A, (la)a∈A, N , (P i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, is spec-
ified by the following elements.
– N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, a finite set of players.
– A, a finite set of resources.
– la, the per-unit cost function of resource a ∈ A, defined from R+ ∩ N to R+. When
there are x players who use a, the cost to each of them for using it is la(x).
– P i ⊂ 2A, the pure strategy set of player i ∈ N . A pure strategy pi ∈ P i is a subset of
A.
– ui, the cost function of player i ∈ N , defined on the set of pure strategy profiles
P = ∏i∈N P i as follows:
ui(p) =
∑
a∈pi
la
(
φa(p)
)
,
where φa(p) is the total number of the players using resource a, when the strategy
profile is p.
Let us first cite a simple example, then make some remarks on the definition of Rosenthal
potential games.
Example 1.2. In a public goods game, each of the N players chooses one and only one
piece of public goods from a set A. The cost to a player is determined by the number of the
players who make the same choice as her.
Remark 1.3.
Separability of the cost. By definition, given a strategy profile, the cost associated to a
strategy played by someone is the sum of the costs of the resources used by it. This property
is called the separability of the cost.
Non externality of the cost. The cost of a resource depends only on the number of its
users, but not on the number of the users of the others resources. In other words, there is
no externality.
Anonymous game. The cost to player i depends only on her own strategy pi and the
set of the strategies played, but not the identity of the carrier of a certain strategy pj . In
other words, Rosenthal congestion games belong to the class of anonymous games, where
each player’s payoff depends on her own strategy and the vector (xp)p∈∪i∈NP i , where xp is
the number of the players choosing strategy p. If the players have specific weights, then
“number” should be replaced by “weight”.
Notice that, in a Rosenthal congestion game, the players have the same weight and the
same cost functions for the resources, which need not be the case in either anonymous games
or congestion games in the general case.
Network congestion game. An important family of congestion games take place in a
network, namely, a finite directed graph. The resources there are arcs. A pair of vertices
are associated to each player, which are her origin and her destination, respectively. Each
strategy of her is a directed elementary path (i.e., it does not pass twice by the same vertex),
which connects her origin to her destination. For example, in Figure 1.1, the players having
o1/d1 (resp. o2/d2) as origin/destination have 7 (resp. 2) pure strategies. The cost associated
to an arc can be interpreted as the travel time, which is usually nondecreasing with the traffic
intensity on the arc because of the congestion.
1.2. Congestion games: definition, proprieties, examples 23
o1
o2
d1
d2
s
Figure 1.1: A congestion game in a network.
1.2.2 Potential games
The proof by Rosenthal [74] of the existence of pure Nash equilibria in Rosenthal games
is based on a potential function. Nevertheless, it is only 23 years later that Monderer and
Shapley [62] formally defined potential games (with a finite number of players).
Definition 1.4. Suppose that Γ
(N , (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) is a strategic game, where N =
{ 1, . . . , N } is the finite set of players, Si the (probably infinite) set of pure strategies
of player i, and ui the payoff function of player i, defined on the set of pure strategy profiles
S = ∏i∈N Si. Game Γ is a potential game (finite, cf. Chapter 7) if there exists a real-valued
function P defined on S such that, for all player i, for all strategies si and ti in Si, for all
profile s−i in S−i = ∏j∈N\{i} Sj , one has:
ui(si, s−i)− ui(ti, s−i) = P (si, s−i)− P (ti, s−i). (1.1)
And P is called a potential function of the game Γ.
The connection between potential games and Rosenthal congestion games is clarified by
the following theorem (Monderer and Shapley [62]).
Theorem 1.5. 1. Each Rosenthal congestion game Γ
(
A, (la)a∈A, N , (P i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
is a
potential game.
A potential function of Γ is
P (p) =
∑
a∈A
φa(p)∑
k=0
la(k). (1.2)
2. Conversely, a potential game with a finite number of strategies is isomorphic to a Rosen-
thal congestion game.
Proof. 1. Suppose that pi, qi ∈ P i are two strategies of player i, and p−i ∈ P−i =∏
j∈N\{i} P j is a strategy profile of the other players. Suppose that B = (pi∩qi)∪
(
A\(pi∪qi))
is the subset of A which contains all the common components of pi and qi as well as the
resources used neither by pi nor by qi. Then, for a resource b ∈ B, the number of its users
φb does not change when the strategy profile changes from (pi, p−i) to (qi, p−i).
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On the one hand,
P (pi, p−i)− P (qi, p−i)
=
∑
a∈pi\qi
(φa(pi,p−i)∑
k=0
la(k)−
φa(qi,p−i)∑
k=0
la(k)
)
−
∑
b∈qi\pi
(φb(qi,p−i)∑
k=0
lb(k)−
φb(pi,p−i)∑
k=0
lb(k)
)
=
∑
a∈pi\qi
la
(
φa(pi, p−i)
)− ∑
b∈qi\pi
lb
(
φb(qi, p−i)
)
,
where pi \ qi = {a ∈ A | a ∈ pi, a /∈ qi}.
On the other hand,
ui(pi, p−i)− ui(qi, p−i) =
∑
a∈pi
la
(
φa(pi, p−i)
)−∑
b∈qi
lb
(
φb(qi, p−i)
)
=
∑
a∈pi\qi
la
(
φa(pi, p−i)
)− ∑
b∈qi\pi
lb
(
φb(qi, p−i)
)
.
Therefore,
ui(pi, p−i)− ui(qi, p−i) = P (pi, p−i)− P (qi, p−i). (1.3)
2. See Monderer and Shapley [62].
Theorem 1.6. All Rosenthal congestion game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In a Rosenthal congestion game Γ
(
A, (la)a∈A,N , (P i)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, according to The-
orem 1.5, there is a potential function P such that, for all player i, for all strategies pi and
qi in P i, for all profile p−i ∈ P−i, equality (1.3) holds.
Since P is finite set and cost functions (la)a∈A are positives, there exists a global minimum
point p of function P in P. If p was not a Nash equilibrium of game G, then a player i
could have reduced her cost by choosing another strategy qi, i.e. ui(pi, p−i) > ui(qi, p−i).
However, according to (1.3), this implies that P (pi, p−i) > P (qi, p−i), which contradicts the
global minimality of p.
Remark 1.7. The proof of Theorem 1.6 implies that, in a Rosenthal congestion game, a
global minimum of the potential function is a Nash equilibrium. The converse is not true.
In particular, there is no uniqueness. In the following example (Rosenthal [74]), the game
admits two pure Nash equilibria, and one of them does not minimize the potential function.
Example 1.8. In Figure 1.2, the cost functions are written on the arcs.
B
A
C
D E
x2 x2
0 1
0 0
Figure 1.2
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Player 1 goes from A to B, while player 2 goes from A to C. At one of the two pure
Nash equilibria, player 1 takes path A → E → B, while player 2 takes path A → D → C.
The potential function attains its minimum 3. The other pure Nash equilibrium is attained
when player 1 takes path A → D → B, while player 2 takes path A → E → C. The value
of the potential function is 4, hence it is not minimized.
Remark 1.9. By definition, the players have the same weight in a Rosenthal congestion
game. If the players have different weights, it is called a weighted congestion game. The
existence of a potential function and thus that of a pure Nash equilibrium are not guaranteed
in weighted congestion games. Here is an example from Libman and Orda [51].
Example 1.10. The arc cost functions in Figure 1.3 are given in Table 1.1.
O A C D
e5
e2 e3
e6
e4
e1
Figure 1.3
arc a la(1) la(2) la(3)
e1 5 10 40
e2 5 200 1000
e3 10 50 60
e4 60 600 2000
e5 80 90 100
e6 50 60 70
Table 1.1
The weight of player 1 is 2, while that of player 2 is 1. Both of them travel from O to
D. One can verify that the game has no pure Nash equilibrium.
However, there are particular cases where a weighted game admits a potential function,
for example, if the arc cost functions are affine (cf. Fotakis et al. [30], Mavroniclas et al. [53]).
Remark 1.11. If the players have the same weight but not the same cost functions for the
resources, they are said to have specific costs. In this case, a potential function does not
necessarily exists either. There is an exception when the cost functions of the same arc for
different players are identical up to an additive constant, i.e. if, for all arc a, there exists a
function x 7→ la(x) such that, for all player i, her cost function for arc a is lia(·) = la(·) + θia,
where θia > 0 (Mavroniclas et al. [53]).
1.2.3 Nonatomic congestion games
When the number of the players is so large that the influence of a player on the others
becomes negligible, one can represent the set of players by a continuum, for example, a real
interval endowed with Lebesgue measure. Each player is reduced to a point. That is the
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origin of the name “nonatomic”. Here, we will only give the definition of a nonatomic public
goods game, which is a congestion game, and some important properties of the game. A
more general analysis on the nonatomic congestion games will be made in §1.3.4.
In a nonatomic public goods game Γ, a population of nonatomic players is represented by
the real interval [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ. The players have a common set
of strategies A, which is a finite set of public goods. A per-unit cost function la is associated
to each piece of goods a ∈ A, which depends only on the total weight of the players choosing
it. A strategy profile θ induces a flow vector x = (xa)a∈A in the (|A| − 1)-simplex ∆|A|−1,
where xa stands for the measure of the set of the players choosing a. Hence, by abuse of
notation, the cost to the users of a is la(x) = la(xa).
An equilibrium of this game is called a Wardrop equilibrium because Wardrop [94] was
the first one to formulate it in the following way.
Definition 1.12. In a nonatomic public goods game with a set of goods A, a strategy profile
θ is a Wardrop equilibrium if, for all a, b ∈ A such that a is used by a nonnegligible set of
players, i.e. xa > 0, one has
la(x) ≤ lb(x),
where x is the flow vector induced by θ.
Theorem 1.13. Suppose that, in a nonatomic public goods game Γ with a set of goods A,
for all a ∈ A, the cost function la is continuous and finite on a neighborhood of [0, 1]. Then,
a real-valued function P called the potential (in the sense of population games, cf. Chapter 7)
of game Γ is defined on ∆|A|−1 by
P (x) =
∑
a∈A
∫ xa
0
la(s) ds. (1.4)
All optimal solution of the nonlinear program
min
x∈∆|A|−1
P (x) (1.5)
is induced by a Wardrop equilibrium.
Conversely, if, in addition to the above assumptions on the arc cost functions, for all
a ∈ A, la is weakly monotone, then all Wardrop equilibrium induces an optimal solution of
program (1.5).
Remark 1.14. One notices immediately the similarity between (1.2) and (1.4), the potential
function in the discreet model and that in the continuous model. As in a (discreet) Rosenthal
congestion game, one can find Wardrop equilibria in a (continuous) nonatomic congestion
game by minimizing its potential function. The continuity of the goods cost functions and
the compactness of ∆|A|−1 imply immediately the existence of a Wardrop equilibrium. On
the contrary, the goods cost functions have to be monotone in a nonatomic congestion game,
which is not the case in a Rosenthal congestion game.
The social cost Cs is defined as the sum of the costs to all the players:
Cs(x) =
∑
a∈A
xa la(xa). (1.6)
If the cost functions are furthermore assumed to be differentiable on their definition
domain, then, by defining the modified cost of the piece of goods a by
l˜a(s) = la(s) + s l′a(s), (1.7)
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the social cost can be written as
Cs(x) =
∑
a∈A
∫ xa
0
l˜a(s) ds. (1.8)
By comparing (1.4) and (1.8), one sees that the social cost function in a nonatomic
congestion game Γ is equivalent to the potential function in another game Γ˜ with the mod-
ified costs. In consequence, the social cost minimum in Γ would be attained at a Wardrop
equilibrium in Γ˜.
In particular, if the cost functions are all of forme la = βaxα, where α and {βa}a∈A are
positive constants, then, according to (1.7), l˜a = (1+α)la. Thus, Cs(x) = (1+α)P (x). This
implies that the social optimum and the Wardrop equilibrium coincide in this case. This
example was first cited by Dafermos and Sparrow [28].
1.2.4 Braess’s paradox and Pigou’s example
Braess’s paradox It is the most famous paradox in transport analysis [16]. This paradox
shows that adding an arc in a network may be disadvantageous to all the passengers.
Suppose that a continuum of nonatomic players of total weight 1 travel from A to C in
the left network in Figure 1.4. Two paths are available: A → B → C and A → D → C.
The cost of arc AD and that of BC are always 1, while the arc cost functions of AB and
DC are x, where x is the total weight on the arc in question. Then, at the unique Wardrop
equilibrium, the players equally share the two paths. The cost is common for all, which is
1 + 12 =
3
2 .
Suppose that a new arc of cost zero is added in the network to connect B to D as
illustrated on the right in Figure 1.4. At the unique Wardrop equilibrium, all the players
take path A→ B → D → C. Their common cost is then 1 + 1 = 2.
Conclusion: Adding an arc has increased all the players’ costs!
A
C
B D
1x
x1
A
C
B D
1x
0
x1
Figure 1.4: The paradox of Braess.
This paradox also exists in Rosenthal’s discreet model. Suppose that there are 2n players,
all of weight 1, traveling from A to C. One has just to replace the per-unit cost of arc AB
and that of DC by x2n+1 , where x is the total number of the players on the arc. Then, in
the left network, at the unique Nash equilibrium, n players take path A→ B → C and the
others take A→ D → C, each having a cost 3n+12n+1 . In the right network, at the unique Nash
equilibrium, all the 2n players take path A→ B → D → C, and each has a cost 4n2n+1 .
In a minimization problem, relaxing constraints on the variable or, in other words, extend-
ing the definition domain of the objective function, can only improve the optimal solution.
The Braess’s paradox shows that this is not the case in a game: it is possible that the cost
to each player and the social cost are increased when more choices are available.
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Pigou’s example A well-know example of the sub-optimality of Nash equilibria was es-
tablished by Pigou. Suppose that a continuum of players of total weight 1 play in a network
composed of their origin O, their destination D, and two arcs connecting the two vertices as
illustrated in Figure 1.5. The cost of the upper arc is always 1, while that of the lower arc
is equal to the total weight of the passengers on the arc.
O D1
1
x
Figure 1.5: Pigou’s example.
At the unique Wardrop equilibrium, all the players take the lower arc and their common
cost is 1. The social cost is 1. On the contrary, if half of the players take the lower arc and
the other half take the upper one, the social cost is only 1× 12 + 12 × 12 = 34 .
As Braess’s paradox, Pigou’s example also has a discreet Rosenthal version. Consider 2n
players, all of weight 1. Now, let the cost of the lower arc by x2n+1 . Then, at the unique
Nash equilibrium, all the players take the lower arc and have a common cost 2n2n+1 , thus the
average social cost is also 2n2n+1 . On the contrary, the average social cost attains its minimum
(3n+1)/2
2n+1 if n players go by the upper arc and the other half go by the lower one.
Pigou’s example points out the probable inefficiency of Wardrop or Nash equilibria at
the social level in congestion games, caused by the lack of coordination among the players.
1.3 Network congestion
1.3.1 General model
The underlying network of a congestion game is a finite directed graph G = (V,A, l),
where V is the vertex set, A the set of directed arcs, l the vector of arc costs l = (la)a∈A,
and la is the per-unit cost function of arc a defined from ]−η,+∞[ to R¯ = R∪{+∞}, where
η > 0. The per-unit cost of arc a depends only on the total traffic weight on a. The player
set N can be finite or infinite. A player i is characterized by her weight mi, i.e. the stock
that she controls, and a pair of vertices (oi, di) ∈ V × V which are, respectively, the origin
and the destination of her stock. In other words, she has to send a quantity mi of stocks oi
to di.
From now on, we consider only network congestion games so that they will be simply
called congestion games. Furthermore, we consider only the case where players have a
common cost function for each arc. The case where the players have specific costs will be
discussed at the end.
Four versions will be treated according to the composition of the players.
Atomic games with unsplittable stocks (cf. §1.3.2) Each player controls a finite quan-
tity which cannot be split, hence she has to send it by a single path.
Atomic games with splittable stocks (cf. §1.3.3) Each player controls a finite quantity
which she can split arbitrarily and send each part by a different path.
Nonatomic games (cf. §1.3.4) Each player controls an infinitesimal quantity (Thus the
weight of a nonatomic player is zero).
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Composites games (cf. §1.3.5) Atomic players with splittable stocks and nonatomic play-
ers coexist.
1.3.2 Atomic congestion games with unsplittable stocks
A congestion game with a finite number of players who have each a finite quantity to
send by a single path is called atomic with unsplittable stocks. Such a game is specified by
an underlying graph G = (V,A, l), a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , N}, a vector of weight
m = (mi)i∈N , and a vector of origin/destination pairs (oi, di)i∈N . A strategy of player i is
a directed elementary path connecting oi to di. Let the set of such paths available to player
i be denoted by P i, and the set of pure strategy profiles be denoted by P = ∏i∈N P i. The
game is denoted by Γnd(G,N ,m,P), where the subscript nd stands for “unsplittable”.
The players’ cost functions are slightly different from those in Rosenthal congestion games
because the players are weighted. Still let φa(p) denote the total weight of players using arc a,
while the strategy profile is p = (pi)i∈N , where pi is the path taken by player i. Then, player
i’s cost function is defined by
ui(p) = mi
∑
a∈pi
la
(
φa(p)
)
.
Game Γ is a matrix game, thus it admits mixed Nash equilibria which correspond to
random choices of paths. On the contrary, except that the players have the same weight
(and thus the game is simply a Rosenthal one), the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is
not guaranteed (cf. Example 1.10).
1.3.3 Atomic congestion games with splittable stocks
Definitions and notations
If the (finitely many) atomic players can arbitrarily split their stock and send different
parts by different paths, the game is called atomic with splittable stocks. In such a game
Γd(G,N ,m,P) (where the subscript d stands for “splittable”), for player i in N of weight
mi, of origin oi and of destination di, P i still denotes the set of elementary paths connecting
oi to di which are available to her.
A strategy θi of player i is defined by a distribution of her stock onto the paths. Explicitly,
for path p in P i, let f ip denote the quantity that player i sends by p. Vector f i = (f ip)p∈P i
is also called the configuration on the paths of player i’s stock. A configuration on the paths
induced a configuration on the arcs. For arc a, denote
xia =
∑
p: p∈P i, a∈p
f ip,
the total weight of the stock that player i sends on arc a. To avoid confusion, let us call
vector xi = (xia)a∈A player i’s flow, and reserve the term configuration for paths only. The
incidence matrix Di ∈ R|A|×|P i| is defined by
Dia,p = (δa,p)a∈A, p∈P i ,
where δa,p = 1 if arc a belongs to path p, and 0 otherwise. Then, the connection between a
configuration and the flow induced by it is given by the following equation:
xi = Di f i. (1.9)
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Unlike f i, xi does not characterize player i’s pure strategy. Different configurations can
induce the same flow, and matrix Di is not invertible in the general case.
The set of feasible configurations of player i is her (pure) strategy set. This is a convex
compact set in R|P i|, defined by
F i =
{
f i = (f ip)p∈P i ∈ R|P
i| ∣∣ f i ≥ 0 ; ∑
p∈P i
f ip = mi
}
. (1.10)
The set of feasible flows of player i is a convex compact set in R|A|, defined by
F il =
{
xi ∈ R|A| ∣∣ ∃ f i ∈ F i such that xi = Di f i }. (1.11)
The strategy profile of the N players is specified by the vector of players’ configurations
or, the system configuration, f = (f i)i∈N . It induces the vector of players’ flows or, the
system flow, x = (xi)i∈N . Let us define the system incidence matrix by
D = diag
{
D1, . . . , DN
}
.
Explicitly, D = (dst)st is a matrix of dimension N |A| ×∑i∈N |P i|. The bloc composed
of the elements dst such that (i|A| − |A|+ 1) ≤ s ≤ i|A| and (∑i−1j=1 |P |j) ≤ t ≤ (∑ij=1 |P |j)
corresponds to player i. In this bloc, the element dst is 1 if s = (i − 1)|A| + a and t =∑i−1
j=1 |P |j + p for certain a ∈ A and certain p ∈ P i (i.e., arc a is a component of path p),
otherwise dst is 0. The elements not belonging to these N blocs are all zero.
Then,
x = Df . (1.12)
The set of strategy profiles or, the set of feasible system configurations, is a convex
compact set in R
∑
i∈N |P i|, defined by F = F 1 × · · · × FN . The set of feasible system flow is
a convex compact set in R|A|×N defined by Fl = F 1l × · · · × FNl .
Let us define the vector of aggregate arc flows or, simply, the aggregate flow by
ξ = (ξa)a∈A, where ξa =
∑
i∈N
xia. (1.13)
The aggregate flow ξ describes the total weight of traffic on each arc induced by the system
flow x.
Given a system configuration f , as well as the system flow x and the aggregate flow ξ
induced by it, the vector of arc costs is l (x) =
(
la(ξa)
)
a∈A. This determines the cost of path
p ∈ ⋃i∈N P i:
cp(f) =
∑
a∈p
la(ξa).
Player i’s path costs vector is defined by
ci(f) =
(
cip(f)
)
p∈P i = D
iT l (x), (1.14)
where the notation MT stands for the transpose of matrix M .
The vector of system path costs, which is a function of the system configuration f , is
defined by c(f) =
(
ci(f)
)
i∈N , and the vector of system arc costs is defined by l (x) =(
l (x), . . . , l (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
)
, then
c(f) = DT l (x). (1.15)
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Now, one can determine the players’ cost functions. Given a strategy profile f , player i’s
cost function is defined by
ui(f) =
〈
f i , ci(f)
〉
=
∑
p∈P i
f ip c
i
p(f), (1.16)
where 〈, 〉 stands for the inner product.
One can also compute player i’s cost by the system flow:
vi(x) =
〈
xi , l (x)
〉
=
∑
a∈A
xia la(ξa). (1.17)
Remark 1.15. At first glance, the (|P i| − 1) dimensional simplex ∆(P i), which is the set
of mixed strategies of player i in a game with unsplittable stocks, is identical to F i, the set
of pure strategies of player i in a game with splittable stocks. Rigourously, F i = mi∆(P i),
in the sense that xi 7→ mixi is a bijection from ∆(P i) to F i. However, the interpretation is
quite different: in the first case, xip is the probability with which player i sends a quantity
mi on path p, thus it describes a random choice; in the second case, mixip is the quantity
that she puts on path p, hence it describes a determinist choice. In particular, player i’s cost
functions are different in the two cases and the two games are of fairly different natures. Let
us cite a simple example to understand the difference.
Example 1.16. Suppose that an atomic player of weight 1 has to send her stock from vertex
o to vertex d. Two parallel arcs connect the two vertices. If the stock is unsplittable, a mixed
strategy (12 ,
1
2) means that the player sends all her stock by arc 1 with probability
1
2 , and by
arc 2 with the same probability. If the stock is splittable, a pure strategy (12 ,
1
2) means that
the player sends half of the stock by arc 1 and the rest by arc 2. If per-unit cost functions
of the two arcs are both x 7→ x, then the expected cost of the player is 1 in the unsplittable
case, but 12 in the splittable case.
Nash equilibrium: definition and characterizations
Let us give the definition of a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) in two formulations:
via paths and via arcs.
Definition 1.17. In an atomic congestion game with splittable stocks Γd(G,N ,m,P), a
system configuration f∗ ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium if, for all player i, her configuration
f∗i ∈ F i is an optimal solution of the program
min
f i∈F i
ui
(
f i , f∗−i
)
, (1.18)
where f∗−i = (f∗j)j∈N\{i} ∈ F−i =
∏
j∈N\{i} F j .
In the same game, a system flow x∗ ∈ Fl is induced by a Nash equilibrium if, for all player
i, x∗i ∈ F il is an optimal solution of the program
min
xi∈F i
l
vi
(
xi , x∗−i
)
, (1.19)
where x∗−i = (x∗j)j∈N\{i} ∈ F−il =
∏
j∈N\{i} F
j
l .
In this framework, some assumptions on the arc cost functions are necessary. Let M =∑
i∈N mi be the total weight of all the players.
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A 1.18. For all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is continuous and finite on a neighborhood
U of interval [ 0, M ], and positive on U ∩ R+.
A1.18 is assumed to be true throughout this work.
A 1.19. For all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is of class C1 on U .
Remark 1.20. Under A1.19, according to equation (1.12) and the fact that cp(f) =
∑
a∈p la(ξa),
for all player i and all path p ∈ P i, cp(f) is a function of class C1 on a neighborhood of F .
Now, one can define the marginal costs of the paths and those of the arcs.
Definition 1.21. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), under A1.19, the marginal cost of path p ∈ P i for
player i is a function of the system configuration defined by
cˆip(f) = cp(f) +
∑
l∈P i
f il
∂ cl(f)
∂ f ip
.
The vector of marginal path costs for player i is cˆi(f) =
(
cˆip(f)
)
p∈P i . The system vector of
marginal path costs is cˆ (f) =
(
cˆi(f)
)
i∈N .
The marginal cost of arc a ∈ A for player i is a function of the system flow defined by
lˆia(x) = la(ξa) + xiathea(ξa).
The vector of marginal arc costs for player i is lˆi(x) =
(
lˆia(x)
)
a∈A. The system vector of
marginal arc costs is lˆ (x) =
(
lˆi(x)
)
i∈N .
Remark 1.22. It is easy to verify that
cˆi (f) = ∇i ui(f), lˆi(x) = ∇i vi(x), (1.20)
where ∇i ui(f) stands for the gradient of function ui(f i, f−i) with respect to f i, while ∇ivi(x)
stands for the gradient of function vi(xi, x−i) with respect to xi.
Next, let us formulate the conditions of Nash equilibrium via variational inequalities
under A1.19. To this end, first recall a classical result which characterizes a solution of a
(convex) optimization problem by a variational inequality.
Proposition 1.23. Suppose that X is a closed convex set in Rn, and f is a real-valued
function of class C1 defined on X.
1. All optimal solution x∗ of the program
min
x∈X
f(x) (1.21)
satisfies the following variational inequality:
〈 ∇f(x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. (1.22)
2. If f is convex on X, then all point x∗ in X satisfying (1.22) is an optimal solution of the
program (1.21).
Proof. See Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [49, Chapter 1, Proposition 5.1] for statement 1,
and [49, Chapter 1, Proposition 5.2] for statement 2.
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The following theorem characterizes a Nash equilibrium in an atomic congestion game
with splittable stocks by a family of variational inequalities.
Theorem 1.24. Suppose that in an atomic congestion game with splittable stocks Γd(G,N ,m,P),
A1.19 holds.
1. If a system configuration f∗ ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium, then f∗ satisfies the following
variational inequality: 〈
cˆ (f∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ F. (1.23)
Conversely, if, for all player i and for all fixed f−i ∈ F−i, ui (f i , f−i) is convex with
respect to f i, then all f∗ ∈ F satisfying (1.23) is a Nash equilibrium.
2. If a system flow x∗ ∈ Fl is induced by a Nash equilibrium, then x∗ satisfies the following
variational inequality: 〈
lˆ (x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ Fl. (1.24)
Conversely, if, for all player i and for all fixed x−i ∈ F−il , vi
(
xi , x−i
)
is convex with
respect to xi, then all x∗ satisfying (1.24) is induced by a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Only statement 1 will be proved. Statement 2 can be proved in a similar way.
According to Proposition 1.23, on the one hand, if f∗i is an optimal solution of (1.18),
then 〈
cˆi (f∗i, f∗−i) , f i − f∗i 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f i ∈ F i; (1.25)
on the other hand, if ui
(
f i , f∗−i
)
is convex with respect to f i, then all f∗i ∈ F i satisfying
(1.23) is an optimal solution of (1.18).
It remains to show that (1.25) is equivalent to (1.23).
On the one hand, if (1.25) is true for all i, then (1.23) follows immediately; on the other
hand, if (1.23) is true, one can take a specific configuration f ∈ F such that f j = f∗j for all
j 6= i to obtain (1.25) for player i.
Remark 1.25. Variational inequalities were used by Haurie and Marcotte [36] to charac-
terize the Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games with splittable stocks.
Nash equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
The formulation of Nash equilibria via variational inequalities is essential to study their
existence and uniqueness.
Let us first recall the definition of a monotone map, then give some classical results on
the existence and the uniqueness of solutions of variational inequalities.
Definition 1.26. Suppose that X is a subset of Rn and F is a map defined on X to Rn.
Map F is monotone on X if〈
F(x)− F(y) , x− y 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ X, ∀ y ∈ X;
Map F is strictly monotone on X if〈
F(x)− F(y) , x− y 〉 > 0, ∀ x ∈ X, ∀ y ∈ X, x 6= y.
Theorem 1.27. Let X be a nonempty, compact, and convex set in Rn. Suppose that F is a
continuous map defined on X to Rn. Then, there exists x∗ ∈ X which satisfies the following
variational inequality:
〈 F(x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. (1.26)
If F is strictly monotone on X, then the solution of variational inequality (1.26) is unique.
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Proof. For the existence, see Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [49, Chapter 1, Theorem 3.1].
For the uniqueness under the assumption that F is strictly monotone on X, suppose that
x1 and x2 in X are two solutions of variational inequality (1.26), then〈
F(x1) , x2 − x1
〉 ≥ 0, 〈F(x2) , x1 − x2 〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ 〈F(x1)− F(x2) , x1 − x2 〉 ≤ 0,
so that x1 = x2.
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.27.
Theorem 1.28. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), under A1.19, if, for all player i and for all profile
f−i ∈ F−i (resp. x−i ∈ F−il ), ui(f i, f−i) (resp. vi(xi, x−i)) is convex with respect to f i
(resp. xi), then the game admits a Nash equilibrium.
If lˆ (x) is strictly monotone, then the flow induced by the Nash equilibria is unique.
Proof. Under A1.19, variational inequality (1.23) admits a solution f∗ in F . According to
Theorem 1.24, if, for all i and all f−i ∈ F−i, ui(f i, f−i) is convex with respect to f i, then f∗
is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
If lˆ (x) is strictly monotone, then the variational inequality (1.23) admits only one solu-
tion. According to Theorem 1.24, all flows induced by a Nash equilibrium of the game is a
solution of (1.23). Consequently, the flow induced by the Nash equilibria is unique.
Naturally, one would like to know when ui(f i, f−i) (resp. vi(xi, x−i)) is convex with
respect to f i (resp. xi). Here are two examples.
Lemma 1.29. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), under A1.19, if, for all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la
is nondecreasing and convex on U , then vi(xi, x−i) is convex with respect to xi for all fixed
x−i ∈ F−i.
Proof. Recall that ∇ivi(xi, x−i) stands for the gradient of vi(xi, x−i) with respect to xi, i.e.
∇ivi(x) =
(
la(xa) + xial′a(xa)
)
a∈A .
In order to show that vi(xi, x−i) is convex with respect to xi, it is enough to show that
vi(yi, x−i) ≥ vi(xi, x−i) + 〈∇ivi(xi, x−i), yi − xi 〉, ∀ xi, yi ∈ F i. (1.27)
For all arc a, la is convex and nondecreasing. This implies
la(yia + x−ia ) ≥ la(xia + x−ia ) + (yia − xia) l′a(xia + x−ia )
⇒ yia la(yia + x−ia ) ≥ yia la(xa) + yia (yia − xia) l′a(xa)
≥ yia la(xa) + xia (yia − xia) l′a(xa)
= xia la(xa) + (yia − xia)
[
la(xa) + xia l′a(xa)
]
.
⇒
∑
a∈A
yia la(yia + x−ia ) ≥
∑
a∈A
xia la(xa) +
∑
a∈A
(yia − xia)
[
la(xa) + xia l′a(xa)
]
,
which is simply a reformulation of (1.27).
Lemma 1.30. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), if, for all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is of class C2
on U , and
2 l′a(x) + y l′′a(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ U ∩ R+, ∀ y ∈ [0, x],
then vi(xi, x−i) is convex with respect to xi for all fixed x−i ∈ F−i.
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Proof. If the conditions in the theorem hold, then the Hessien matrix of vi(xi, x−i), as a
function of xi, is a diagonal matrix, and the element corresponding to arc a is 2 l′ia (xa) +
xia l
′′i(xa) ≥ 0. Consequently, vi(xi, x−i) is convex with respect to xi.
Theorem 1.28 and Lemmas 1.29 and 1.30 entail immediately the following theorems.
Theorem 1.31. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), under A1.19, if, for all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la
is nondecreasing and convex on U , then the game admits a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1.32. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), if the conditions in Lemma 1.30 hold, then the game
admits a Nash equilibrium.
Next, one would like to find the sufficient conditions for lˆ to be strictly monotone. Here
is a particular case.
Theorem 1.33. In Γd(G,N ,m,P), if, for all a ∈ A, la(s) = ba s + ca for s ∈ U with
ba ≥ 0 and ca ≥ 0, and there exists aˆ ∈ A such that baˆ > 0, then the system flow induced by
the Nash equilibria is unique.
Proof. For all a ∈ A, lˆia(x) = ba(ξa + xia) + ca.
Let x and x′ be two distinct points in Fl. Then,〈
lˆ (x)− lˆ (x′) , x− x′ 〉 = ∑
a∈A
∑
i∈N
(
ba(ξa + xia)− ba(ξ′a + x′ia)
)
(xia − x′ia)
=
∑
a∈A
ba
[
(ξa − ξ′a)
∑
i∈N
(xia − x′ia) +
∑
i∈N
(xia − x′ia)2
]
=
∑
a∈A
ba
[
(ξa − ξ′a)2 +
∑
i∈N
(xia − x′ia)2
]
> 0.
The last inequality is due to the assumption that there exists aˆ ∈ A such that baˆ > 0.
The conclusion follows from Theorem 1.28.
Remark 1.34. If, for all a ∈ A, la(s) = ba s + ca for s ∈ U with ba ≥ 0 and ca ≥ 0,
game Γd(G,N ,m,P) is a potential game in the sense of Monder and Shapley. A potential
function is
P (x) = 12
∑
a∈A
ba
(
ξ2a +
∑
i∈N
xi2a
)
+
∑
a∈A
caξa.
Indeed, player i’s cost function is
vi(xi , x−i ) =
∑
a∈A
xia (baξa + ca) =
∑
a∈A
bax
i
a
2 + (
∑
a∈A
bax
−i
a + ca)xia, xi ∈ F il , x−i ∈ F−il ,
where x−ia =
∑
j∈N\{i} xia.
One can verify that, for all xi and yi in F il and all x−i in F−il ,
vi(xi,x−i)− vi
(
yi,x−i
)
= P (xi,x−i)− P (yi,x−i)
=
∑
a∈A
ba(xia
2 − yia2) +
∑
a∈A
(bax−ia + ca)(xia − yia).
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Remark 1.35. In the general case where the arc cost functions are not affine, or the players
have specific costs, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed. Nevertheless,
Orda et al. [66] showed that, if the network is composed of two vertices connected by parallel
arcs or if the atomic players are symmetric, i.e. if they have interchangeable stocks, the
equilibrium is unique under much less stringent conditions on the convexity of the arc cost
functions. Richman and Shimkin [71] and Bhaskar et al. [10] extended, respectively, the
result (on parallel networks) of [66] to nearly parallel networks (a notion introduced by
Milchtaich [61]), and to generalized parallel networks. Altman et al. [3] proved the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium for a specific class of arc cost functions.
1.3.4 Nonatomic congestion games
Model
A nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P) (where the subscript n stands for “nonatomic”)
is specified by the following elements.
– G = (V,A, l), a directed finite graph equipped with a per-unit cost function la for each
arc a ∈ A.
– N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, the finite set of populations of nonatomic players. Population i
is described by a real interval Ii endowed with Lebesgue measure λ. Each player in
population i is specified by a point in Ii. The players in the same population are
identical and anonymous.
– m = (mi)i∈N , where mi = λ(Ii) is the total weight of population i.
– P = ∏i∈N P i, where P i ∈ 2A is the set of elementary paths from vertex oi to vertex
di, which are, respectively, the origin and the destination of population i.
A (pure) strategy of a player in population i is a path in P i. A (pure) strategy profile
of population i is described by a measurable map θi defined from interval Ii to P i such that
player t ∈ Ii takes path θi(t) ∈ P i. Map θi induces a configuration f i = (f ip)p∈P i , where
f ip = λ(θ−i(p)) is the total weight of the players in population i choosing path p. Since
the players in population i are identical and anonymous, the configuration f i characterizes
the strategy profile θi in the sense that all the profiles inducing the same configuration are
equivalent. From now on, strategy profile of population i means its configuration.
One notices immediately the similarity between the configuration of a population in a
nonatomic game and that of a player in an atomic game with splittable stocks. Even though a
population and an atomic player with splittable stocks have strategically different objectives,
both have the same kind of behavior, namely, distributing the stock on available paths.
The flow xi = Dif i of population i is defined in the same way. Its set of feasible
configurations F i, its set of feasible flows F il , the system configuration f , the system flow
x, the set of feasible system configurations F , the set of feasible system flows Fl and the
aggregate flow ξ are all defined as their counterparts in §1.3.3. Population i’s flow still
does not characterize its strategy profile. The cost for a player to take path p is cp(f) =∑
a∈p la(ξa). The vector of the costs of the paths available to population i is defined by ci(f),
the vector of system path costs c(f), the vector of arc costs l(x) and the vector of system
arc costs l (x) are defined in the same way as their counterparts in §1.3.3.
Wardrop equilibrium: definition and characterizations
At an equilibrium of a nonatomic congestion game, no player has incentive to change
her path unilaterally. In other words, the cost of a path chosen by a player is lower than or
1.3. Network congestion 37
equal to the cost of any other path that she could have chosen, where the cost of the first
path is in the actual configuration, while the cost of the second path is in the configuration
after the deviation. However, the fact that a player of measure zero change her path does
not change the system configuration. One deduces that a path used by a nonatomic player
at an equilibrium has a cost lower than or equal to any other path between the same pair of
origin and destination. This result was first formulated by Wardrop [94] (cf. §1.2.3).
Definition 1.36. In Γn(G,N ,m,P), a system configuration f is a Wardrop equilibrium if,
for all population i and all path p ∈ P i,
if f ip > 0, then cp(f) ≤ cq(f) for all q ∈ P i. (1.28)
Similar to a Nash equilibrium in an atomic game with splittable stocks, a Wardrop
equilibrium in a nonatomic game is also characterized by a variational inequality, but for a
different reason. Recall that variational inequalities (1.23) and (1.24) are obtained as first
order conditions of some nonlinear programs. On the contrary, the variational inequality
characterizing a Wardrop equilibrium is deduced from its definition (1.28). This is shown by
the proof of the following theorem which extends Theorem 1.5.
Theorem 1.37. In Γn(G,N ,m,P),
1. a system configuration f∗ ∈ F is a Wardrop equilibrium if, and only if, it satisfies the
following variational inequality:〈
c(f∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f ∈ F ; (1.29)
2. a system flow x∗ ∈ Fl is induced by a Wardrop equilibrium if, and only if, it satisfies the
following variational inequality:〈
l (x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ Fl. (1.30)
Proof. 1. Define µi = minp∈Pi cip(f∗). Then,∑
p∈Pi
(
cp(f∗)− µi
) (
f ip − f∗ip
)
=
∑
p∈Pi
cp(f∗)
(
f ip − f∗ip
)− µi ∑
p∈Pi
(
f ip − f∗ip
)
=
∑
p∈Pi
cp(f∗)
(
f ip − f∗ip
)− µi(mi −mi)
=
〈
cp(f∗), f i − f∗i
〉
,
which implies that (1.29) is equivalent to∑
p∈Pi
(
cp(f∗)− µi
) (
f ip − f∗ip
) ≥ 0. (1.31)
It remains to show the equivalence between (1.31) and (1.28).
(1.28) ⇒ (1.31): According to (1.28),
(
cp(f∗)− µi
) (
f ip − f∗ip
)
=
{(
cp(f∗)− µi
)
f ip ≥ 0, if f∗ip = 0,
0, if f∗ip > 0,
and (1.31) is satisfied.
38 Chapter 1. Network congestion games: models and properties
(1.31) ⇒ (1.28): Define an auxiliary configuration f i of player i as follows:
f ip =
{
0, if cp(f∗) > µi,
mi/κi, if cp(f∗) = µi,
where κi =
∣∣{ p ∈ P i ∣∣ cip(f∗) = µi }∣∣ is the number of the paths in P i which have minimal
cost at f∗. By taking this f i in (1.31), one has∑
p∈Pi: cip(f∗)>µi
(
cip(f∗ )− µi
) (−f∗ip ) ≥ 0,
which implies that f∗ip can only be zero if cip(f∗) > µi, then (1.28) follows.
2. Suppose that a system flow x∗ is induced by a Wardrop equilibrium f∗, i.e. x∗ = Df∗.
According to statement 1, f∗ satisfies (1.29).
For x ∈ Fl, there exists f in F such that x = Df . Then, according to (1.29) and (1.15),〈
c(f∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ 〈DT l (x∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0
⇒ 〈 l (x∗) , Df −Df∗ 〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ 〈 l (x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0.
Conversely, suppose that x∗ ∈ Fl satisfies (1.30). First, there exists f∗ (not necessarily
unique) in F such that x∗ = Df∗. For f ∈ F and x = Df , according to (1.30),〈
l (x∗) , x− x∗ 〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ 〈 l (x∗) , Df −Df∗ 〉 ≥ 0
⇒ 〈DT l (x∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0 ⇒ 〈 c (f∗) , f − f∗ 〉 ≥ 0.
Thus, according to statement 1, f∗ is a Wardrop equilibrium.
Remark 1.38. Smith [85] and Dafermos [27] characterized a Wardrop equilibrium via a
variational inequality. Aashtiani and Magnanti [1] identified a Wardrop equilibrium with a
solution of a nonlinear complementarity problem.
In addition to the characterization via a variational inequality, a Wardrop equilibrium can
be identified with an optimal solution of a convex program under A1.19, where a potential
function is to be minimized. This formulation first appeared in Beckmann et al. [9].
Theorem 1.39. In Γn(G,N ,m,P) under A1.19, a potential function P of game Γn is
defined on Fl by
P (x) =
∑
a∈A
∫ ξa
0
la(s) ds. (1.32)
1. Each optimal solution of the nonlinear program
min
x∈Fl
P (x) (1.33)
is a system flow induced by a Wardrop equilibrium.
2. If, for all arc a, the cost function la is weakly monotone on U , then all Wardrop equilibrium
induces a system flow in Fl which is an optimal solution of nonlinear program (1.33).
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Proof. According to the definition of potential function P , its gradient with respect to x is
the vector of system arc costs l(x).
Besides, if, for all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is monotone on U , then l (x) is a
monotone map on Fl. Indeed, given x and y in Fl,〈
l (x)− l (y) , x− y 〉 = ∑
a∈A
∑
i∈N
(
l(xa)− l(ya)
)
(xia − yia)
=
∑
a∈A
(
l(xa)− l(ya )
)
(xa − ya) ≥ 0.
Consequently, P (x) is convex on Fl.
The proof can be achieved by applying Theorems 1.23 and 1.37.
Remark 1.40. If the characterization of a Wardrop equilibrium via variational inequalities
extends, without difficulty, to the case where the populations have specific costs, this is not
the case for its characterization by the minimum of a potential function. In particular, such
a function whose gradient is l (x) does not always exist.
Recall that the potential function in a Rosenthal game has form (1.2), which is simply
a discreet version of (1.32). Indeed, in order that a potential function exists in an atomic
game with unsplittable stocks, the players must have the same weight and the same arc cost
functions. The counterpart of the first condition is automatically satisfied in a nonatomic
game because the stocks are continuous. The counterpart of the second condition is simply
that the populations have the same per-unit cost functions.
As in Rosenthal games, if the cost functions of different populations for a same arc
are identical up to an additive constant, then a potential function always exists (cf. Re-
mark 1.11).
Finally, it should be stressed that the potential function in this nonatomic congestion
game (thus with a continuum of players) does not have the property (1.1) as in a potential
game with N players in the sense of Monderer and Shapley.
Wardrop equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
In the first place, the existence and the uniqueness of Wardrop equilibria can be studied
with the help of its formulation via a variational inequality.
Theorem 1.41. All nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P) admits a Wardrop equilib-
rium.
If the system vector of arc costs l is strictly monotone on Fl, then the flow induced by
the Wardrop equilibria is unique.
Proof. Since Fl is nonempty, compact and convex, and l (x) is continuous on Fl, Theo-
rem 1.27 implies that variational inequality (1.30) admits a solution which is a flow induced
by a Wardrop equilibrium according to Theorem 1.37. The uniqueness of the flow induced by
the Wardrop equilibria under the assumption that l is strictly monotone follows immediately
from Theorem 1.27.
If a potential function exists in a nonatomic congestion game, one can show the existence
and the uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium by its characterization as a minimum of the
potential function. Let us begin by the following general result (Mangasarian [52]).
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Lemma 1.42. Suppose that X is a convex set in Rn, and Ω is a neighborhood of X. Let f
be a real-valued function defined on Ω, which is convex and of class C2. If X¯ is the set of
optimal solutions of the program minx∈X f(x), then the gradient ∇f(x) is constant on X¯.
Theorem 1.43. The game Γn(G,N ,m,P) admits a Wardrop equilibrium.
Under A1.19, if, for all a ∈ A, the cost function la is weakly monotone on U , then the
Wardrop equilibrium is unique in Γn(G,N ,m,P), in the sense that the cost for a population i
is the same at all equilibria.
If, in addition, for all a ∈ A, the monotonicity of la is strict, then the system flow induced
by the Wardrop equilibria is unique.
Proof. Theorem 1.39 states that all minimum of the potential function P on Fl is induced by
a Wardrop equilibrium. But, P is continuous on the convex compact set Fl, thus a minimum
exists.
In the proof of Theorem 1.39, one has seen that P is convex in x on Fl, if la is monotone
on U for all a ∈ A. A1.19 assures that P is of class C2 on a neighborhood V of Fl. Then,
Lemma 1.42 implies that l, the gradient of P , is constant on the set of its minima. In other
words, if x and x′ are two system flows induced by two Wardrop equilibria, the cost for a
nonatomic player of population i is the same at x and at x′.
If the monotonicity of la is strict for all a, then, for two different system flows x and y
in Fl, 〈
l (x)− l (y) , x− y 〉 = ∑
a∈A
(
l(xa)− l(ya)
)
(xa − ya) > 0,
hence l is strictly monotone. Therefore, P is strictly convex on convex compact set Fl, hence
its minimum is unique there.
Remark 1.44. The result on the uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium in Theorem 1.43
does not hold when the populations have specific costs. Nevertheless, Milchtaich [61] showed
that the uniqueness of populations’ costs at Wardrop equilibria is guaranteed under some
weak convexity and monotonicity conditions if the network has a nearly parallel structure
(cf. Remark 1.35).
1.3.5 Composite congestion games
After the introduction of atomic games with splittable stocks and nonatomic games,
their similarity can be observed in several aspects. In particular, the equilibria in the two
classes of games are characterized by variational inequalities. Only, marginal path or arc
costs are used for atomic players with splittable stocks, while paths or arc costs are used
for nonatomic players. Based on this idea, one can define a more general class of games,
called composite congestion games, which contains the two previous classes. By composite,
one means that atomic players with splittable stocks and nonatomic players coexist while
their strategic behaviors are different (Nash and Wardrop, respectively). Composite games
were first studied by Harker [32] then by Boulogne et al. [15]. They called such games mixed
games (This terminology is avoided here because it can be confused with the mixed extension
of a game).
Formally, a composite congestion game Γc
(
G,N ∪ M, {mi}i∈N ∪ {µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪
{P j}j∈M
)
(where the subscript c stands for “composite”) is specified by the following ele-
ments.
– G = (V,A, l), a directed finite graph equipped with a cost function la for all arc a ∈ A.
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– N , a set of N atomic players with splittable stocks; M, a set of M populations of
nonatomic players.
– mi, the weight of atomic player i; µi, the total weight of population j.
– P i ∈ 2A, the set of elementary paths connecting vertex oi to vertex di, where oi and di
are, respectively, the origin and the destination of atomic player i; P j ∈ 2A, the set of
elementary paths connecting vertex oj to vertex dj , where oj and dj are, respectively,
the origin and the destination of population j.
Composite equilibrium
Subscripts d and n will be added to distinguish the atomic players with splittable stocks
from the populations when it is necessary. Denote the configuration of the atomic players
by fd = (f i)i∈N , the configuration of the populations by fn = (f j)j∈M, the set of feasible
configurations for the atomic players by Fd, and the set of feasible configurations for the
populations by Fn. Notice that, the system configuration is f =
(
fd, fn
)
, and the set of
feasible system configurations is F = Fd×Fn. The system flow and the corresponding set of
feasible flows are defined in a similar way. The marginal path or arc cost functions for the
atomic players, their cost functions in the game, and the path and arc cost functions for the
populations are also defined as in §1.3.3 and §1.3.4.
The definition of an equilibrium, its characterization via variational inequalities, and the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria can be obtained as a simple generalization of
the results in two previous sections. Only the results are collected here without proof.
Definition 1.45. In Γc
(
G,N ∪ M, {mi}i∈N ∪ {µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪ {P j}j∈M
)
, a system
configuration f∗ in F is a composite equilibrium if the following two conditions are satisfied.
(1.i) For all player i, f∗i ∈ F i is an optimal solution of the program minf i∈F i ui
(
f i , f∗−i
)
.
(1.ii) For all population j and all path p ∈ P j ,
if f∗jp > 0, then cp(f∗) ≤ cq(f∗) for all q ∈ P j .
A system flow x∗ ∈ Fl is induced by a composite equilibrium f∗ if the two conditions
below are satisfied:
(2.i) For all player i, x∗i ∈ F il is an optimal solution of the program minxi∈F il v
i
(
xi , x∗−i
)
.
(2.ii) For all population j and all path p ∈ P j ,
if f∗jp > 0, then cp(f∗) ≤ cq(f∗) for all q ∈ P j .
Theorem 1.46. Suppose that, in a composite congestion game Γc
(
G,N ∪M, {mi}i∈N ∪
{µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪ {P j}j∈M
)
, A1.19 holds.
1. If a system configuration f∗ =
(
f∗d , f∗n
) ∈ F is a composite equilibrium, then f∗ satisfies
the following variational inequality:〈
cˆd (f∗) , fd − f∗d
〉
+
〈
cn(f∗) , fn − f∗n
〉 ≥ 0, ∀ f = (fd, fn) ∈ F. (1.34)
If, for all atomic player i, for all profile f−i ∈ F−i = ∏k∈N∪M\{i} F k, ui (f i , f−i) is
convex with respect to f i, then all system configuration f∗ satisfying variational inequality
(1.34) is a composite equilibrium.
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2. If a system flow x∗ =
(
x∗d,x∗n
) ∈ Fl is induced by a composite equilibrium, then x∗ satisfies
the following variational inequality:〈
lˆd(x∗) , xd − x∗d
〉
+
〈
ln(x∗) , xn − x∗n
〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x = (xd,xn) ∈ Fl, (1.35)
If, for all atomic player i and for all profile x−i ∈ F−il =
∏
k∈N∪M\{i} F kl , vi
(
xi , x−i
)
is convex with respect to xi, then all system flow x∗ satisfying variational inequality (1.35)
is induced by a composite equilibrium.
Theorem 1.47. In Γc
(
G,N ∪M, {mi}i∈N ∪{µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪{P j}j∈M
)
under A1.18, if,
for all atomic player i and for all f−i ∈ F−i (resp. x−i ∈ F−il ), ui(f i, f−i) (resp. vi(xi, x−i))
is convex with respect to f i (resp. xi), then the game admits a composite equilibrium.
If the map
(
lˆd(x), ln(x)
)
is strictly monotone in x, then the flow induced by the composite
equilibria is unique.
Existence of a potential function in composite games
The analogy between the variational inequalities characterizing, respectively, a Wardrop
equilibrium, a Nash equilibrium and a composite equilibrium (cf. Theorems 1.37, 1.24 and
1.46) implies that a Nash equilibrium (resp. a composite equilibrium) in an atomic game with
splittable stocks (resp. a composite game) could be identified with a Wardrop equilibrium
in a nonatomic game, only by replacing each atomic player i by a population of nonatomic
players holding the same stocks and, in addition, by imposing on them a per-unit cost cˆia for
each arc a, which was the marginal cost of arc a for the replaced player i. However, once
such a virtual nonatomic game is defined, the populations have, in general, specific costs
(because of the term xial′a in cˆia). In consequence, a potential function does not necessarily
exist except in some particular cases, for example, when the paths are all composed of a
single arc with an affine cost function.
In the particular case where a potential function exists, its minima are Wardrop equilibria
of the virtual nonatomic game. Nevertheless, in order that they are Nash or composite
equilibria in the initial atomic or composite game, the cost function vi(x) for each atomic
player i should also be convex with respect to her flow xi (cf. (1.24) and (1.46)). This is
true in the case where the paths are all composed of a single arc with an affine cost function.
1.3.6 Social optimum
In the four previous sections, the congestion problem is studied from the angle of the
players’ strategic behaviors. Now, the social cost, which is the sum of the costs to all the
players, will be considered, and its minimal level will be studied.
Definition 1.48. The social cost in Γc
(
G,N ∪M, {mi}i∈N ∪{µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪{P j}j∈M
)
is defined by
β (f) =
〈
c(f) , f
〉
=
∑
i∈N∪M
∑
p∈Pi
f ip cp(f) (1.36)
as a function of the system configuration f ∈ F or, equivalently, by
Cs (x) =
〈
l(ξ) , ξ
〉
=
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξ) (1.37)
as a function of the system flow x ∈ Fl.
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Definition 1.49. In Γc
(
G,N ∪ M, {mi}i∈N ∪ {µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N ∪ {P j}j∈M
)
, a system
configuration f ∈ F (resp. a system flow x ∈ Fl) is a social optimum if it is an optimal
solution of the nonlinear program
min
f∈F
β (f), (1.38)
(resp. min
x∈Fl
Cs (x).) (1.39)
Theorem 1.50. All composite congestion game Γc
(
G,N∪M, {mi}i∈N∪{µj}j∈M, {P i}i∈N∪
{P j}j∈M
)
admits a social optimum. In addition, the optimal social cost is unique.
Proof. The continuous function β (resp. Cs) attains its global minimum in the nonempty
and compact set F (resp. Fl).
Unlike the existence of the social optimum which requires only the continuity of the cost
functions, its uniqueness is not always guaranteed, except in some particular cases.
1.4 Comparisons
1.4.1 Approximation and convergence
It is shown that, when there are a great number of atomic players such that each individ-
ual has only a negligible influence on the others, they can be approximated by a continuum
of nonatomic players, each of whom has measure zero. Parallel results are also obtained in
atomic and nonatomic models. Let us return to two themes: the formulation of an equilib-
rium in terms of variational inequalities, and the potential function.
Formulation of equilibria in terms of variational inequalities
The Nash equilibria in atomic games with splittable stocks are formulated by (1.23) and
(1.24), while the Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic games by (1.29) and (1.30). The two
formulations are nearly identical except that, in the atomic case, the marginal costs replace
the initial costs. Haurie and Marcotte [36] showed that the Nash equilibria in a sequence
of atomic games with splittable stocks converge to the Wardrop equilibrium in a nonatomic
game, if the atomic players split themselves into smaller and smaller players. To this end,
they showed that the sequence of variational inequalities corresponding to the Nash equilibria
of the atomic games converges to the variational inequality corresponding to the Wardrop
equilibrium of the nonatomic game. Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2) generalized this result to
composite games, by allowing, in addition, the players to split themselves into small players
of different sizes.
Potential functions in Rosenthal games and nonatomic games
The potential function exists in (discreet) Rosenthal games and in (continuous) nonatomic
games, under the condition that the players have the same arc cost functions and, further-
more, they have the same weight in the first case. The potential functions’ forms are similar
in the two cases: it is a partial sum (1.2) in the discreet case and an integral (1.4) in the
continuous case. This is not a coincidence. Sandholm [79] showed that such a nonatomic
game or, more generally, a population game, is indeed the limit of a sequence of potential
games with a finite number of players in the sense of Monderer and Shapley.
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1.4.2 Inefficiency of the equilibria and price of anarchy
Pigou’s example (cf. §1.2.4) illustrates the probable gap between the social cost at
(Nash, Wardrop, composite) equilibria and the optimal social cost. Koutsoupias and Pa-
padimitriou [50] first suggested to evaluate the inefficiency of equilibria by the price of
anarchy [67], defined as the ratio between the social cost of the worst equilibrium and the
optimal social cost.
For atomic games with unsplittable stocks, Christocoulou and Koutsoupias [19] showed
that, in a Rosenthal congestion game with N players, the upper bound of the price of anarchy
is 2.5 if the arc cost functions are affine, and that this bound is improved to 5N−22N+1 if the
players have the same strategy set. Awerbuch et al. [8] found that the upper bound is 2.618
in the case where the cost functions are affine but the players are weighted. Both [19] and
[8] also treated the case where the cost functions are polynomial. Since then, a large number
of studies have followed and improvements on the bounds have been made.
Let us focus on the price of anarchy in nonatomic games and atomic games with splittable
stocks.
Price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
Roughgarden and Tardos [78] were the first to study the price of anarchy in nonatomic
congestion games, followed by a series of articles, for example, Roughgarden [75] and Correa
et al. [22, 23]. Some important results and proof sketches are presented here.
Definition 1.51. The price of anarchy of a nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P) is
defined by
ρ (Γn) =
β(f∗)
β(f˜)
= Cs(x
∗)
Cs(x˜)
,
where f∗ is the Wardrop equilibrium at which the social cost is the highest (among all the
Wardrop equilibria), f˜ the optimal configuration in terms of the social cost, x∗ and x˜ the
flows induced by, respectively, f∗ and f˜ .
Recall that β(f) and Cs(x) are the social cost functions defined by (1.36) and (1.37).
Lemma 1.52. [78] Suppose that, in a nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P) under
A1.19, for each arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is nondecreasing on U , and
x la(x) ≤M
∫ x
0
la(s)ds, ∀x ∈ R+ ∩ U.
Then, ρ (Γn), the price of anarchy of the game, satisfies that ρ (Γn) ≤M .
Proof. Suppose that x∗ is the flow induced by a Wardrop equilibrium, x is a feasible flow,
and ξ∗ and ξ are the aggregate flow induced by, respectively, x∗ and x. Then,
Cs(x∗) =
∑
a∈A
ξ∗ala(ξ∗a) ≤
∑
a∈A
M
∫ ξ∗a
0
la(s)ds = M P (x∗) ≤M P (x) ≤MCs(x).
Here, P is the potential function introduced in (1.32). The last inequality follows from
the fact that
∫ x
0 la(s)ds ≤ x la(x), because la is nondecreasing. Finally, let x be the social
optimum x˜.
The following parameter is needed.
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Definition 1.53. [22, 75] Given a family of functions L, the Pigou’s bound of L is defined
by
α (L) = sup
l∈L
sup
x,s≥0
s l(s)
x l(x) + (s− x) c(s) .
First, one has the following result which bounds the price of anarchy [22, 75].
Theorem 1.54. Given a family of functions L, suppose that, in a nonatomic congestion
game Γn(G,N ,m,P), the arc cost functions are nondecreasing and in L. Then, ρ (Γn), the
price of anarchy of the game, satisfies that ρ (Γn) ≤ α(L).
Proof. Suppose that ξ∗ is the aggregated flow induced by the Wardrop equilibrium x∗, and
ξ the aggregate flow induced by a feasible x. Then,
Cs(x∗) =
∑
a∈A
ξ∗a la(ξ∗a) ≥
[ 1
α(L)
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξa)
]
+
∑
a∈A
(ξ∗a − ξa) la(ξa) ≥
Cs(x)
α(L) ,
where the first inequality is due to the definition of α(L), and the second is due to variational
inequality (1.30). Finally, let x be the social optimum x˜.
A corollary of Theorem 1.54 (cf. Roughgarden and Tardos [78, Theorem 4.5]) provides
the least upper bound of the price of anarchy in a nonatomic congestion game with affine
arc cost functions.
Theorem 1.55. Suppose that, in a nonatomic congestion game Γn =
〈
G,N ,m,P〉, the arc
cost functions are affine: for all arc a in A, la(s) = ζas + θa, where ζa ≥ 0, θa ≥ 0. Then,
ρ (Γn), the price of anarchy of the game, satisfies that ρ (Γn) ≤ 4/3.
Proof. Let us cite a proof by Correa et al. [23, 24] which is extremely concise and elegant.
0 ξ∗aξa
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Figure 1.6
Let x∗ be the Wardrop equilibrium, and ξ∗ the aggregate flow induced by x∗. Let ξ be
the aggregate flow induced by a feasible flow x. Then, according to (1.30),
Cs(x∗) =
∑
a∈A
ξ∗a la(ξ∗a) ≤
∑
a∈A
ξ∗a la(ξa)
=
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξa) +
∑
a∈A
(ξ∗a − ξa) la(ξa) ≤
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξa) +
∑
a∈A:ξ∗a>ξa
(ξ∗a − ξa) la(ξa)
≤
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξa) +
1
4
∑
a∈A
ξ∗a l
∗
a(ξ∗a),
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where the last inequality is due to fact that the gray part in Figure 1.6 occupies at most 1/4
of the area of the large rectangle. Finally, let x be the social optimum x˜.
On the contrary, if the arc cost functions in a nonatomic game are nonlinear but still
nondecreasing and of class C∞, Roughgarden and Tardos [78, p.247 §3] showed that the
price of anarchy can be probably infinite. Explicitly, they used an example similar to that
of Pigou, by replacing the cost function of the lower arc by xp and letting p tend to +∞.
Nevertheless, even though the price of anarchy can no longer be bounded by a numerical
value in this case, the following theorem [78, Theorem 3.1] shows that the social cost at
an equilibrium of a nonatomic game does not exceed the social cost at any configuration in
another game where the total weight of each population is doubled.
Theorem 1.56. Suppose that, in a nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P), the arc
cost functions are nondecreasing on a neighborhood U ′ of interval [0, 2M ]. Let x∗ be the
flow induced by the Wardrop equilibrium of Γn. Let x be a feasible flow in the nonatomic
congestion game Γ′n(G,N ,2m,P) where the size of each population is doubled with respect
to Γn. Then,
Cs(x∗) ≤ Cs(x).
Proof. Let us still cite the proof of Correa et al. [23, 24] which is in the same esprit as that
of Theorem 1.55.
For all a ∈ A, because la is nondecreasing on U ′, one has, for all za, ya ∈ U ′ ∩ R+,
ya la(za) ≤ max{za la(za), ya la(ya)} ≤ za la(za) + ya la(ya).
In this inequality, let us take z = ξ∗, the aggregate flow induced by x∗, and y = ξ, the
aggregate flow induced by x. Notice that x/2 is a feasible system aggregate flow in game
Γn. Thus,
Cs(x∗) = 2Cs(x∗)− Cs(x∗) ≤ 2
∑
a∈A
ξa
2 la(ξ
∗
a)− Cs(x∗) =
∑
a∈A
ξa la(ξ∗a)− Cs(x∗) ≤ Cs(x).
Remark 1.57. Only those congestion games where the cost functions of strategies are
separable, i.e., the cost of a strategy is the sum of the costs of the resources used by it are
discussed so far. The price of anarchy is also studied in the nonseparable case, for example,
in Chau and Sim [18] for symmetric players, and in Perakis [69] for more general cases.
Price of anarchy in atomic games with splittable stocks and in composite games
Cominetti et al. [20] showed that the bounds of the price of anarchy in nonatomic games
cannot be extended directly to atomic games with splittable stocks. For example, in such
a game with N atomic players, if the arc cost functions are affine, the price of anarchy is
bounded by 3N+12N+2 ≤ 32 , and it tends to 32 when N tends to infinity. In particular, as long as
N > 5, 3N+12N+2 is greater than
4
3 , which is the bound in nonatomic games with affine costs [20,
Proposition 3.5]. We will return to this point in §1.4.3.
For atomic games with splittable stocks with more general cost functions, and for com-
posite games, the results are less general than in the case of nonatomic games. Harks [33]
showed that, if the network is composed of two vertices connected by parallel arcs whose
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cost functions are nondecreasing, convex and of class C1, the price of anarchy does not ex-
ceed the number of atomic players. Bhaskar et al. [11] extended this result to series parallel
networks (see Duffin[29] for a description). Roughgarden and Tardos [78], Roughgarden [76],
Cominetti et al. [20], Harks [33, 34], and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [77] obtained the
bounds of the price of anarchy for more general network topology and more general cost
functions.
Besides, the price of anarchy in an atomic game with splittable stocks or in a composite
game can be studied by comparing the social cost at Nash or composite equilibria with that
at Wardrop equilibria in a nonatomic game with the same stocks. This approach will be
developed in §1.4.3.
1.4.3 Comparison between nonatomic games and composite games
Single-commodity games
For atomic games with splittable stocks and composite games, a simple case called single-
commodity, where all the players have the same origin o, the same destination d and the same
set P of available paths, was widely studied. Some results are collected here. For the sake
of simplicity, given Γ, a single-commodity atomic game with splittable stocks or a single-
commodity composite game, its corresponding nonatomic game is the nonatomic game where
the players have the same set of stocks as in Γ.
Altman et al. [3] showed that, in a single-commodity atomic game, if, for each arc a ∈ A,
the cost function is la(x) = αaxγ , where αa > 0 and γ > 0 (γ is common for all a), then
the Nash equilibrium in this atomic game, the Wardrop equilibrium in its corresponding
nonatomic game, and the social optimum coincide.
For more general cost functions, one has the following results concerning the social cost.
Theorem 1.58. Suppose that, in a single-commodity atomic game Γd with splittable stocks,
under A1.19, the total weight of the N players is M . Then, in each of the three cases below,
the social cost at the Nash equilibrium of game Γd does not exceed the social cost at the
Wardrop equilibrium of its corresponding nonatomic game.
1. For all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is nondecreasing and convex on U . All the
players have the same weight, namely, M/N .
2. Path P contains a finite number of parallel arcs, i.e, P = A. For all arc a, the cost
function of la is nondecreasing on U , and function s 7→ s la(s) is convex on U .
3. The network is series parallel. For all arc a ∈ A, the cost function la is nondecreasing
and convex on U .
Proof. 1. See Cominetti et al. [20, Corollaire 4.1].
2. See Hayrapetyan et al. [37, Theorem 2.3].
3. See Bhaskar et al. [11, Theorem 1].
The three results in Theorem 1.58 compare the Nash equilibrium and the Wardrop equi-
librium in terms of the social cost. The following result, obtained by Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2)
in the framework of composite games, shows that not only the social cost, but also the per-
unit cost of each atomic player and the nonatomic players’ cost at the composite equilibrium
are reduced with respect to the Wardrop equilibrium cost.
Theorem 1.59. Suppose that, in a composite game Γc under A1.19, N atomic players with
splittable stocks of total weightm and a population of nonatomic players of total weight µ have
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all origin o, destination d and a set A of parallel arcs connecting o to d as available paths.
If, for all arc a, the cost function la is strictly increasing and convex on a neighborhood of
[0,m+µ], the social cost at the composite equilibrium of Γc, the per-unit cost of each atomic
player and the common cost to the nonatomic players do not exceed the Wardrop equilibrium
cost of the corresponding nonatomic game.
To every composite game, one can associate a nonatomic game and a one-player atomic
game with splittable stocks such that the three games have the same set of stocks. In the
one-player game, the unique outcome is the social optimum. More generally, for a set of
splittable stocks S which have origins, destinations and sets of available paths in a finite
directed graph, one can define a structure of poset (i.e. a partially ordered set) Ξ(S) on the
composite games where the set of stocks controlled by the (atomic and nonatomic) players
is S: a game Γ1 is higher than a game Γ2 if an atomic player in Γ1 represents a family of
atomic players and a mass of nonatomic players in Γ2. Therefore, the game with an atomic
player is the highest and the nonatomic game is the lowest in Ξ(S).
Theorems 1.58 and 1.59 imply that, in the single-commodity case and, in particular,
where the paths are (series-)parallel arcs, all composite game in Ξ(S) is more efficient than
the nonatomic game as far as the social cost is concerned, and it is even more efficient in
terms of individual’s cost in Theorem 1.59 (under some conditions on the arc cost functions).
These results compare the costs at the equilibrium of a composite game with the equilibrium
cost of its corresponding nonatomic game. However, one can also make the comparison
between different composite games with the same set of stocks. Wan [92] (cf. Chapter 3)
showed that, if one considers only single-commodity games in a graph composed of two
vertices connected by two parallel arcs, there is a monotonicity in terms of the social cost
in the poset Ξ(S). More precisely, the social cost at the composite equilibrium of a game is
less than that of a game lower than it in the poset.
Theorem 1.60. Suppose that G is a network composed of two vertices connected by a finite
number of parallel arcs, and all the arc cost functions are strictly increasing, convex, and
of class C1 on a neighborhood of [0,M ], where M > 0. Let Γ1 be a composite congestion
game played in G such that the total weight of the players is M . Suppose that a player i of
weight mi is replaced by a composite set of players, namely, a finite number L (probably 0)
of atomic players with splittable stocks, in addition to a (probably empty) set of nonatomic
players whose total weight is mi. In this way, game Γ1 becomes game Γ2. Then, the social
cost and the costs to all the players except i (and her replacers) at the unique equilibrium of
Γ2 are not lower than those in Γ1.
Nevertheless, the result that the social cost is reduced after each formation of coalition(s)
is no longer valid when there are more than two parallel arcs. Huang [46] provided a counter-
example where a single-commodity congestion game takes place in a network composed of
two vertices connected by three parallel arcs whose cost functions are nondecreasing, convex
and of class C1. The social cost at the equilibrium is increased when two of the three players
form a coalition.
Huang [46] gave the necessary and sufficient conditions for the social cost to be reduced
after each formation of coalition(s). His result [46, Theorem 1] is reformulated here.
Theorem 1.61. In a single-commodity atomic congestion game with splittable stocks, sup-
pose that the arc cost functions are nondecreasing, convex and of class C1. The following two
conditions are necessary and sufficient for that, after each formation of coalition(s) between
some players, the social cost at the equilibrium does not exceed the social cost before.
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(i) The network is well designed.
(ii) The are cost functions are affine.
Huang’s definition of a well designed network is omitted here. For example, he showed
that a series parallel network is well designed [46, Proposition 2].
Nevertheless, for the costs of the players not involved in coalition, whether the results in
Theorem 1.60 hold in more general networks remains a open problem.
Multi-commodity games
As soon as we leave the framework of single-commodity stocks, the impact of the compo-
sition of the players on the social cost and the individuals’ costs is even more complicated.
For example, in §1.4.2, it is shown that the price of anarchy of an atomic game with split-
table stocks in a network where the arc costs are affine can well exceed the upper bound of
the price of anarchy in nonatomic games in the same network. Here is another interesting
example cited by Cominetti et al. [20].
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Example 1.62. In Figure 1.7, the cost functions are written on the corresponding arcs.
There are two splittable stocks, each of weight one. The stock on the left has origin A,
destination B, and paths set {A→ B,A→ E → F → B}, while the stock on the right has
origin C, destination D, and path set {C → D,C → E → F → D}.
At the social optimum, all the stock on the left goes by arc AB, while all the stock on
the right goes by path C → E → F → D. The minimal social cost is 2.9.
If the two stocks are controlled by two populations of nonatomic players 1 and 2, re-
spectively, then, at the Wardrop equilibrium, 0.9 of the players of population 1 take path
A → B and 0.1 of them take path A → E → F → B, while the whole population 2 takes
path C → E → F → D. The social cost is 3.8.
Now, suppose that the stock on the right is controlled by an atomic player, while the
stock on the left is still controlled by population 1. At the composite equilibrium, the whole
population 1 takes path A → E → F → B, while the atomic player sends 0.9 of her stock
by path C → E → F → D, and the rest by arc C → D. The social cost is then 3.89, larger
than 3.8. In particular, the price of anarchy of this composite game is 3.892.9 ≈ 1.341 > 43 .
Besides, the total cost of the stock on the right is 1.9 at the Wardrop equilibrium when it
is controlled by a population, but 1.99 at the composite equilibrium when it is controlled by
an atomic player. This means that the formation of a coalition by population 2 has increased
the average cost of its members.
Cominetti et al. [20] also showed that, if the stock on the right is controlled by 94 or
more identical atomic players, then the price of anarchy in this atomic game will also exceed
50 Chapter 1. Network congestion games: models and properties
o d
x+ 10
10x+ 1
Figure 1.8
4
3 . In other words, the formation of a coalition by atomic players with splittable stocks may
produce similar effects. Altman et al. [5] also cited an example where the formation of the
coalitions by atomic players with splittable stocks reduces not only the social cost but also
the average cost of the members of each coalition.
Variation of one part of the stocks
Let S be a set of single-commodity stocks. The social optimum is attained in the one-
player game which is the highest one in the poset Ξ(S) (cf. §1.4.3). Moreover, in the
particular case where the network is composed of two vertices connected by two parallel
arcs whose cost functions are nondecreasing, convex and of class C1, the social cost increases
when one goes down in Ξ(S).
Now, suppose that the stocks in S are divided into two parts, I and II, and the composi-
tion of part II is fixed (By “the composition of the stocks”, one means that the distribution
of these stocks among the atomic and nonatomic players). We are only interested in the
total cost of part I. Let Γ1 denote the composite game played by an atomic player who
controls part I and the players who share (in a disjointed way) part II. Then, one has to
go down from Γ1 in the poset Ξ(S) so as to find the best composition of part I. Is it still
true that the total cost of part I attains its minimum when I is controlled by a single player
or, furthermore, her total cost keeps increasing while one goes down in Ξ(S)? The reply
depends on the composition of part II. Here is an example in Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2).
Example 1.63. As illustrated in Figure 1.8, a set of stocks of total weight 1 should be
sent from vertex o to vertex d by two parallel arcs. The cost function of the upper arc is
x 7→ x+ 10 and that of the lower arc is x 7→ 10x+ 1. The stocks are divided into two parts
I and II, each of weight 12 .
Let us consider two scenarios according to the composition of part II of the stocks. In
each scenario, different compositions of part I of the stocks facing the composition of part II
will be compared.
Scenario 1. Part II is controlled by a population of nonatomic players. Theorem 1.59
shows that the total cost to part I is lower when it is controlled by a single player than when
it is controlled by a population of nonatomic players.
Scenario 2. Part II is controlled by a single atomic player. If part I is controlled by a
single atomic player, her total cost at the Nash equilibrium is 4.227. If it is controlled by a
population of nonatomic players, her total cost at the composite equilibrium is 4.136, lower
than 4.227. This result is in contrast to the results for the social cost. Besides, if part I is
controlled by two atomic players, both of weight 14 , their total cost at the Nash equilibrium
is 4.125, even better than the two previous compositions. This shows that the total cost to
part I is not monotone with respect to the order in the poset Γ(S), which is still different
from the result for the social cost.
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1.5 Dynamics
So far, only static properties concerning the equilibria in congestion games have been
discussed. Now, let us turn to the dynamic issues.
1.5.1 Dynamics in atomic games with unsplittable stocks
In a Rosenthal congestion game which is also a potential game, Monderer and Shapley [62]
showed that an alternating best reply dynamics, where the players adapt their pure strategy
in turn, converges to a minimum point of the potential function, which is an equilibrium of
the game. Milchtaich [60] developed this idea.
A weighted atomic game with unsplittable stocks is reduced to a finite game. A model
of learning process is proposed by Cominetti et al. [21] for such a game, where each player’s
only information is her own payoff at each stage. Throughout the time, a player adapts her
mixed strategy according to her information. An application of this model to a Rosenthal
congestion game is discussed in detail in the same paper. In this N -player game, every
day, everyone chooses one of the M parallel paths, and her only information is her own
cost, namely, her travel time, which depends only on the number of the players choosing the
same path as her. She updates an M dimensional vector of scores, each component of which
corresponds to a different path. Then, she updates her mixed strategy in the (M−1)-simplex
according to this vector. The almost sure convergence of the dynamics to the unique rest
point is obtained under certain conditions on the path cost functions and the adaptation
mechanism.
1.5.2 Dynamics in nonatomic games
Potential game approach
Recall that, in §1.3.4, a Wardrop equilibrium is formulated as a minimum point of a
potential function (1.32). Sandholm [79] started to study a class of dynamics in nonatomic
games where a potential function exists. The existence of such a function is essential, because
it is used as a Lyapunov function for all the dynamics satisfying certain conditions. As an
example, let us take the BNN (Brown-von Neumann-Nash) dynamics as an example to cite
some principle results in [79]. They are collected in Theorem 1.64 below.
First, recall that the BNN dynamics in a nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P) is
f˙ ip = mikip − f ip
∑
q∈P i
kiq, ∀ p ∈ P i, ∀ i ∈ N , (1.40)
where, with the notation x+ = max{x, 0},
kip =
[ 1
mi
∑
q∈P i
f iqcq(f)− cp(f)
]+
,
which compares the cost of path p to the average cost of population i.
Theorem 1.64. In Γn(G,N ,m,P) under A1.19, one has
1. −P , the negative of the potential function P defined by (1.32), is a global Lyapunov
function for the BNN dynamics;
2. the Wardrop equilibria of the game coincide with the rest points of the BNN dynamics;
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3. the set of local minimum points is stable in the sense of Lyapunov;
4. all limit set ω(f) (f ∈ F ) of the BNN dynamics is a closed and connected set of Wardrop
equilibria of the game.
Proof. See the proofs of Lemma 4.1, Proposition 4.2, Proposition 4.3, Theorem 4.4 and
Theorem 4.5 in [79].
Stables game approach
Remark 1.40 states that a potential function does not always exist if the populations have
specific costs. Therefore, the dynamics for the potential games introduced earlier cannot be
applied directly in this case. Nevertheless, if the vector of system path costs (whose definition
will be given below) is a continuous and monotone map, then the game belongs to the class
of stable games introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm [40], where they studied dynamics
for this class. Before, Smith [86] had already applied this idea in a dynamics, which is called
Smith dynamics later. Smith applied it to nonatomic congestion games.
First, let us define a nonatomic game Γn(G,N ,m,P, l) by specifying the specific arc cost
functions: l = (li)i∈N , where li = (lia)a∈A is the vector of arc costs for population i, and
x 7→ lia(x) is continuous and finite on U , positive on U ∩ R+ for all a and all i. The cost of
path p for population i is denoted by cip =
∑
a∈p lia. The vector of path costs for population i
is thus ci = (cip)p∈P i , and the vector of system path costs is c = (ci)i∈N . Let the system
flow still be denoted by x, and the system configuration by f . Then, l is a map defined from
Fl, the set of feasible system flows, to RN |A|, and c is a map defined on F , the set of feasible
system configurations, to R
∑
i∈N |P i|.
If −c is a monotone map on F , Γn is a stable game defined by Hofbauer and Sandholm,
in the sense that 〈
g− f , c (g)− c (f) 〉 ≤ 0, ∀ f ,g ∈ F.
Smith [86] proposed the following dynamics for a nonatomic congestion game Γn(G,N ,m,P, l):
f˙ = Φ(f) for f ∈ F , where the equation for the component f ip is
f˙ ip =
∑
l∈P i
f il
(
cl(f)− cp(f)
)+ − f ip ∑
l∈P i
(
cp(f)− cl(f)
)+
. (1.41)
Remark 1.65. The Smith dynamics belongs to the pairwise comparison dynamics (cf. [40,
80, 81]).
With the help of the following Lyapunov function V , Smith [86] obtained the convergence
and the stability of dynamics (1.41) as shown by Theorem 1.66:
V (f) =
∑
i∈N
∑
p,l∈P i
f ip
(
cp(f)− cl(f)
)+2
.
Theorem 1.66. If the vector of system path costs c is of class C1, and if −c is monotone
on F , then, for all initial system configuration f0 ∈ F , dynamics (1.41) admits a unique
solution which converges to a nonempty set of equilibria.
A particular case where map −c is monotone is when each path is composed of a single
arc, and the cost functions of an arc a for different populations are equal to a monotone
function la up to an additive constant.
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1.5.3 Atomic games with splittable stocks and composite games
In §1.3.5, it is shown that a potential function exists in a composite game if the paths
are all composed of a single arc with affine cost function. In this case, an atomic player
with splittable stocks can be replaced by a population of nonatomic players, who control
the same stocks and whose per-unit cost of an arc is the marginal arc cost of the replaced
atomic player. In this way, the game is transformed into a virtual nonatomic game, and
its Wardrop equilibrium coincides with the composite equilibrium of the initial composite
game. The dynamics in the potential games approach can then be applied to this virtual
nonatomic game so as to obtain the convergence to the equilibrium. Altman et al. [4] applied
the replicator dynamics to this kind of atomic games with the help of the corresponding
potential function.
The approach of stable games can also be applied to the case where the paths are all
composed of a single arc, and the cost functions of each arc for different players and different
populations are equal to an affine function up to an additive constant. It can be shown that
the vector of marginal costs is monotone on Fl. The Smith’s dynamics can be applied to
the nonatomic game induced by the initial composite game by replacing each atomic player
by a population, whose costs in this virtual nonatomic game are defined to be the marginal
costs of the replaced player in the initial game.
As for the dynamics linked to the atomic players’ rationality, one first thinks about the
best-reply dynamics. Orda et al. [66] considered this dynamics in a two-atomic-player game
with splittable stocks in a network composed of two parallel arcs with cost functions which
are nondecreasing, convex and of class C1. The two players play in turn a best reply to their
opponent. A result on the convergence of the dynamics to the unique Nash equilibrium was
obtained. Mertzios [59] extended this result to series parallel networks. Altman et al. [2]
applied the best-reply dynamics to N -player atomic games in the same structure of network,
but with linear arc costs. They obtained the results of convergence for several scenarios, for
example, where the players play one by one or two by two a best reply.
However, except such cases where the networks have specific structures and cost functions,
the dynamics in atomic games with splittable stocks and in composite games remains an open
problem.
1.5.4 Two-level dynamics
In the two previous sections, the composition of the players or, more precisely, the dis-
tribution of the stocks among the atomic players with splittable stocks and the populations
of nonatomic players is fixed during the dynamical process. However, one can consider
situations where this distribution varies as well.
A first example is inspired by a model in Wan [93] (cf. §1.4.3 and Chapter 4). An atomic
player i might have interest in distributing her stocks among some small atomic players
and/or a mass of nonatomic players, facing the structure of the stocks not controlled by her.
This structure will be called player i’s environment. The following two-level scenario can
then be considered. At the first level, the initial atomic players change the composition of
their stocks and, at the second level, the initial nonatomic players and the new atomic and
nonatomic players created by the initial atomic players play a composite game. This scenario
then entails a two-level dynamical process of two levels, probably with different speeds at
the two levels. For example, the dynamics of the composite game at the second level is faster
than the dynamics of the the recomposition of the stocks at the first level.
Another example comes from the congestion game model with coalitions [20, 37, 91] (cf.
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Chapter 2). In a composite game, atomic and/or nonatomic players may have incentive
to form a coalition which behaves like an atomic player with splittable stocks, then these
coalitions and the independent players belonging to no coalition play a composite game.
Here, a two-level scenario is such that, at the first level, the initial players form coalitions
and, at the second level, the coalitions and the independent players play a composite game.
In a dynamical process of two levels with different speeds induced by this scenario, the
dynamics for the composite game at the second level might be faster than the dynamics for
the formation of coalitions at the first level. Bravo and Wan [17] (cf. Chapter 6) modeled
this scenario by a discreet dynamics.
1.6 Remarks and possible extensions
1.6.1 Splittability of the stocks
An atomic player with an unsplittable stock can only send all her stock by a single
path. An atomic player with a splittable stock can arbitrarily split her stock into infinites-
imally small parts. In addition to these two extreme cases (unsplittable and infinitesimally
splittable), other intermediate levels of divisibility of the stocks can also be considered.
An atomic player i with generalized splittable stocks of weight mi is specified by the
unsplittable components and a splittable component of her stocks: mi = (mi,1, . . . ,mi,ni , µi),
where ni ∈ N∗, mi,l ∈ R++ for all l and ∑nil=1mi,l + µi = mi. Her stocks has total weight
mi, where ni components are unsplittable (which are of weight, respectively, mi,1, . . . ,mi,ni),
and a splittable component of weight µi. She can send different unsplittable components by
different paths, but an unsplittable component can no longer be divided. On the contrary,
she can arbitrarily split the splittable component.
For example, in a traffic network, a train can be split into wagons but no smaller com-
ponents; in a telecommunication network, a flow can only be decomposed into packets.
1.6.2 Type of the stocks
It is mentioned that the players may have specific costs. More rigorously, it is the stocks
which have specific cost functions. This idea is to be specified and extended here.
In a congestion game, there can be a finite number of types of stocks. A type τ is
characterized by two elements:
1. P τ , the set of available paths for the stock, and
2. (lτa)a∈A, the vector of arc costs for the stock.
Remark 1.67. Set P τ determines not only the origin and the destination of the stock, but
also the set of the paths connecting these vertices which are available to it. Two stocks which
have the same pair of origin/destination do not necessarily have access to the same paths.
Remark 1.68. It is not rare that, on the same arc, stocks of different types have different
per-unit costs. For example, a truck, a car, and a bike do not experience the congestion on
a path in the same way.
An atomic player can control several types of stocks. Let us define a composite conges-
tion game with T types of stocks by specifying, on the one hand, for each atomic player,
unsplittable components and a splittable component for each type of her stocks and, on the
other hand, for each population of nonatomic players, the type of their stocks:
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Nonatomic players: there are T populations of nonatomic players of distinct types: pop-
ulation τ have stocks of type τ and their total weight is θτ ;
Atomic players: for each atomic player i, her stocks are composed of T parts corresponding
to the T types. The part corresponding to type τ is specified by a vector miτ =
(mi,1τ , . . . ,mi,n
i
τ , µ
i
τ ), where niτ ∈ N is the number of unsplittable components of stocks
of type τ (they are of weight, respectively, mi,1τ , . . . ,mi,n
i
τ ), and µiτ is the weight of the
splittable component of stock of type i.
As the definition of a composite equilibrium in §1.3.5, a composite equilibrium in such
a composite congestion game with T types of stocks and N atomic players is defined as a
system configuration which
(i) minimizes the cost of each of the N atomic players given her opponents’ configurations,
and which
(ii) equalizes, for each of the T populations of nonatomic players, the per-unit costs of all
the paths used by it.

Chapter 2
Coalitions in network congestion
games
This chapter is based on the paper Coalitions in network congestion games.
Abstract. This work shows that, in a two-terminal parallel-arc network, the formation of
a finite number of coalitions in a nonatomic network congestion game benefits everyone. At
the equilibrium of the composite game played by coalitions and individuals, the average cost
to each coalition and the individuals’ common cost are all lower than in the corresponding
nonatomic game (without coalitions). The individuals’ cost is lower than the average cost
to any coalition. Similarly, the average cost to a coalition is lower than that to any larger
coalition. Whenever some members of a coalition become individuals, the individuals’ payoff
is increased. In the case of a unique coalition, both the average cost to the coalition and
the individuals’ cost are decreasing with respect to the size of the coalition. In a sequence of
composite games, if a finite number of coalitions are fixed, while the size of the remaining
coalitions goes to zero, the equilibria of these games converge to the equilibrium of a composite
game played by the same fixed coalitions and the remaining individuals.
2.1 Introduction
This paper considers the impact of introducing coalitions in network congestion games
played by nonatomic individuals, namely, nonatomic routing games. These games belong to
a more general class of noncooperative games played by a continuum of anonymous identical
players, each of whom has a negligible effect on the others.
First, let us cite some historic references on routing games, in particular, on coalitions in
such games.
Beckman, McGuire and Winston [9] first formulated Wardrop equilibrium (Wardrop [94])
in nonatomic congestion games as an optimal solution of a convex programming problem,
and thus proved its existence under weak conditions on the cost functions.
A coalition of nonatomic individuals of total weight T behaves the same way as an atomic
player who holds a flow of weight T that can be split and sent by different paths. Routing
games with finitely many atomic players holding splittable flow (called atomic splittable
games) were first examined by Haurie and Marcotte [36]. They focused on the asymptotic
behavior of Nash equilibria in such games. By characterizing a Nash equilibrium in an
atomic splittable game and a Wardrop equilibrium in the corresponding nonatomic game by
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two variational inequalities, they proved that the former converges to the latter, when the
number of atomic players tends to infinity. This result will be extended in this paper.
Harker [32] first studied composite games (that he called mixed games), where atomic
players holding splittable flow (or coalitions) and nonatomic individuals play together. He
characterized a composite-type equilibrium by a variational inequality, and thus proved the
existence of a solution under some weak conditions on the cost functions as well as its
uniqueness under more stringent conditions.
Orda, Rom and Shimkin [66] made a detailed study on the uniqueness and other prop-
erties of Nash equilibria in atomic splittable games on two-terminal parallel-link networks.
This specific setting will be adopted in this paper, where their results will be extended.
Richman and Shimkin [71] extended their results to composite congestion games in nearly
parallel-link networks.
For the impact of coalitions on the equilibrium costs, Cominetti, Correa and Stier-Moses
[20] showed that, in the atomic splittable case where the atomic players are identical, the
social cost at the equilibrium of the game is bounded by that of the corresponding nonatomic
game, under weak conditions on the cost functions.
Hayrapetyan, Tardos and Wexler [37] proved that the formation of coalitions (that they
called collusion) reduces the social cost in a two-terminal parallel-link network. Although
stronger conditions on the cost functions are needed in this paper, our results prove that the
formation of coalitions benefits everyone.
Apart from the consequence of the formation of coalitions on the equilibrium costs, this
paper also studies how this impact varies with the structure of coalitions.
2.1.1 A Sketch of the model
A continuum of nonatomic individuals are commuters in a two-terminal parallel-arc (di-
rected) network. Their common origin and common destination are the only two vertices,
which are connected by a finite set of parallel arcs. The per-unit traffic cost of an arc de-
pends only on the total weight of the flow on it. A pure strategy of an individual is an arc by
which she goes from the origin to the destination. Nash equilibria in such nonatomic games
are usually called Wardrop equilibria (WE for short) [94]. At a WE, the arc chosen by an
individual costs no more than any other available arc, hence it has the lowest cost in the
network. The individuals have the same cost at a WE.
A composite routing game is played by a finite number of disjoint coalitions formed
by some of the individuals and the remaining individuals. A coalition is specified by its
size. Within a coalition, a coordinator assigns an arc to each member, with the objective of
minimizing their total cost. An equilibrium in this game is called composite equilibrium (CE
for short), because it is Nash type for the coalitions and Wardrop type for the individuals.
All the individuals have the same cost at a CE, while the average costs to the coalitions may
differ.
2.1.2 Main results
After recalling the existence and the uniqueness of the CE of a composite game under
certain conditions on the cost functions, five main results are obtained:
1. At the CE, the average social cost, the individuals’ cost and the average cost to each
coalition are lower than the equilibrium cost at the WE of the corresponding nonatomic
game.
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2. At the CE, the average cost to a coalition is lower than that to any other larger
coalition. If a coalition sends flow on a certain arc, then any other larger coalition
sends more on it.
3. If some members quit a coalition to become individuals, the individuals’ cost is in-
creased at the corresponding CE.
4. If there is only one coalition, the social cost, the average cost to the coalition, and the
individuals’ cost at the CE are all decreasing with respect to the size of the unique
coalition.
5. If, in a sequence of composite games, a finite number of coalitions are fixed, and the
maximum size of the remaining coalitions tends to zero, the sequence of equilibrium of
these games converges to the equilibrium of a game played by the same fixed coalitions
and the remaining individuals.
2.1.3 Organization of the work
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 provides a detailed description of
the model as well as characterizations of the CE in different formulations. The existence and
the uniqueness of the CE will be recalled. Section 2.3 analyzes some important properties
of the CE. Section 2.4 deals with the impact of the formation of coalitions by comparing
the players’ costs at the WE of the corresponding nonatomic game and those at the CE.
Section 2.5 considers the impact of the composition of the players on the CE costs: first, how
the equilibrium costs vary with the size of a unique coalition; second, how the individuals’
cost varies when some members of a coalition become individuals. Section 2.6 focuses on the
asymptotic behavior of CE, by fixing some coalitions while letting the remaining coalitions
vanish. Section 2.7 discusses some problems for future research.
2.2 The model and characterization of an equilibrium
2.2.1 Model and notations
Network and arc costs (R, c). Let the set of identical anonymous nonatomic individuals
be described by the unit real interval I = [ 0, 1], endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ. The
players’ common origin is vertex O, and their common destination is vertex D. The finite
set of parallel arcs between O and D is denoted by R, with R = |R| its cardinality. Let
c = (cr)r∈R be the vector of the per-unit arc cost functions: for every arc r, x 7→ cr(x) is a
real function defined on a neighborhood U of [ 0, 1]. The per-unit cost of an arc only depends
on the total weight of the flow on it. The network is characterized by the pair (R, c).
The following assumption is made throughout this paper.
A 2.1. For every arc r in R, the cost function cr is strictly increasing, convex and continu-
ously differentiable on U , and nonnegative on [ 0, 1].
Composite routing game Γ(R, c,T). Suppose that K coalitions are formed in the
set of individuals I, with K ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, · · · }. The family of coalitions is denoted by
K = {1, . . . , K}. Every coalition behaves like an atomic player holding a splittable flow.
The remaining individuals are independent nonatomic players. For a coalition k ∈ K, the
measurable set of its members is denoted by Ik, a subset of I, and its total weight is de-
noted by T k = µ(Ik). Let I0 denote the set of individuals so that I0 = [ 0, 1]\ ∪k∈K Ik,
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O D1
R
and its weight is T 0 = µ(I0) = 1−∑k∈K T k. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
T 1 ≥ T 2 ≥ · · · ≥ TK . Let us define T = (T 0; T 1, . . . , TK ). Let Γ(R, c,T) be the composite
routing game played by these K coalitions and the remaining individuals in the network
(R, c).
Two particular cases should be mentioned. First, if I0 = [ 0, 1] and K = 0, there is no
coalition so that the game is a nonatomic one, denoted simply by Γ(R, c), and the equilibria
there are WE. Second, if I0 is empty, i.e. T 0 = 0, the game is an atomic splittable one with
K atomic players, and the equilibria there are Nash equilibria (NE for short) in its usual
sense; in particular, if K = 1, i.e, there is a global coalition, the equilibrium is obtained by
solving the optimization problem of searching for the social optimum.
Strategies and flow configurations In the game Γ(R, c,T), as the individuals are iden-
tical and anonymous, only the total weight sent by each coalition on each arc counts. The
strategy profile of the individuals (resp. the strategy of coalition k) is specified by the flow
configuration (flow for short) x0 (resp. xk) defined by
x0 = (x0r)r∈R (resp. xk = (xkr )r∈R),
where x0r (resp. xkr ) is the total weight of the individuals (resp. of coalition k) on arc r.
A strategy profile is specified by x = (x0, x1, . . . , xK), a point in R(1+K)×R.
The feasible flow set of the individuals (resp. of coalition k) is a convex compact subset
of RR, defined by
F 0 =
{
x0 ∈ RR | ∀ r ∈ R, x0r ≥ 0 ;
∑
r∈R
x0r = T 0
}
,
(
resp. F k =
{
xk ∈ RR | ∀ r ∈ R, xkr ≥ 0 ;
∑
r∈R
xkr = T k
})
.
The feasible flow set F of the game Γ(R, c,T) is a convex compact subset of R(1+K)×R,
defined by F = F 0 × F 1 × · · · × FK .
The aggregate flow x′ induced by x is a vector in RR, defined by x′ = (xr)r∈R, where
xr = x0r +
∑
k∈K xkr is the aggregate weight on arc r.
For coalition k, the vector x−k is a point in F−k = ∏l∈{0}∪K\{k} F l, defined by x−k =
(xl)l∈{0}∪K\{k}. For all arc r, define x−kr = x0r +
∑
l∈K\{k} xlr.
Average costs and marginal costs The average cost to the individuals, the average cost
to coalition k and the average social cost are respectively defined by
Y 0(x) = 1
T 0
∑
r∈R
x0rcr(xr), Y k(x) =
1
T k
∑
r∈R
xkrcr(xr), Y (x) =
∑
r∈R
xrcr(xr).
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Recall that the total weight of the players is normalized to one, hence the average social cost
is just the social cost.
The total cost to coalition k is denoted by uk(x) = T k · Y k(x) = ∑r∈R xkrcr(xr).
Following Harker [32], the marginal cost function of coalition k is defined by
cˆk(x) = (cˆkr (x))r∈R, where cˆkr (x) = cr(xr) + xkrc′r(xr).
Notice that cˆk(x) is the gradient of uk(x) with respect to xk. More precisely,
cˆk(x) = ∇xk uk(xk, x−k) =
( ∂uk
∂xkr
(
x
))
r∈R
.
2.2.2 Characterizing equilibria: existence and uniqueness
The following definition of a CE (Harker [32]) consists of two parts: the first for the
individuals and the second for the coalitions.
Definition 2.2 (Composite equilibrium). A point x∗ = (x∗0, x∗1, . . . , x∗K ) in F is a CE
of the game Γ(R, c,T) if
∀ r ∈ R, if x∗0r > 0, then r ∈ arg min
s∈R
cs (x∗s) ; (2.1)
∀ k ∈ K, x∗k minimizes uk(xk, x∗−k) on F k. (2.2)
Proposition 2.3 (Characterization of a CE). The following are equivalent:
(i) x∗ = (x∗0, x∗1, . . . , x∗K ) in F is a CE;
(ii) (marginal cost formulation) x∗ = (x∗0, x∗1, . . . , x∗K ) in F satisfies
∀ r ∈ R, if x∗0r > 0, then ∀s ∈ R, cr(x∗r) ≤ cs(x∗s); (2.3)
∀ k ∈ K, if x∗kr > 0, then ∀s ∈ R, cˆkr (x∗r) ≤ cˆks(x∗s),
i.e. cr(x∗r) + x∗kr c′r(x∗r) ≤ cs(x∗s) + x∗ks c′s(x∗s); (2.4)
(iii) (variational inequality formulation) x∗ = (x∗0, x∗1, . . . , x∗K ) in F satisfies
〈 c(x∗), x0− x∗0 〉+
∑
k∈K
〈 cˆk(x∗), xk − x∗k 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ x = (x0, x1, . . . , xK ) ∈ F, (2.5)
where 〈 ·, ·〉 stands for the standard inner product operator on the Euclidean spaces.
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii): For the individuals, (2.3) is simply a reformulation of (2.1). For the
coalitions, in order to show that (2.2) is equivalent to (2.4), let us first prove that for coalition
k, uk(xk, x−k) is convex in xk for any given x−k in F−k.
Indeed, for any r in R, the fact that cr is convex and strictly increasing implie that
cr(ykr + x−kr ) ≥ cr(xkr + x−kr ) + (ykr − xkr ) c′r(xkr + x−kr )
⇒ ykr cr(ykr + x−kr ) ≥ ykr cr(xr) + ykr (ykr − xkr ) c′r(xr) ≥ ykr cr(xr) + xkr (ykr − xkr ) c′r(xr)
= xkr cr(xr) + (ykr − xkr )
[
cr(xr) + xkr c′r(xr)
]
.
⇒
∑
r∈R
ykr cr(ykr + x−kr ) ≥
∑
r∈R
xkr cr(xr) +
∑
r∈R
(ykr − xkr )
[
cr(xr) + xkr c′r(xr)
]
,
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which further implies that
uk(yk, x−k) ≥ uk(xk, x−k) + 〈∇xk uk(xk, x−k), yk − xk 〉, ∀ xk, yk ∈ F k.
Thus, x∗k minimizes the convex function uk(xk, x∗−k) on the convex compact set F k if,
and only if, 〈∇xk uk(x∗), xk − x∗k 〉 ≥ 0 for all xk ∈ F k or, equivalently,
〈 cˆk(x∗), xk − x∗k 〉 ≥ 0, ∀ xk ∈ F k. (2.6)
Let us set cˆk = minr∈R cˆkr (x∗). Then,
∑
r∈R( cˆkr (x∗)− cˆk) (xkr −x∗kr ) =
∑
r∈R cˆkr (x∗) (xkr −
x∗kr ) − cˆk
∑
r∈R (xkr − x∗kr ) =
∑
r∈R cˆkr (x∗) (xkr − x∗kr ) − cˆk(T k − T k) = 〈 cˆk(x∗), xk − x∗k 〉.
Consequently, (2.6) is equivalent to∑
r∈R
( cˆkr (x∗)− cˆk) (xkr − x∗kr ) ≥ 0. (2.7)
It remains to show that (2.7) is equivalent to (2.4).
(2.4) ⇒ (2.7): According to (2.4),
( cˆkr (x∗)− cˆk) (xkr − x∗kr ) =
{
( cˆkr (x∗)− cˆk)xkr ≥ 0, if x∗kr = 0,
0, if x∗kr > 0.
Thus, ∑r∈R( cˆkr (x∗)− cˆk) (xkr − x∗kr ) ≥ 0.
(2.7) ⇒ (2.4): Let us define an auxiliary flow xk in F k as follows: xkr = 0 if cˆkr (x∗) > cˆk,
and xkr = T
k
m if cˆkr (x∗) = cˆk. Here m = |{r ∈ R | cˆkr (x∗) = cˆk}|, the number of arcs whose
marginal cost to coalition k at x∗ are the smallest in the network. Then, for this specific
xk, (2.7) implies that ∑r∈R,cˆkr (x∗)>cˆk( cˆkr (x∗ ) − cˆk) (−x∗kr ) ≥ 0. Consequently, x∗kr = 0 if
cˆkr (x∗) > cˆk, which leads to (2.4).
(ii) ⇔ (iii): By the same argument used above for the equivalence between (2.4) and
(2.6), one can show that (2.3) is equivalent to〈
c(x∗), x0 − x∗0
〉
≥ 0, ∀ x0 ∈ F 0. (2.8)
The variational inequalities (2.6) and (2.8) imply immediately (2.5). For the converse,
it is enough to take an x = (x0, x1, . . . , xK ) in F such that xl = x∗l for all l in K (resp.
xl = x∗l for all l in {0} ∪ K \ {k}) to get (2.8) (resp. (2.6)).
Thus, one has shown that (2.3) and (2.4) are equivalent to (2.5).
Remark 2.4. (iii) has been proven for the specific cases of NE and WE as well as for CE: a
WE was characterized as the solution of a variational inequality problem by Smith [85] and
Dafermos [27], and as the solution of a nonlinear complementarity problem by Aashtiani and
Magnanti [1]. Variational inequalities were used to characterize a NE in atomic splittable
games by Haurie and Marcotte [36], and a CE in composite games by Harker [32].
Condition (2.4) shows that the marginal costs (cˆkr )r∈R play the same role for coalition k
as (cr)r∈R for the individuals: at the CE, all the arcs used by coalition k have the lowest
marginal cost and, a fortiori, the same one. For flow x ∈ F , cˆkr (x) = cr(xr) + xkrc′r(xr) is a
function of only two variables xkr and xr. Besides, according to Assumption 2.1, it is strictly
increasing in both of them.
Theorem 2.5 (Existence and uniqueness of CE). In a composite game, a CE exists, and it
is unique.
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Proof. The variational inequality formulation for CE (2.5) is used to prove its existence.
Theorem 3.1 in Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [49, p.12] states that the variational inequality
problem (2.5) admits a solution if F is a convex compact set, and if cˆk and c are continuous.
According to Assumption 2.1, these conditions are satisfied.
For the uniqueness of CE, see Richman and Shimkin [71, Theorem 4.1].
Remark 2.6. For the nonatomic routing game Γ(R, c), a WE exists if the cost functions
cr’s are continuous. If they are furthermore strictly increasing on U , then the WE is unique.
See Patriksson [68, Theorems 2.4, 2.5] for a proof.
2.3 A detailed study on CE
Let us consider a composite game Γ(R, c,T). This section focuses on the properties of
its unique CE, denoted by x here and in Section 2.4.
First, some notations are recalled or given.
Notation. R0(x) = {r ∈ R |x0r > 0} ⊂ R is the support of x0;
Rk(x) = {r ∈ R |xkr > 0} ⊂ R is the support of xk, for coalition k;
c0(x) is the lowest arc cost in the network;
cˆk(x) is the marginal cost to coalition k of every arc used by it;
Y 0(x) is the common cost to all the individuals; Y 0(x) = c0(x);
Y k(x) is the average cost to coalition k;
Y k(x) = minr∈Rk cr(xr) is the lowest arc cost of the arcs used by coalition k;
Y (x) is the social cost.
All the statements made in this section and Section 2.4 are to be understood at the CE
x. And x will often be omitted if it does not cause confusion.
The following facts follow immediately from (2.3) and (2.4). They will be repeatedly
referred to in this work without further explanation:
cr(xr) = c0, if r ∈ R0; cr(xr) ≥ c0, if r ∈ R \ R0;
∀ k ∈ K, cˆkr (x) = cˆk, if r ∈ Rk; cˆkr (x) ≥ cˆk, if r ∈ R \ Rk.
The following lemma states that an arc used by a coalition costs less than any arc not
used by it.
Lemma 2.7. For any coalition k, for any arc r in Rk and any arc s in R \ Rk, cr(xr) <
cs(xs).
Proof. Indeed, cr(xr) < cr(xr) + xkrc′r(xr) = cˆk ≤ cs(xs) because xkr > 0 and xks = 0,.
The next lemma shows that an arc used by individuals is also used by all the coalitions.
Besides, the average cost to any coalition is not lower than the individuals’ cost.
Lemma 2.8. For any coalition k,
(i) R0 ⊂ Rk, i.e. for all r ∈ R, if x0r > 0, then xkr > 0;
(ii) c0 < cˆk;
(iii) Y 0 = Y k ≤ Y k.
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Proof. (i) Suppose that x0r > 0. If xkr = 0, there is another arc s such that xks > 0. Then,
cr(xr) ≥ cˆk(x) = cs(xs) + xksc′s(xs) > cs(xs). However, x0r > 0, hence cr(xr) ≤ cs(xs), a
contradiction.
(ii) Take r in R0. By (i), xkr > 0. Thus, cˆk = cr(xr) + xkrc′(xr) > cr(xr) = c0.
(iii) The individuals take the arcs with the lowest cost, hence Y 0 ≤ Y k ≤ Y k. And (i)
implies that Y 0 = Y k.
The next lemma states that an arc used by a coalition is also used by any larger coalition,
and the larger one sends more flow on it.
Lemma 2.9. Let two coalitions k and l be such that T k < T l. Then, the following are true:
(i) Rk ⊂ Rl, i.e. for all r ∈ R, if xkr > 0, then xlr > 0;
(ii) cˆk < cˆl;
(iii) For any arc r, xkr ≤ xlr, and the inequality is strict if xkr > 0;
(iv) Y k ≤ Y l, and the equality holds if, and only if, Y l = Y k = Y 0.
If T k = T l, all these inequalities or inclusions become equalities.
Proof. (i) Suppose that T k < T l. If Rk 6⊂ Rl, there is some r such that xkr > 0 but xlr = 0.
Hence, cˆk = cr(xr) + xkrc′r(xr) > cr(xr) ≥ cˆl. In particular, cˆk > cˆl.
For all s inR\Rk, cs(xs) ≥ cˆk > cˆl, which implies that xls = 0. As a result,R\Rk ⊂ R\Rl
or, equivalently, Rl ⊂ Rk.
For all r in Rl and, a fortiori, in Rk, cˆk = cr(xr) + xkrc′r(xr) and cˆl = cr(xr) + xlrc′r(xr).
Hence, xkr − xlr = (cˆk − cˆl)/c′r(xr) > 0, so that xkr > xlr. As a result, T l =
∑
r∈Rl xlr <∑
r∈Rl xkr ≤ T k, a contradiction.
Therefore, Rk ⊂ Rl.
Suppose that T k = T l. The above proof is still valid. Thus, Rk ⊂ Rl and, by symmetry,
Rl ⊂ Rk. This leads to Rk = Rl.
(ii) and (iii) Suppose that T k < T l. By (i), Rk ⊂ Rl. There are two cases.
Case 1. Rk = Rl. Given r in Rk = Rl, cˆk = cr(xr)+xkrc′r(xr) and cˆl = cr(xr)+xlrc′r(xr).
It follows that xlr − xkr = (cˆl − cˆk)/c′r(xr). Thus, 0 < T l − T k =
∑
r∈Rk(xlr − xkr ) =
(cˆl − cˆk) ∑r∈Rk 1/c′r(xr) and, consequently, cˆl > cˆk.
Case 2. Rk ⊂ Rl but Rk 6= Rl. Take s in Rl \ Rk. Then, cˆl = cs(xs) + xlsc′s(xs) >
cs(xs) ≥ cˆk.
In both cases, cˆl > cˆk. For all r in Rk, xlr − xkr = (cˆl − cˆk)/c′r(xr) > 0; in particular,
xkr < x
l
r. And for all r in R \Rk, 0 = xkr ≤ xlr.
Suppose that T k = T l. By (i), Rk = Rl. On the one hand, the same argument as for
Case 1 leads to cˆl = cˆk and xlr = xkr for all r in Rk = Rl. On the other hand, xlr = xkr = 0
for all r in R \Rk.
(iv) Suppose that T k < T l. According to (i), Rk ⊂ Rl.
Set Y˜ l = ∑r∈Rk xlrcr(xr)/∑r∈Rk xlr, the average cost to coalition l onRk. By Lemma 2.7,
the arcs in Rk cost strictly less than those in R \ Rk. One deduces that Y˜ l = Y l if Rk is
equal to Rl, and Y˜ l < Y l if Rk is a proper subset of Rl.
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Now, let us show that Y k ≤ Y˜ l:
Y˜ l =
∑
r∈Rk xlrcr(xr)∑
r∈Rk xlr
=
∑
r∈Rk xkrcr(xr) +
∑
r∈Rk(xlr − xkr )cr(xr)∑
r∈Rk xkr +
∑
r∈Rk(xlr − xkr )
= Y
kT k +∑r∈Rk(xlr − xkr )cr(xr)
T k +∑r∈Rk(xlr − xkr ) .
It follows from (iii) that, for all r in Rk, xlr − xkr > 0. The relation Y k ≤ Y˜ l is thus
equivalent to the inequality
Y k ≤
∑
r∈Rk(xlr − xkr )cr(xr)∑
r∈Rk(xlr − xkr )
. (2.9)
For r in Rk, xlr − xkr = (cˆl − cˆk)/c′r(xr) and cr(xr) = cˆk − xkrc′r(xr). Inequality (2.9) can
thus be written as∑
r∈Rk xkrcr(xr)∑
r∈Rk xkr
≤
∑
r∈Rk cr(xr)(cˆl − cˆk)/c′r(xr)∑
r∈Rk(cˆl − cˆk)/c′r(xr)
=
∑
r∈Rk cr(xr)/c′r(xr)∑
r∈Rk 1/c′r(xr)
⇔
∑
r∈Rk
xkrcr(xr)
∑
r∈Rk
1
c′r(xr)
≤
∑
r∈Rk
xkr
∑
r∈Rk
cr(xr)
c′r(xr)
⇔
∑
r∈Rk
xkr
(
cˆk − xkrc′r(xr)
) ∑
r∈Rk
1
c′r(xr)
≤
∑
r∈Rk
xkr
∑
r∈Rk
cˆk − xkrc′r(xr)
c′r(xr)
⇔
∑
r∈Rk
(
xkr
)2
c′r(xr)
∑
r∈Rk
1
c′r(xr)
≥
( ∑
r∈Rk
xkr
)2
. (2.10)
Inequality (2.10) follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Furthermore, the equality
holds (or, equivalently, Y k = Y˜ l) if, and only if, xkrc′r(xr) is constant for all r in Rk. When
this is the case, cr(xr) = cˆk − xkrc′r(xr) is also a constant for all r in Rk. According to
Lemma 2.8 (iii), this constant must be equal to c0.
The relations Y k(x) ≤ Y˜ l(x) ≤ Y l(x) is now established. Suppose, moreover, that
Y k(x) = Y l(x). On the one hand, Y˜ l(x) = Y l(x), implying that Rk = Rl. On the other
hand, Y k(x) = Y˜ l(x), implying that every arc in Rk costs c0.
Suppose that T k = T l. The result follows directly from (iii).
Remark 2.10. (i) and (iii) of Lemma 2.9 were also proven by Orda, Rom and Shimkin [66]
with another formulation for atomic splittable games. Lemma 1 in [66] claims that, at the
NE, if xkr < xlr for some arc r, then xks ≤ xls for all arc s, and the inequality is strict if xks > 0.
The following corollary of Lemma 2.9 shows that the behavior of a coalition at the CE
is specified by its weight.
Corollary 2.11. Two coalitions send the same weight on every arc if, and only if, they have
the same weight. In this case, they have the same average cost.
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2.4 Comparison between CE and WE
The previous section was contributed to the basic properties of the CE x of the game
Γ(R, c,T). This section will compare it with the WE w = (wr)r∈R of the corresponding
nonatomic game Γ(R, c). The equilibrium cost at w is denoted by W ∈ R. One says that x
induces w if x′ = w, i.e. xr = wr for all r ∈ R.
Following Hayrapetyan, Tardos and Wexler [37], let R− = {r ∈ R |xr < wr}, R+ = {r ∈
R |xr > wr} and RJ = {r ∈ R |xr = wr} be, respectively, the set of underloaded arcs, the
set of overloaded arcs and the set of justly-loaded arcs.
Lemma 2.12. If x does not induce w, then the following are true:
(i) for all s ∈ R− and for all r ∈ R+, cs(xs) < W < cr(xr);
(ii) R0 ⊂ R−, i.e. for all r ∈ R, if x0r > 0, then xr < wr;
(iii) R+ ⊂ R1, i.e. for all r ∈ R, if xr > wr, then x1r > 0.
Proof. (i) As x′ 6= w, both R− and R+ are nonempty. Take s in R− and r in R+, then
ws > xs ≥ 0 and wr < xr. In particular, ws > 0, which implies that s is used at the WE.
Then, cs(xs) < cs(ws) = W ≤ cr(wr) < cr(xr).
(ii) The individuals take the arcs of the lowest cost at x. According to (i), these arcs
must be in R−, hence R0 ⊂ R−.
(iii) For all r in R+, r is used at x because xr > wr ≥ 0,. According to Lemma 2.8 and
Lemma 2.9, it is used by the largest coalition, coalition 1. Thus, R+ ⊂ R1.
The following theorem compares the equilibrium costs at x with the equilibrium cost at
w.
Theorem 2.13. If x does not induce w, then Y 0(x) < W and Y k(x) < W for each coalition
k. Consequently, Y (x) < W .
Proof. For the individuals, for all r ∈ R0, cr(xr) = Y 0(x). Lemma 2.12(ii) implies that r is
in R−, and Lemma 2.12(i) shows that cr(xr) < W .
For the coalitions, it is enough to show that Y 1(x) < W for the largest coalition, coalition
1. Once this is proven, the remaining results follow from Lemma 2.9.
Let us define an auxiliary flow z in F , such that it induces w and satisfies the following
conditions: 
z1r > x
1
r , z
k
r ≥ xkr , z0r = x0r , k ∈ K \ {1}, r ∈ R−,
z1r < x
1
r , z
k
r ≤ xkr , z0r = x0r , k ∈ K \ {1}, r ∈ R+,
zkr = zkr , k = 0 or k ∈ K, r ∈ RJ .
For example, one can define, for all k ∈ K and r ∈ R+, zkr = xkr − dkr , where dkr = (xr −
wr)xkr/
∑
l∈K xlr, while for all r ∈ R−, zkr = xkr+dkr , where dkr = (wr−xr)
∑
t∈R+ d
k
t /
∑
s∈R−(ws−
xs). The above conditions are satisfied according to Lemma 2.12(iii).
Let us define another auxiliary flow y in F as follows. For all r ∈ R,
ykr =
{
zkr , if k 6= 1,
x1r , if k = 1.
In other words, at y, the individuals and all coalitions, except coalition 1, behave like at w,
while coalition 1 behaves like at x. Let us show that u1(x) ≤ u1(y) < u1(z).
Some preliminary results are needed.
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For all s ∈ R− and for all r ∈ R+,
i) ys ≥ xs, because ys − xs = ∑K\{1} zks − xks ≥ 0:
ii) xr ≥ yr, because xr − yr = ∑K\{1} xkr − zkr ≥ 0:
iii) by Lemma 2.12(iii), coalition 1 takes arc r. Thus,
cr(xr) + x1rc′r(xr) = cˆ1(x) ≤ cs(xs) + x1sc′s(xs). (2.11)
Moreover, according to Assumption 2.1, for all 0 < x < xr and y > 0,
cr(xr − x) + (x1r − x) c′r(xr − x) < cˆ1(x) < cs(xs + y) + (x1s + y) c′s(xs + y). (2.12)
Finally, cs(xs) < cr(xr) by Lemma 2.12(i). Then, it follows from (2.11) that x1rc′r(xr) <
x1sc
′
s(xs). Let B be a constant such that maxt∈R+{x1t c′t(xt)} ≤ B ≤ mint∈R−{x1t c′t(xt)}.
Then, by Assumption 2.1, for all x and y such that 0 ≤ x < xr and y > xs,
x1r c
′
r(x) ≤ B ≤ x1s c′s(y). (2.13)
Now, let us show that u1(x) ≤ u1(y) < u1(z):
u1(y)− u1(x) =
∑
r∈R
y1rcr(yr)−
∑
r∈R
x1rcr(xr) =
∑
r∈R
x1rcr(yr)−
∑
r∈R
x1rcr(xr)
=
∑
s∈R−
[
x1scs(ys)− x1scs(xs)
]− ∑
r∈R+
[
x1rcr(xr)− x1rcr(yr)
]
=
∑
s∈R−
∫ ys
xs
x1s c
′
s(x)dx−
∑
r∈R+
∫ xr
yr
x1r c
′
r(x)dx
≥
∑
s∈R−
(ys − xs)B −
∑
r∈R+
(xr − yr)B =
∑
r∈R
(yr − xr)B = 0,
where the inequality is due to (2.13) and the fact that ys ≥ xs for all s in R− and xr ≥ yr
for all r in R+;
u1(z)− u1(y) =
∑
r∈R
z1rcr(wr)−
∑
r∈R
y1rcr(yr) =
∑
r∈R
z1rcr(wr)−
∑
r∈R
x1rcr(wr − z1r + x1r)
=
∑
s∈R−
[
z1scs(ws)− x1scs(ws − z1s + x1s)
]− ∑
r∈R+
[
x1rcr(wr − z1r + x1r)− z1rcr(wr)
]
=
∑
s∈R−
∫ z1s
x1s
∂
∂x
[
xcs(ws − z1s + x)
]
dx−
∑
r∈R+
∫ x1r
z1r
∂
∂x
[
xcr(wr − z1r + x)
]
dx
=
∑
s∈R−
∫ z1s
x1s
[
cs(ws − z1s + x) + xc′s(ws − z1s + x)
]
dx
−
∑
r∈R+
∫ x1r
z1r
[
cr(wr − z1r + x) + xc′r(wr − z1r + x)
]
dx
≥
∑
s∈R−
∫ z1s
x1s
[
cs(xs − x1s + x) + xc′s(xs − x1s + x)
]
dx (2.14)
−
∑
r∈R+
∫ x1r
z1r
[
cr(xr − x1r + x) + xc′r(xr − x1r + x)
]
dx
>
∑
s∈R−
(z1s − x1s) cˆ1(x)−
∑
r∈R+
(x1r − z1r ) cˆ1(x) (2.15)
=
∑
r∈R
(z1r − x1r) cˆ1(x) = (T 1 − T 1) cˆ1(x) = 0.
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Inequality (2.14) is due to the following facts which follow immediately from the definition
of z. For s in R−, z1s > x1s and ws − z1s ≥ xs − x1s, while for r in R+, x1r > z1r and
xr − x1r ≥ wr − z1r . Inequality (2.15) is due to (2.12).
Thus, one has proved that u1(x) < u1(z) or, equivalently, Y 1(x) < Y 1(z). Besides, every
arc used at z costs W because z induces w. Therefore, Y 1(z) = W , which completes the
proof.
Remark 2.14. Cominetti, Correa and Stier-Moses [20, Corollary 4.1] proved that, if the cost
functions are non-decreasing, convex and differentiable, and the atomic splittable players are
identical, then the social cost at any NE in an atomic splittable game is lower than that
at the corresponding WE. Hayrapetyan, Tardos and Wexler [37, Theorem 2.3] proved that,
in a two-terminal parallel-arc network, if the cost functions are non-decreasing, convex and
differentiable, then the social cost at any NE in an atomic splittable game is lower than that
at the corresponding WE. In this work, stronger convexity conditions on the cost functions
allow to prove that not only the social average cost, but also the average cost to any coalition
and the individuals’ cost are lower at the CE than at the WE.
Remark 2.15. Cominetti, Correa and Stier-Moses [20, §2.1] provided an example where two
groups of individuals have different origin/destination pairs. They showed that, when one of
the two groups forms a coalition, both the social cost and the average cost to this coalition
are increased. Altman, Kameda and Hayerl [5] showed that a similar phenomenon can exist
when atomic players with splittable flow form a coalition. These imply that further studies
are needed for more general cases where the network is not two-terminal parallel-arc type. In
particular, the study on price of collusion, a notion introduced by Hayrapetyan, Tardos and
Wexler [37] and developped by Altman, Kameda and Hayerl [5], should be carried further.
2.5 Impact of the composition of the population on the CE
costs
This section focuses on the relation between the costs at the CE and the composition of
the set of the players, i.e. its partition into coalitions and individuals. In the first part, one
considers a unique coalition of weight T ∈ [ 0, 1], and studies the variation of the coalition’s
cost and the remaining individuals’ cost with respect to T . In the second part, for a general
composition of the set of the players, one shows that, whenever a coalition decreases, i.e.
some of its members become individuals, the individuals’ cost is increased.
2.5.1 CE costs as functions of the size of the unique coalition
Suppose that a unique coalition of weight T ∈ [0, 1] is formed.
Every horizontal line in Figure 2.1 represents a composition of the set of the players: the
unique coalition is presented by the plain part on the left, and the individuals by the dashed
part on the right. From bottom to top, the unique coalition decreases. The top (dashed)
line stands for the WE w, the bottom (plain) line stands for the social optimum, and any
horizontal line between them stands for the CE of a one-coalition composite game.
Lemma 2.16. There exists a number T˜ in [ 0, 1] such that the CE in Γ(R, c, (1 − T ; T ))
induces w if, and only if, T ≤ T˜ .
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0 T 1
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1− T
T
WE
SO
CE(1− T ;T )
Figure 2.1: Composition of the players
Proof. Let Ra = {r ∈ R |wr > 0} be the set of used arcs at w, and Ri = R\Ra = {r ∈
R |wr = 0} the set of unused arcs, which may be empty. Set A = ∑r∈Ra 1c′r(wr) . Then, thefollowing constant
T˜ = min
{
min
r∈Ra
wrc
′
r(wr)A, min
r∈Ri
(cr(0)−W )A
}
, (2.16)
is the threshold. This can be proven in two cases.
Case 1. For all r ∈ Ri, cr(0) > W .
In this case, T˜ > 0. Let us show that the CE induces w if, and only if, T ≤ T˜ .
On the one hand, if T ≤ T˜ , the following flow x is the CE:x1r =
T
Ac′r(wr)
, x0r = wr − x1r , r ∈ Ra;
x1r = x0r = 0, r ∈ Ri.
Indeed, x is well-defined because of the definition of T˜ , and ∑r∈R x1r = T . Next, as xr = wr
for all r, the individuals do take the arcs of the lowest cost. Finally, it follows from the
definition of T˜ that, for all r ∈ Ri, (cr(0)−W )A ≥ T˜ ≥ T . It is not difficult to see that, for
all r ∈ Ra, cr(xr) + x1rc′r(wr) = W + TA and, for all r ∈ Ri, cr(0) ≥W + TA . The equilibrium
condition (2.2) is thus satisfied for the coalition. One deduces that x is the CE. Besides, it
induces a WE, because xr = wr for all r.
On the other hand, if the CE x induces w, i.e. xr = wr for all r, then for all r ∈ Ri,
xr = wr = 0, which implies that there exists an arc s ∈ Ra such that x1s > 0. However,
for all r ∈ Ra such that x1r = 0, one has W = cr(wr) = cr(xr) ≥ cˆ1(x) = cs(xs) +
x1sc
′
s(xs) > cs(xs) = cs(ws) = W , a contradiction. Therefore, for all r ∈ Ra, x1r > 0
and cr(xr) + x1rc′r(xr) = cˆ1(x). As a result, x1r =
cˆ1(x)−cr(xr)
c′r(xr)
= cˆ
1(x)−W
c′r(wr)
. The constraint
x1r ≤ wr implies that cˆ1 −W < wrc′r(wr). Consequently, T =
∑
r∈Ra x
1
r =
∑
r∈Ra
cˆ1−W
c′r(wr)
=
(cˆ1 −W )A < wrc′r(wr), for all r ∈ Ra.
Besides, for all r ∈ Ri, cˆ1 ≤ cr(0), which implies that T = (cˆ1 −W )A ≤ (cr(0) −W )A.
Thus, T ≤ T˜ is proven.
Case 2. There exists some t ∈ Ri such that ct(0) = W .
In this case, T˜ = 0. Let us show that the CE does not induce a WE as long as T > 0.
Otherwise, suppose that for some T > 0, the CE x induces a WE. By the same reasoning as
70 Chapter 2. Coalitions in network congestion games
in Case 1, there exists an arc s ∈ Ra such that x1s > 0. Then, ct(0) = W = cs(ws) < cs(ws)+
x1sc
′
s(ws) = cˆ1. However, xt = wt = 0, which implies that ct(0) ≥ cˆ1, a contradiction.
Example 2.17. There are two parallel arcs r1 and r2, whose cost functions are, respectively,
c1(x) = x+ 10 and c2(x) = 10x+ 1. A computation shows that the threshold is T˜ = 110 . If
less than one tenth of the players join the coalition, the coalition changes actually nothing
in the game equilibrium.
Theorem 2.18. Let T˜ be defined by (2.16). The individuals’ cost Y 0(T ), the average cost to
the unique coalition Y 1(T ), and the social cost Y (T ) in Γ(R, c, (1−T ; T )) have the following
properties:
(i) for T ∈ [ 0, T˜ ], Y 0(T ) = Y 1(T ) = Y (T ) = W ;
(ii) for T ∈ ( T˜ , 1 ], Y 0(T ) < Y 1(T ) < W , Y (T ) < W . In particular, Y 1(1) < Y 0(0) = W ;
(iii) Y 0(T ), Y 1(T ) and Y (T ) are all strictly decreasing with respect to T on [ T˜ , 1 ].
Proof. First, notice that Y 1(T ) is not defined for T = 0, and that Y 0(T ) is not defined for
T = 1. However, as the cost functions satisfy Assumptions 2.1, one can extend Y 1(T ) to
T = 0 and Y 0(T ) to T = 1 without difficulty.
(i) See Lemma 2.16.
(ii) According to Lemma 2.16, when T˜ < T ≤ 1, the CE does not induce w. Therefore,
according to Lemma 2.8(iii) and Theorem 2.13, Y 0(T ) ≤ Y 1(T ) < W . It remains to show
that Y 0(T ) < Y 1(T ).
Suppose that Y 0(T ) = Y 1(T ). Then, Y 0(T ) = Y 1(T ) = Y 1(T ) by Lemma 2.8, where
Y 1(T ) is the lowest cost of the arcs used by the coalition. This means that every arc used by
the coalition has the lowest cost Y 0(T ). Therefore, the CE does induce w, a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose that T˜ < S < T ≤ 1. Let x = (x0, x1) and y = (y0, y1) be, respectively,
the CE of the game Γ(R, c, (1− T ; T )) and that of the game Γ(R, c, (1− S; S)). The other
notations are as listed at the beginning of Section 2.3.
Let R− be the set of underloaded or justly-loaded arcs, and R+ = R \R− be the set of
overloaded arcs. In other words,
R− = {r ∈ R | yr ≤ xr}, R+ = {r ∈ R | yr > xr}.
If R+ = ∅, then x′ = y′, i.e. xr = yr for all r ∈ R. Let us prove that this is impossible.
Define R[ = {r ∈ R | cr(xr) = c0(x)} and R] = {r ∈ R |xr > 0, cr(xr) > c0(x)}. Then,
for all r ∈ R], x0r = 0. As T > S > T˜ , according to (ii), x and y do not induce w. Therefore,
R] is nonempty.
For all r ∈ R[, cr(yr) = cr(xr) = c0(x) while, for all r ∈ R], cr(yr) = cr(xr) > c0(x).
Hence, c0(x) is the minimal arc cost at y. One deduces that c0(y) = c0(x) and, for all
r ∈ R], y0r = 0, y1r = yr = xr.
On the one hand, cˆ1(x) and cˆ1(y) are both equal to cr(xr) + xrc′r(xr) for all r ∈ R]. On
the other hand, for all r ∈ R[, as cˆ1(x) = cr(xr) + x1rc′r(xr) and cˆ1(y) = cr(xr) + y1rc′r(xr), it
follows from cˆ1(x) = cˆ1(y) that x1r = y1r . Therefore, T =
∑
r∈R[ x
1
r +
∑
r∈R] xr =
∑
r∈R[ y
1
r +∑
r∈R] yr = S, a contradiction. Hence, R+ 6= ∅, and there exists some r ∈ R− such that
yr < xr.
Now, we will show that Y 0(T ) < Y 0(S), Y 1(T ) < Y 1(S) and Y (T ) < Y (S) in eight
steps.
(a) Let us prove that there exists some s ∈ R+ such that y0s > 0.
If for all s ∈ R+, y0s = 0, then y1s = ys > xs ≥ x1s and, consequently, cˆ1(y) = cs(ys) +
y1sc
′(ys) > cr(xs) +x1sc′(xs) = cˆ1(x). Moreover,
∑
s∈R+ y
1
s >
∑
s∈R+ x
1
s. But
∑
r∈R y1r = S <
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T = ∑r∈R x1r . Therefore, ∑t∈R− y1t < ∑t∈R− x1t . In particular, there exists some r ∈ R−
such that y1r < x1r . Because yr ≤ xr, cˆ1(y) ≤ cr(yr) + y1rc′(yr) < cr(xr) + x1rc′(xr) = cˆ1(x), a
contradiction.
(b) Let us show that c0(y) > c0(x).
Choose the previous s ∈ R+ with y0s > 0, and recall that ys > xs. Then, Y 0(S) =
c0(y) = cs(ys) > cs(xs) ≥ c0(x) = Y 0(T ). One deduces that Y 0(T ) is strictly decreasing in
T on [ T˜ , 1 ].
(c) For all r ∈ R−, x0r = 0, because yr ≤ xr and, consequently, cr(xr) ≥ cr(yr) ≥ c0(y) >
c0(x).
(d) Let us show that cˆ1(y) < cˆ1(x).
Recall that there exists r ∈ R− such that yr < xr. Then, y1r ≤ yr < xr, and x1r = xr
according to (c). Therefore, cˆ1(y) ≤ cr(yr) + y1rc′(yr) < cr(xr) + x1rc′(xr) = cˆ1(x).
(e) One can show that, for all s ∈ R+, y1s < x1s and, consequently, y0s > 0, x1s > 0.
Indeed, for all s ∈ R+, ys > xs ≥ 0, hence y1s > 0. If there exists some s ∈ R+ such that
y1s ≥ x1s, then cˆ1(y) = cs(ys) + y1sc′(ys) > cs(xs) + x1sc′(xs) ≥ cˆ1(x), i.e. cˆ1(y) > cˆ1(x). This
contradicts (d).
It follows from the fact that ys > xs that y0s > x0s ≥ 0. Besides, x1s > y1s ≥ 0.
(f) For all r ∈ R− and s ∈ R+, cr(xr) > cs(xs), because cr(xr) ≥ cr(yr) ≥ c0(y) =
cs(ys) > cs(xs).
(g) Let us define an auxiliary flow z in the game Γ(R, c, (1− T ; T )) by{
z1s = ys − x0s, z0s = x0s, s ∈ R+;
z1r = yr, z0r = 0, r ∈ R−.
Clearly, z′ = y′, i.e. for all r ∈ R, zr = yr, and
x1s < z
1
s ≤ ys, z0s = x0s, s ∈ R+,
z1r = zr ≤ xr = x1r , z0r = x0r , r ∈ R−.
Now, we are ready to prove that the total cost to the coalition of weight T at z is higher
than that at x, i.e. u1T (y˜) > u1T (x) (the subscript T is added to stress the weight of the
coalition in question). Indeed, for all s ∈ R+ and for all r ∈ R− such that xr > 0,
cˆ1(x) = cs(xs) + x1sc′(xs) = cr(x1r) + x1rc′(x1r). (2.17)
One deduces that, for all s ∈ R+, r ∈ R− such that xr > 0, and for all x > x1s and y such
that 0 ≤ y ≤ x1r ,
cs(x+ x0s) + x c′s(x+ x0s) > cˆ1(x) ≥ cr(y) + y c′r(y). (2.18)
Then,
u1T (z)− u1T (x) =
∑
s∈R+
[
z1scs(zs)− x1scs(xs)
]− ∑
r∈R−
[
x1rcr(x1r)− z1rcr(z1r )
]
=
∑
s∈R+
∫ z1s
x1s
∂
∂x
[
x cs(x+ x0s)
]
dx−
∑
r∈R−
∫ x1r
z1r
∂
∂x
[
x cr(x)
]
dx
=
∑
s∈R+
∫ z1s
x1s
[
cs(x+ x0s) + x c′s(x+ x0s)
]
dx−
∑
r∈R−
∫ x1r
z1r
[
cr(x) + x c′r(x)
]
dx
>
∑
s∈R+
(z1s − x1s) cˆ1(x)−
∑
r∈R−
(x1r − z1r ) cˆ1(x) =
∑
r∈R
(z1r − x1r) cˆ1(x) = (T − T ) cˆ1(x) = 0.
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The inequality above is due to (2.18).
Next, notice the following three facts.
1) For all r ∈ R, zr = yr by the definition of z,
2) For all s ∈ R+, cs(ys) = c0(y) by (e), and
3) For all r ∈ R−, either z1r = yr = y1r or z1r = yr > y1r . In the second case, y0r > 0, which
implies that cr(yr) = c0(y).
These facts induce the relation between the total cost to the coalition of weight T at z
and the total cost to the coalition of weight S at y:
u1T (z) =
∑
s∈R+
z1s cs(zs) +
∑
r∈R−
z1r cr(zr)
=
∑
s∈R+
[
y1s + (z1s − y1s)
]
cs(zs) +
∑
r∈R−
[
y1r + (z1r − y1r )
]
cr(zr)
=
∑
s∈R+
y1s cs(ys) +
∑
r∈R−
y1r cr(yr) +
∑
s∈R+
(z1s − y1s) cs(ys) +
∑
r∈R−
(z1r − y1r ) cr(yr)
= u1S(y) +
∑
r∈R
(z1r − y1r ) c0(y)
= u1S(y) + (T − S) c0(y) = S · Y 1(S) + (T − S) c0(y).
Recall that u1T (z) > u1T (x). Then,
T · Y 1(T ) = u1T (x) < u1T (z) = S · Y 1(S) + (T − S) c0(y). (2.19)
This implies that Y 1(S) > Y 1(T ). Because, otherwise, according to (ii), Y 0(S) = c0(y) <
Y 1(S). Then,
S · Y 1(S) + (T − S) c0(y) < T · Y 1(S) ≤ T · Y 1(T ),
which contradicts (2.19).
Therefore, Y 1(S) > Y 1(T ). One deduces that Y 1(T ) is strictly decreasing in T on [ T˜ , 1 ].
(h) Finally, let us prove that Y (S) > Y (T ), i.e. the social cost at y is higher than at x.
In other words, Y (T ) is strictly decreasing in T on [ T˜ , 1 ].
Indeed, (2.17) implies that, for all s ∈ R+ and r ∈ R− such that xr > 0,
cs(xs) + xsc′(xs) ≥ cˆ1(x) ≥ cr(xr) + xrc′(xr).
Then, for all s ∈ R+ and r ∈ R− such that xr > 0, for all u > xs and v such that 0 ≤ v ≤ xr,
cs(u) + u c′s(u) > cˆ1(x) ≥ cr(v) + v c′r(v). (2.20)
Thus,
Y (S)− Y (T ) =
∑
s∈R+
[
yscs(ys)− xscs(xs)
]− ∑
r∈R−
[
xrcr(xr)− yrcr(yr)
]
=
∑
s∈R+
∫ ys
xs
∂
∂u
u cs(u)du−
∑
r∈R−
∫ xr
yr
∂
∂v
v cr(v)dv
=
∫ ys
xs
[
cs(u) + u c′s(u)
]
du−
∑
r∈R−
∫ xr
yr
[
cr(v) + v c′r(v)
]
dv
>
∑
s∈R+
(ys − xs) cˆ1(x)−
∑
r∈R−
(xr − yr) cˆ1(x) = 0,
where the inequality is due to (2.20).
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2.5.2 Individuals’ cost and the composition of the players
The previous results can be partially extended to the multiple coalitions case. Consider
the following two composite games:
Γ0 = Γ(R, c,T), T =
(
T 0;T 1, . . . , TK
)
,
Γ1 = Γ(R, c,T′), T′ =
(
T 0 + δT ;T 1, . . . , T l−1, T l − δT, T l+1, . . . , TK),
with K ≥ 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ K and 0 < δT < T l. Profile T′ can be seen as obtained by T
after the withdrawal from coalition l of a group of members of total weight δT who become
individuals. Let x and y be, respectively, the CE of the game Γ0 and that of the game Γ1.
The other notations are as before.
The following theorem shows that the individuals’ cost is (weakly) higher at the CE in
the game Γ1 than in the game Γ0.
Theorem 2.19. c0(x) ≤ c0(y).
Proof. The case K = 1 is proven in Theorem 2.18, only the case K ≥ 2 is treated here.
First, define two sets of arcs R− = {r ∈ R | yr ≤ xr} and R+ = R \R− = {r ∈ R | yr >
xr}.
If R+ = ∅, then x′ = y′ and c0(x) = c0(y).
If R+ 6= ∅, let us first prove that, for all k ∈ K \ {l}, ∑r∈R− ykr ≥∑r∈R− xkr .
Suppose that ∑r∈R− ykr ≤ ∑r∈R− xkr and, consequently, ∑s∈R+ yks ≥ ∑s∈R+ xks . There-
fore, there is an arc r ∈ R− and an arc s ∈ R+ such that ykr ≤ xkr and yks ≥ xks .
For all such r and s, if xkr > 0 and yks > 0, then cˆk(y) ≤ cr(yr) + ykr c′r(yr) ≤ cr(xr) +
xkrc
′
r(xr) = cˆk(x) ≤ cs(xs) + xksc′s(xs) < cs(ys) + yks c′s(ys) = cˆk(y), a contradiction. Con-
sequently, either ykr = xkr = 0 or yks = xks = 0. For this to be true, there can be two
cases.
Case 1. For all s ∈ R+ such that yks ≥ xks , yks = xks = 0. Then, there is no s ∈
R+ such that yks < xks because, otherwise,
∑
s∈R+ y
k
s <
∑
s∈R+ x
k
s , which contradicts the
hypothesis that∑r∈R− ykr ≤∑r∈R− xkr . Thus, for all s ∈ R+, yks = xks = 0 and, consequently,∑
r∈R− y
k
r =
∑
r∈R− x
k
r = T k.
Case 2. There exists some s ∈ R+ such that yks ≥ xks and yks > 0. Then, for all r ∈ R−
such that ykr ≤ xkr , ykr = xkr = 0. Therefore, there is no r ∈ R− such that ykr > xkr because,
otherwise, ∑r∈R− ykr > ∑r∈R− xkr , which again contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, for all
r ∈ R−, ykr = xkr = 0 and, in consequence,
∑
r∈R− y
k
r =
∑
r∈R− x
k
r = 0.
Hence, ∑r∈R− ykr ≥ ∑r∈R− xkr and, consequently, ∑s∈R+ yks ≤ ∑s∈R+ xks . Besides, the
equalities hold if, and only if, ∑r∈R− ykr = ∑r∈R− xkr = T k or 0.
From the fact that ∑s∈R+ ys >∑s∈R+ xs and ∑s∈R+ yks ≤∑s∈R+ xks for all k ∈ K \ {l},
one can deduce that ∑s∈R+(y0s + yls) >∑s∈R+(x0s + xls) ≥ 0.
Let us show that there exists some t ∈ R+ such that y0t > 0. Indeed, if for all s ∈ R+,
y0s = 0, then
∑
s∈R+ y
l
s >
∑
s∈R+(x
l
s + x0s) ≥
∑
s∈R+ x
l
s. Besides,
∑
r∈R ylr = T − δT < T =∑
r∈R xlr, hence
∑
t∈R− y
l
t <
∑
t∈R− x
l
t. In particular, there exists r ∈ R− such that ylr < xlr
and s ∈ R+ such that yls > xls. Then, cˆl(y) ≤ cr(yr) + ylrc′(yr) < cr(xr) + xlrc′(xr) = cˆl(x),
and cˆl(y) = cs(ys) + ylsc′(ys) > cs(xs) + xlsc′(xs) ≥ cˆl(x), a contradiction. Thus, there exists
t ∈ R+ such that y0t > 0 and, consequently, c0(y) = ct(yt) > ct(xt) ≥ c0(x).
However, the average cost to the coalition of weight T l (called coalition l) in Γ0 is not
necessarily lower than that to the coalition of weight T l − δT (called coalition l′) in Γ1, and
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the former is not necessarily lower than the average cost to the group composed of coalition
l′ and a set of individuals of total weight δT in Γ1 (the group corresponding to coalition l in
Γ0). In other words, the other two results in Theorem 2.18 (iii) cannot be extended to the
multiple coalitions case. Here is an example.
Example 2.20. Composite game Γ takes place in the same network as in Example 2.17,
where the cost functions of arcs r1 and r2 are, respectively, c1(x) = x+10 and c2(x) = 10x+1.
Coalition 1 has weight T with T ∈ (0, 12 ]; coalition 2 has weight 12 ; the total weight of the
individuals is 12 − T . Then, the average cost to coalition 1 at the CE is 9111 for T ∈ (0, 15 ] and1
99 [919 − 4(25T + 4T )] for T ∈ [15 , 12 ], which is constant in T on (0, 15 ], strictly increasing on
[15 ,
2
5 ] and strictly decreasing on [
2
5 ,
1
2 ]. Therefore, it is not always decreasing in the size of
the coalition. The average cost to the group of total weight 12 composed of coalition 1 and
all the individuals is 9111 for T ∈ (0, 15 ] and 199 [400(T − 1140)2 + 816.75] for T ∈ [15 , 12 ], which is
constant in T on (0, 15 ], strictly decreasing in (
1
5 ,
11
40 ] and strictly increasing on [
11
40 ,
1
2 ]. As a
result, it is not always decreasing in T .
2.6 Asymptotic behavior of composite games
This subsection studies the asymptotic behavior of composite games, when some coali-
tions are fixed and the size of the others vanish.
Definition 2.21 (Admissible sequence of composite games and its limit game). A sequence
of composite games {Γn}n∈N∗ , with Γn = Γ(R, c,Tn) and Tn = (T 0n ; T 1n , T 2n , . . . , TKnn ), is
called admissible if {Tn}n∈N∗ satisfies the following conditions:
(i) there is a constant L ∈ N, and L strictly positive constants {T 1, T 2, . . . , TL} such that∑L
k=1 T
k < 1. For all n, Kn > L, and T in = T i for i = 1, . . . , L;
(ii) δn = maxL<k≤Kn T kn . And δn → 0 as n→∞.
The L-coalition composite game Γ0 = Γ(R, c, (T˜ 0; T 1, T 2, . . . , TL)) is called the limit
game of the sequence {Γn}n∈N∗ , where T˜ 0 = 1−∑Lk=1 T k.
Remark 2.22. Condition (i) means that there are L coalitions fixed all along the sequence
{Γn}n∈N∗ , and the total weight of the remaining coalitions and the individuals is fixed to
T˜ 0. Condition (ii) means that the other coalitions are vanishing along the sequence and,
necessarily, Kn tends to infinity.
Notation. As before, in the game Γn, x∗n = (x∗kn )Knk=0 is the CE, where x∗0n is the flow of
the individuals, and x∗kn the flow of coalition k. Besides, Y 0(x∗n) is the individuals’ cost and
Y k(x∗n) the average cost to coalition k at CE.
The aggregate flows are defined as x∗n′ = (y∗n, x∗1n , x∗2n , . . . , x∗Ln ), where y∗n = (y∗n,r)r∈R,
y∗n,r = x∗0n,r+
∑Kn
k=L+1 x
∗k
n,r. Thus, y∗n is the aggregate flow of the individuals in addition to all
the coalitions different from the L fixed ones. Notice that this is different from the definition
of aggregate flow in the previous sections.
The feasible flow set is Fn = {x ∈ RR×(1+Kn) |x ≥ 0; ∀ k = 0 or k ∈ K, ∑r∈R xkr = T kn}
and F0 = {x ∈ RR×(1+L) |x ≥ 0; ∀ k ∈ K, ∑r∈R xkr = T k; ∑r∈R x0r = T˜ 0} is the feasible
aggregate flow set. Notice that it is common to all the games in {Γn}n∈N∗ .
In Γ0, x∗ = (y∗, x∗1, . . . , x∗L) is the CE, where y∗ = x∗0 is the flow of the individuals,
and x∗k the flow of coalition k. Y 0(x∗) is the individuals’ cost and Y k(x∗) the average cost
to coalition k at CE. The feasible flow set is F0.
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The following theorem states that the CE of Γn converges to the CE of Γ0. Hence, it
justifies the name ‘limit game’.
Theorem 2.23 (Convergence of admissible composite games). Suppose that {Γn}n∈N∗ is a
sequence of admissible games satisfying Assumption 2.1. Let Γ0 be its limit game. Then,
x∗n′ → x∗ as n → ∞. In particular, Y k(x∗n) → Y k(x∗) for k = 1, . . . , L, and Y k(x∗n) →
Y 0(x∗) for k = 0 and k > L.
Proof. Let us begin by writing the variational inequality condition for the CE’s x∗n and x∗.
By Proposition 2.3, x∗n is the CE of Γn if, and only if,
〈
c(x∗n), x0n − x∗0n
〉
+
Kn∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉
≥ 0, ∀ xn ∈ Fn, (2.21)
and x∗ is the CE of Γ0 if, and only if,
〈 c(x∗), y− y∗ 〉+
L∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗), xk − x∗k
〉
≥ 0, ∀ x = (y, x1, . . . , xL) ∈ F0. (2.22)
According to Assumption 2.1, one can find a constantM such thatM > supr∈R, x∈[0, 1]{|c′r(x)|}.
Set n = 2δnMR so that n tends to 0. Let us show that, for all n, the aggregate flow x∗n′ in
F0 satisfies
〈
c(x∗n′), y− y∗n
〉
+
L∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n′), xk − x∗kn
〉
≥ −n, ∀ x = (y, x1, . . . , xL) ∈ F0. (2.23)
Indeed, for any x = (y, x1, . . . , xL) ∈ F0, one can find xn = (xkn)Knk=0 ∈ Fn such that{
xkn = xk, k = 1, . . . , L;
x0n,r +
∑Kn
k=L+1 x
k
n,r = yn,r, ∀ r ∈ R.
(2.24)
For example, take x0n,r = yn,rT 0/T˜ 0, xkn,r = yn,rT k/T˜ 0 for k = L + 1, . . . , Kn. Then, by
(2.21),
〈
c(x∗n), x0n − x∗0n
〉
+
Kn∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉 ≥ 0
⇒ 〈 c(x∗n), x0n − x∗0n 〉+ L∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉
+
Kn∑
k=L+1
〈
c(x∗n) + x∗kn c˙(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉 ≥ 0
⇒
〈
c(x∗n), x0n +
Kn∑
k=L+1
xkn − x∗0n −
Kn∑
k=L+1
x∗kn
〉
+
L∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉
≥ −
Kn∑
k=L+1
〈
x∗kn c˙(x∗n), xkn − x∗kn
〉 ≥ − Kn∑
k=L+1
〈
δnM, xkn − x∗kn
〉
= −
〈
δnM,
Kn∑
k=L+1
xkn −
Kn∑
k=L+1
x∗kn
〉
≥ −2δnMR.
By (2.24), this is just 〈 c(x∗n′), y− y∗n 〉+
∑L
k=1
〈
cˆk(x∗n′), xk − x∗kn
〉 ≥ −n.
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The fact that F0 is a compact subset of RR×(1+L) implies that {x∗n′}n∈N∗ admits accu-
mulation points in F0. For any convergent subsequence of {x∗n′}n∈N∗ (which is still denoted
by {x∗n′}n∈N∗ for simplicity), let x˜ = (y˜, x˜1, . . . , x˜L) be its accumulation point. Let n tend
to infinity in (2.23). Then, by the continuity of the marginal cost functions and the fact that
n tends to 0,
〈
c(x˜L), y− y˜
〉
+
L∑
k=1
〈
cˆk(x˜), xk − x˜k
〉
≥ 0, ∀ x = (y, x1, . . . , xL ) ∈ F0.
According to (2.22), this implies that x˜ = x∗.
Therefore, x∗n′ converges to x∗ as n tends to infinity. This induces immediately that
Y k(x∗n) tends to Y k(x∗) for k = 1, . . . , L, and Y k(x∗n) tends to Y 0(x∗) for k = 0 and
k > L.
Remark 2.24. When T 0 = 0 and L = 0, Theorem 2.23 shows that the NE of an atomic
splittable game with only coalitions and no individuals converges to the WE of the corre-
sponding nonatomic game, when the coalitions split into smaller and smaller ones. This
result is obtained by Haurie and Marcotte [36], but only for the case where the coalitions
split into equal-size ones. Theorem 2.23 is an extension of their result in three aspects.
First, the coalitions do not have equal size. Second, the games are composite. Finally, some
coalitions are fixed at a nonnegligible weight.
2.7 Some problems for future research
This section presents some directions for further studies.
2.7.1 Backward induction
Consider a two-stage extensive form game with an underlying network (R, c) and a set
of nonatomic individuals [ 0, 1]. At the first stage, the individuals are given K + 1 choices
{s0, s1, . . . , sK}, where K is a fixed number in N∗ = N \ {0}. The players who choose s0
are called individuals, and those who choose sk (1 ≤ k ≤ K) are considered as members of
coalition k. If there are L coalitions having nonnegligible weights (0 ≤ L ≤ K) then, at the
second stage, the individuals and L coalitions play the composite routing game Γ(R, c,T).
By Lemma 2.8, the players who choose s0 at the first stage have the lowest cost at the end.
Therefore, by a backward induction, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage
game consists in having all the players choosing s0 at the first stage.
2.7.2 Composition-decision games
In a two-player composition-decision game, each player is atomic with a splittable flow.
The weight of player I is T , while that of player II is 1 − T . Each player chooses a pair
of representatives consisting of a coalition and a group of individuals, whose total weight is
her own weight. The cost to each player is defined as the average equilibrium cost to her
representatives in a composite routing game played by all the representatives. Consider two
simple models where the game reduces to a one-player game.
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Model 1: One atomic player faces individuals. Player I has two strategies. Strategy
1 consists in choosing a coalition of weight T , while strategy 2 consists in choosing a group
of individuals of weight T . Player II always chooses a group of individuals of weight 1− T .
If player I chooses strategy 1, the costs to the two players are, respectively, the equilibrium
cost to the unique coalition and that to the individuals in the composite game Γ(R, c, (1−
T ;T )), i.e. Y 1(T ) for player I, Y 0(T ) for player II. If player I chooses strategy 2, both the
costs to the two players are W , the equilibrium cost in the nonatomic game Γ(R, c).
Theorem 2.18(ii) shows that, if 0 < T ≤ T˜ , then the two strategies make no difference to
player I. If T˜ < T < 1, player I’s only best reply is strategy 1, and her cost is Y 1(T ), which
is lower than W . Strategy 1 dominates strategy 2.
Model 2: One group faces a coalition. Player I has the same two strategies as in
Model 1. Player II always chooses a coalition of weight 1− T .
If player I chooses strategy 1, the costs to the two players are the equilibrium costs in
the two-coalition game Γ(R, c, (0;T, 1− T )). If player I chooses strategy 2, the costs to the
two players are, respectively, the equilibrium cost to the individuals and that to the unique
coalition in the composite game Γ(R, c, (T ; 1 − T )), i.e. Y 0(1 − T ) for player I, Y 1(1 − T )
for player II.
Does strategy 1 still dominate strategy 2? The answer is negative. Here is a counter-
example.
Example 2.25. Still take the network where two parallel arcs r1 and r2 have cost functions
c1(x) = x+ 10 and c2(x) = 10x+ 1. T = 1/2, i.e. player I and player II both have weight
1/2. Player II always chooses a coalition of weight 1/2.
If player I chooses strategy 1, at the NE of the atomic splittable game Γ(R, c, (0; 1/2, 1/2)),
the average cost to the coalition of player I is 93/11 = 8.455. (The average cost to the coali-
tion of player II is 93/11 = 8.455. Both two coalitions send weight 2/11 on r1, and the rest
7/22 on r2.)
If player I chooses strategy 2, at the CE of the composite game Γ(R, c, (1/2; 1/2)), the
average cost to the individuals of player I is 91/11 = 8.273. (The average cost to the coalition
of player II is 103/11 = 9.364. The coalition of player II sends weight 3/11 on r1, and the
rest 5/22 on r2, while the individuals of player I all take r2.)
8.273 < 8.455, so that the only best reply of player I is strategy 2.
Furthermore, Example 2.20 shows that, if player I can choose an arbitrary size S ∈ [0, 1/2]
for her coalition, her best choice is S = 11/40.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Group deviation
Let us return to the one-coalition games studied in Section 2.5. Suppose that there is one
coalition of size T formed. Theorem 2.18 (ii) states that, if T > T˜ , then the individuals’ cost
Y 0(T ) is strictly lower than the average cost to the coalition. Because of the individuals’
weightlessness, being the only individual who quits or enters in the coalition will only affect
her own cost. If everybody believes herself to be the only smart one, and no contact is
allowed between them, and if one is free to quit or to stay in the coalition before the game is
repeated, the coalition will no longer exist. Theorem 2.18 confirms that it is the worst result
for everyone.
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However, if the individuals are allowed to talk to each other before the game, and if a
group of individuals of total weight dT > 0 agree to enter in the coalition simultaneously,
their group deviation might decrease their own costs as well as those of the others. This is
actually the case when Y 1(T + dT ) < Y 0(T ).
0 T
c0 Y
1
Y 0
• •
1T T + dTT˜
Figure 2.2
Example 2.26. As in Example 2.17, two parallel arcs r1 and r2 have, respectively, cost
functions c1(x) = x+ 10 and c2(x) = 10x+ 1. Then, T˜ = 1/10, and (cf. Figure 2.2){
Y 0(T ) = Y 1(T ) = W = 11111 , if 0 ≤ T ≤ 110 ;
Y 0(T ) = 11111 − 5011(T − 110), Y 1(T ) = 11111 − 2511T (T − 110)2, if 110 < T < 1.
For T ∈ (T˜ , 1), let
d (T ) = inf
{
d ≥ 0 ∣∣Y 1(T + d) ≤ Y 0(T ) }
be the infimum of group size such that their group deviation reduces their cost. Then
d (T ) =

√
T 2 − 1100 , if 110 < T ≤ 101200 ;
+∞, if 101200 < T < 1.
In other words, when a coalition of weight between 1/10 and 101/200 is already formed,
the group deviation of a group of noncoalitional individuals of total weight larger than√
T 2 − 1/100 will reduce the cost of each of them. This infimum of deviation group size
increases with the size of the actual coalition.
However, it is well known that, lack of trust in each other, such kind of cheap talk before
the game will actually change nothing in the choices of the players.
2.8.2 Cost levels and social marginal costs
This section studies the relation between the cost of an arc and its contribution to the
social cost at the CE in a composite game Γ(R, c,T).
Definition 2.27. The social marginal cost of arc r at y ∈ F is c˜r(y) = cr(yr) + yrc′r(yr).
From now on, all the definitions and results are to be understood at x, the unique CE of
Γ(R, c,T).
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Definition 2.28. The cost level of an arc r is denoted by ir, where i is a function from R
to {1, . . . ,K,+∞} defined by
ir =

0, if r ∈ R \ R1(x);
k, if r ∈ Rk(x) and r /∈ Rl(x), ∀ l > k;
+∞, if r ∈ R0(x),
where k ∈ K, l ∈ K ∪ {0}.
The following corollary follows immediately from Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9.
Corollary 2.29. For any arcs r, s, t ∈ R,
(i) if ir = is = +∞ and it < +∞, then cr(x) = cs(x) ≤ ct(x);
(ii) if 0 ≤ ir < is < +∞, then cs(x) < cr(x).
The following theorem shows that, at the CE, the lower the cost of an arc, the higher its
social marginal cost.
Proposition 2.30. For any arcs r, s ∈ R,
(i) if is < ir ≤ +∞, or if 1 < is = ir < +∞ and cr(x) < cs(x), then c˜r(x) > c˜s(x) and
consequently xr c′(xr) > xs c′(xs);
(ii) if is = ir = 1, or if 1 < ir = is < +∞ and cr(x) = cs(x), then c˜r(x) = c˜s(x).
Proof. First recall that if xkr > 0 and xks > 0 for some k ∈ K,
cr(x) + xkrc′r(x) = cs(x) + xksc′s(x). (2.25)
(i) If is < ir ≤ +∞, then cs(x) ≥ cr(x). By taking the sum of (2.25) for all k ≤ is, one
has
is cr(x) +
is∑
k=1
xkr c
′
r(x) = is cs(x) + xs c′s(x)
⇒ (is − 1 + 1) cr(x) + xr c′r(x) = (is − 1 + 1) cs(x) + xs c′s(x) +
∑
k∈K∪{+∞},k>is
xkrc
′
r(x)
⇒ c˜r(x)− c˜s(x) = (is − 1)
[
cs(x)− cr(x)
]
+
∑
k∈K∪{+∞},k>is
xkr c
′
r(x) > 0 (2.26)
⇒ c˜r(x) > c˜s(x).
Here (2.26) is because ∑k∈K∪{+∞},k>is xkr ≥ xirr > 0.
If 1 < is = ir < +∞ and cr(x) < cs(x), summing (2.25) over all k ≤ is leads to
is cr(x) + xr c′r(x) = is cs(x) + xs c′s(x) (2.27)
⇒ c˜r(x)− c˜s(x) = (is − 1)
[
cs(x)− cr(x)
]
> 0.
(2) If is = ir = 1, or if 1 < ir = is < +∞ and cr(x) = cs(x), then, still by (2.27),
c˜r(x)− c˜s(x) = (is − 1)
[
cs(x)− cr(x)
]
= 0.
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2.8.3 The name of “composite games”
Composite games were first studied by Harker [32] then by Boulogne et al. [15]. They
called such games mixed games. This terminology is avoided here because it can be confused
with the mixed extension of a game. However, since the term “mixed equilibrium” of Harker
is already very much in use, it may be wise to keep this name for games played by atomic
players with splittable stocks and nonatomic players, while reserve “composite games” for a
more general class of games where the atomic players can hold several types of stocks, some
arbitrarily splittable, some unsplittable, and some splittable but not arbitrarily etc. For a
detailed discussion on the types of the stocks, the reader is referred to §1.6.
Chapter 3
Composition of the players in
two-singleton-choice congestion
games
This chapter is based on the paper Composition of the players in two-singleton-choice
congestion games.
Abstract. In a two-terminal two-parallel-arc network, a finite number of atomic players
with splittable stocks and a group of nonatomic players have a common origin/destination
pair and common arc cost functions. This paper shows that, under a standard condition on
the cost functions, whenever an atomic player l is replaced by a composite set T of players
who, together, hold the same stock as l, the social cost as well as the cost to each of the other
players at the unique equilibrium of the second game (played by the players in T and the
others) are increased or do not change with respect to the first game (played by player l and
the others). However, the per-unit cost to an atomic player in T in the second game can be
higher or lower than the per-unit cost to player l in the first game.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Composite congestion games and the composition of the players
In a congestion game [74], each player has a certain quantity of stock and a (specific)
finite set of choices. A choice is a subset of common facilities. A player holding a stock of
infinitesimal weight is called a nonatomic player or an individual. She has to affect her stock
to one choice. A player holding a stock of strictly positive weight is called an atomic player.
Furthermore, she (more rigorously, her stock) is splittable if she can divide it into several
parts and affect each part to a different choice. This work considers only splittable stocks so
that the word splittable is often omitted. Each facility entails a cost to the stocks affected
to it, and the cost depends on the total weight of these stocks. The cost to a player is the
total cost to her stock, and she wishes to minimize it. The social cost is the total cost to all
the players or, equivalently, to all the stocks.
A game with nonatomic (resp. atomic, resp. both nonatomic and atomic) players is
called a nonatomic (resp. atomic, resp. composite) congestion game. Given an atomic or
a composite congestion game Γ, the nonatomic congestion game with the same stocks as in
Γ is called the corresponding nonatomic game of Γ. With continuously differentiable cost
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functions of the facilities, an equilibrium exists in a composite congestion game, and it is
called a composite equilibrium (CE for short) [15, 32, 91]. An equilibrium in a nonatomic
(resp. atomic) game is often called Wardrop equilibrium [94] (resp. Nash equilibrium).
Notice that an equilibrium is not necessarily a social optimum, namely, a strategy profile
that minimizes the social cost.
This work aims to examine the relation between the composition of the players and
their costs at equilibria. With a fixed set of stocks, do the costs at equilibria depend on
how these stocks are distributed between the players? And if so, how? If some atomic or
nonatomic players form a coalition which behaves like an atomic player, will the total cost
of the cooperators be reduced? Will the costs to the non-cooperators be increased? Will the
social cost be reduced or increased? Or, on the contrary, if an atomic player is replaced by
a composite set of players, i.e. a group of atomic and/or nonatomic players, but the total
weight remains the same, how will the equilibrium costs change?
Network congestion games, also called routing games, constitute an important class of
congestion games. They take place in a directed graph, where a facility is an arc and a choice
is a directed path. A player has to send her stock from its origin to its destination, and the
set of her choices is the set of directed paths between these two vertices. Routing games will
be taken as an example in this work to study general congestion games.
In a congestion game with two singleton-choices, all the players have the same two choices,
and each choice contains a single facility. In a routing game, it corresponds to the case where
all the players have to send their stock from a common origin to a common destination, and
the two vertices are connected by two parallel arcs.
3.1.2 Related works
For the sake of simplicity, the following results are presented under the assumption that
the cost functions of the arcs are standard, which means that they are strictly increasing,
convex and continuously differentiable on a domain large enough so that there is no capacity
constraints. Besides, a game has single commodity if all the stocks are to be sent from the
same origin to the same destination by the same available paths, on which they experience
the same per-unit cost. Otherwise, it has multi-commodity.
Roughgarden and Tardos [78], Roughgarden [76], Cominetti et al. [20], Harks [33, 34]
and Roughgarden and Schoppmann [77] studied the price of anarchy in atomic congestion
games. Recall that the price of anarchy [50, 67] is the ratio between the social cost at the
worst Nash equilibrium and the minimal social cost.
Hayrapetyan et al. [37] defined the price of collusion of a nonatomic game to be the
ratio between the social cost at the worst Nash equilibrium of all the atomic games induced
by a formation of coalitions (which they called collusion) and the social cost at the worst
Wardrop equilibrium. They showed that any cooperation reduces the social cost at the
unique equilibrium in a two-terminal parallel-arc network. Therefore, the price of collusion in
nonatomic games in such networks is bounded by 1. Bhaskar et al. [11] extended this result to
single-origin single-destination series-parallel networks. Recall that a series-parallel network
is obtained by merging, in series or in parallel, some two-terminal parallel-arc networks.
Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2) proved the same result for composite games in two-terminal parallel-
arc networks, where individuals can remain independent without joining any coalition. For a
general network, Cominetti et al. [20] obtained that, in an atomic congestion game, if all the
atomic players have the same weight, the social cost at the unique equilibrium is bounded
by that in the corresponding nonatomic game. For the multi-commodity case, Cominetti et
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al. [20] gave two examples where the social cost is increased after the formation of coalition(s)
of the individuals.
As for the cooperation between the atomic players and its impact on the social cost,
Cominetti et al. [20] showed that, in single commodity case, the social cost at the unique
equilibrium in an atomic game whereK atomic players equally share the stocks is bounded by
the social cost in a game where K˜ atomic players equally share the same stocks, and K˜ > K.
Huang [46] proved that, in single commodity case, the social cost after the formation of
coalition(s) (not necessarily of the same size) is bounded by that before the cooperation if,
and only if, the network is well-designed (cf. §3.5) and the cost functions are affine (in which
case the equilibrium is always unique). Altman et al. [5] gave examples of multi-commodity
atomic congestion games where the formation of coalitions by atomic players increases the
social cost.
The above works compare the social cost at equilibria in an atomic or composite conges-
tion game with that in the corresponding nonatomic game. The impact of the cooperation
on the equilibrium cost to each player, either cooperator or non-cooperator, is more complex.
Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2) showed that each atomic player’s per-unit cost and the individuals’
cost at the unique equilibrium of a composite game in a two-terminal parallel-arc network is
lower than the unique equilibrium cost in the corresponding nonatomic game. The author
also showed that, in the same context, if there is a unique coalition, the individuals’ common
cost and the average cost to the coalition are both decreasing with respect to the coalition’s
weight. This result is partially extended to multi-coalition cases in the same paper. It is
proved that, whenever a coalition l is replaced by a composite set of players of the same
total weight as l, which contains a smaller coalition and a set of individuals, the individuals’
common cost is increased. On the contrary, an example in [91] shows that the impact of
the cooperation on the cooperators themselves can be either positive or negative, even in
a two-parallel network with affine costs. For multi-commodity case, Cominetti et al. [20]
and Altman et al. [5] gave examples where the formation of coalition(s) by, respectively,
nonatomic and atomic players increases their own members’ costs.
3.1.3 Main results
This work shows that, in a composite congestion game with two-singleton choices or,
equivalently, in a two-terminal two-parallel-arc composite routing game, with standard cost
functions for each choice, whenever an atomic player of weight m is replaced by a composite
set of players, i.e. L (L can be 0) atomic players of weight m1, . . . ,mL and a set of nonatomic
players of total weight m0, such that m0 ≥ 0, mi > 0 for i = 1, . . . , L, and ∑Li=0mi = m,
the social cost at the unique equilibrium is increased or does not change, and the cost to
each of the other players not involved in this replacement is increased or does not change. In
an equivalent way, after each formation of coalition between certain atomic and nonatomic
players, the social cost and the cost to each of the players not involved in the coalition are
decreased or do not change at the unique equilibrium.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 3.2, the model of the two-
terminal two-parallel-arc composite routing game is presented, and some preliminary results
are recalled. Section 3.3 is contributed to the properties of the composite equilibria in the
specific setting of two-terminal two-parallel-arc networks. In Section 3.4, the main results
are obtained. Section 3.5 concludes by some remarks and some topics for future research.
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3.2 Model and known results
In this work, Jm,nK stands for the set of successive positive integers [m,n] ∩ N =
{m,m+ 1, . . . , n− 1, n}. Recall that N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and N∗ = N \ {0}.
3.2.1 Model of a two-terminal two-parallel-arc composite routing game
O D
c1(x)
c2(x)
Network. Vertex O and vertex D are linked by two arcs. The per-unit cost function of
arc r is cr, for r = 1, 2, and c = (c1, c2). When the total weight of stocks on arc r is x, the
cost to each unit of them is cr(x). Real-valued cost functions c1 and c2 are defined on the
real interval (−η,M + η), where M > 0 and η > 0, and they satisfy the following (standard)
assumption throughout this work.
A 3.1. Cost functions c1 and c2 are strictly increasing, convex and continuously differentiable
on (−η, M + η), and non-negative on [ 0,M ].
Players and strategies. There is a group of individuals of total weight T 0, and N atomic
splittable players, respectively, of weight T 1, T 2, . . . , TN , where N ∈ N, T 0 ≥ 0, and T i > 0
for all i ∈ J1, NK if N > 0. The profile of the players is described by the vector T =
(T 0, T 1, T 2, . . . , TN ). The total weight of the players, i.e. the total weight of their stocks, is
M = ∑Ni=0 T i. Without loss of generality, suppose that T 1 ≥ · · · ≥ TN . An atomic player is
said to be larger than another if she has a larger weight. Denote T [p] = ∑pi=1 T i, the total
weight of the p largest atomic players, for p ∈ J1, NK.
The profile of the individuals’ strategies is specified by a vector x0 = (x01, x02), called their
flow, where x0r is the total weight of the individuals on arc r. The strategy of the atomic
player i is specified by a vector xi = (xi1, xi2), called her flow, where xir is the weight that she
sends by arc r. Denote ξr =
∑N
i=0 x
i
r, the total weight on arc r. The vector x = (xi)Ni=0 is
called the system flow (induced by the players’ strategies) or, flow for short.
For i ∈ J1, NK, denote x−i = ∏0≤j≤N, j 6=i xj and x−ir = ξr − xir. Besides, for i ∈ {0} ∪J1, NK, denote Xi = {xi ∈ R2 |xi1 ≥ 0, xi2 ≥ 0, xi1 + xi2 = T i} and X = ∏Ni=0Xi. These are
the spaces of feasible flows for the individuals, the atomic players and the whole system.
Costs. When the flow is x, the cost to an individual taking arc r is cr(ξr). The cost
to the atomic player i is ui(x) = xi1c1(ξ1) + xi2c2(ξ2). Her per-unit cost is denoted by
Y i(x) = ui(x)/T i. The social cost is defined as v(x) = ξ1c1(ξ1) + ξ2c2(ξ2).
From now on, the network and its cost functions c are fixed. A composite game taking
place there is specified by the profile of its players T and thus denoted by Γ(T).
Composite equilibrium (CE).
Definition 3.2. In the game Γ(T), a flow x ∈ X is a composite equilibrium if it meets the
two conditions below:
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(i) For all r ∈ {1, 2}, if x0r > 0, then cr(ξr) ≤ ct(ξt) for all t ∈ {1, 2}.
(ii) For all i ∈ J1, NK, xi minimizes Y i( ·, x−i) on Xi.
By definition, the individuals take the arcs of the lowest cost at the CE x. When T 0 = 0,
i.e. there are no individuals, Y 0(x) will still be used to denote the lowest arc cost in the
network.
3.2.2 Auxiliary functions and notations
Let  be a strictly positive constant. Two functions h, a, and a family of functions
{Fn}n∈N are defined on the real line R as below:
h(x) =

c2(M − x)− c1(x)
c′1(x)
, if 0 ≤ x ≤M ;
h(0)− x, if x < 0;
h(M)− (x−M), if x > M,
a(x) =

c′2(M − x)
c′1(x)
, if 0 ≤ x ≤M ;
a(0), if x < 0;
a(M), if x > M,
Fn(x) = (M − x)
(
1 + a(x)
)
+ nh(x), n ∈ N.
Remark 3.3. It follows immediately from A3.1 that h and Fn’s are strictly decreasing and
continuous on R, and their ranges are all R. Their inverse functions h−1 and F−1n ’s are also
strictly decreasing and continuous on R.
Besides, a is non-increasing, strictly positive and continuous on R.
Proposition 3.4. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists ξˆ ∈ [ 0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ).
(ii) c1(M) ≥ c2(0) and c2(M) ≥ c1(0) or, equivalently, h(M) ≤ 0 and h(0) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, there is at most one ξˆ ∈ [ 0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ).
Proof. Clear by A3.1.
Notation. H = h(M).
If there exists ξˆ ∈ [ 0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ), then denote A = a(ξˆ).
Remark 3.5. When ξˆ exists, h(ξˆ) = 0, Fk(ξˆ) = (M − ξˆ) (1 +A) = F0(ξˆ) for all k ∈ N.
3.2.3 Properties of CE
Let us recall some important results on composite routing games. The following three
theorems are cited from Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2). They are reformulated in our context.
Theorem 3.6. A vector x ∈ X is a CE of the game Γ(T) if, and only if, for all r ∈ {1, 2},
x0r > 0 ⇒ cr(ξr) = min
s∈{1,2}
cs(ξs) (3.1)
and, for all r ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ J1, NK,
xir > 0 ⇒ cr(ξr) + xir c′(ξr) = min
s∈{1,2}
cs(ξs) + xis c′(ξs). (3.2)
Theorem 3.7. The game Γ(T) admits one and only one CE.
Theorem 3.8. At the CE x of the game Γ(T), for all r ∈ {1, 2},
1. if x0r > 0, then xir > 0 for all i ∈ J1, NK;
2. for all i, j ∈ J1, NK, if T i ≥ T j, then xir ≥ xjr, and the equality holds if, and only if,
T i = T j or xir = xjr = 0;
3. for all i ∈ J1, NK and s ∈ {1, 2} \ {r}, if xir > 0 and xis = 0, then cr(ξr) < cs(ξs).
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3.3 Three modes of the CE
3.3.1 Preliminary results
The following assumption will also be made throughout this work.
A 3.9. One and only one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) c1(M) < c2(0) or, equivalently, H > 0.
(ii) c1(M) ≥ c2(0), c2(M) ≥ c1(0) or, equivalently, H ≤ 0, h(0) ≥ 0; and
ξˆ c′1(ξˆ) ≥ (M − ξˆ) c′2(M − ξˆ). (3.3)
Remark 3.10. Clearly, the case where c2(M) < c1(0) and the case where c1(M) ≥ c2(0),
c2(M) ≥ c1(0) and ξˆ c′1(ξˆ) ≤ (M − ξˆ) c′2(M − ξˆ) are, respectively, symmetric to the two cases
in A3.9. Thus, A3.9 does not lose generality.
Remark 3.11. Without difficulty, one can deduce from (3.3) that
(M − ξˆ)(1 +A) ≤ M ≤ ξˆ 1 +A
A
. (3.4)
On account of A3.9, the flow of the CE x takes some special form as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 3.12. At the CE x of Γ(T),
1. c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2);
2. if c2(0) ≤ c1(M) or, equivalently, H ≤ 0, then ξ1 ≤ ξˆ;
3. h(ξ1) ≥ 0, and the equality holds if, and only if, c2(0) ≤ c1(M) and ξ1 = ξˆ.
Proof. 1. In the case where c1(M) < c2(0), c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2) is always true.
In the case where c1(M) ≥ c2(0) and c2(M) ≥ c1(0), suppose that c1(ξ1) > c2(ξ2). If
ξ1 ≤ ξˆ and thus M − ξ1 ≥ M − ξˆ, according to the monotonicity of c1 and c2 and the
definition of ξˆ, c1(ξ1) ≤ c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ) ≤ c2(ξ2), which contradicts the hypothesis that
c1(ξ1) > c2(ξ2). Therefore, ξ1 > ξˆ. In particular, ξ1 > 0.
Because ξ1 > ξˆ and, consequently, ξ2 < M − ξˆ, according to A3.1 and A3.9, ξ1 c′1(ξ1) >
ξˆ c′1(ξˆ) ≥ (M − ξˆ) c′2(M − ξˆ) > ξ2 c′2(ξ2). Thus, ξ1 c′1(ξ1) > ξ2 c′2(ξ2).
In this case, notice that N ≥ 1 because, otherwise, T 0 = M , i.e. all the players are
individuals, and the hypothesis that c1(ξ1) > c2(ξ2) implies that all the individuals are on
arc 2 because of (3.1), hence c1(0) > c2(M), which contradicts A3.9.
Because c1(ξ1) > c2(ξ2), it follows from Theorem 3.8 that there exists some l ≤ N such
that xi1 > 0, xi2 > 0 for i ∈ J1, lK and, if l < N , xi1 = 0, xi2 = T i for i ∈ Jl + 1, NK. According
to (3.2),
c1(ξ1) + xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + xi2 c′2(ξ2), i ∈ J1, lK. (3.5)
Besides, if T 0 > 0, then x01 = 0 and x02 = T 0 because of (3.1). Summing (3.5) over all
i ∈ J1, lK leads to
l c1(ξ1) + ξ1 c′1(ξ1) = l c2(ξ2) +
(
ξ2 −
N∑
i=l+1
T i − T 0) c′1(ξ1) ≤ l c2(ξ2) + ξ2 c′1(ξ1),
and the equality holds if, and only if, T 0 = 0 and l = N . But this is impossible because,
otherwise, c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2), which contradicts the hypothesis that c1(ξ1) > c2(ξ2).
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Thus, c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2).
2. If c2(0) ≤ c1(M) and ξ1 > ξˆ, then by A3.1, c1(ξ1) > c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ) > c2(ξ2), which
contradicts the fact that c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2).
3. Recall that h is strictly decreasing. If c1(M) < c2(0) or, equivalently, H > 0, the fact
that ξ1 ≤ M implies that h(ξ1) ≥ h(M) = H > 0. If c2(0) ≤ c1(M), the fact that ξ1 ≤ ξˆ
and the monotonicity of h imply that h(ξ1) ≥ h(ξˆ) = 0, and the equality holds if and only if
ξ1 = ξˆ.
Combining the previous results, only three modes of x of the game Γ(T) are possible.
They will be analyzed below.
3.3.2 Mode 1
The CE x is of mode 1 if {
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
xi1 = T i, i ∈ 0 ∪ J1, NK. (3.6)
Mode 1 T 1 · · · TN T 0
arc 1 T 1 · · · TN T 0
arc 2 0 · · · 0 0
Because ξ1 = M and c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2), c1(M) < c2(0) or, equivalently, H > 0.
If N ≥ 1, it follows from (3.2) that, for i ∈ J1, NK, c1(M) + T i c′1(M) ≤ c2(0) or,
equivalently, T i ≤ H.
These results yield the following proposition.
Proposition 3.13. The sufficient and necessary conditions for the CE x of Γ(T) to be of
mode 1 (cf. (3.6)) are the following:
H > 0; (3.7)
if N ≥ 1, then T i ≤ H for all i ∈ J1, NK. (3.8)
3.3.3 Mode 2
The CE x is of mode 2 if
c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2). (3.9)
Mode 2 T 1 · · · TN T 0
arc 1 x11 · · · xN1 x01
arc 2 x12 · · · xN2 x02
According to Proposition 3.4 and A3.9, the fact that c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) implies that H ≤ 0
and ξ1 = ξˆ.
If N ≥ 1, then it follows from (3.2) that c1(ξ1) + xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + xi2 c′2(ξ2) for
i ∈ J1, NK. This is equivalent to xi1 = AT i1+A because c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2). The flow is
xi1 =
AT i
1 +A, i ∈ J1, NK; (3.10a)
x01 = ξˆ −
AT [N ]
1 +A . (3.10b)
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Because 0 ≤ x01 ≤ T 0, one deduces from (3.10) and (3.4) that T [N ] < (M − ξˆ )(1 +A).
These results give rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.14. The sufficient and necessary conditions for the CE x of Γ(T) to be of
mode 2 (cf. (3.9)) are the following:
H ≤ 0; (3.11)
if N ≥ 1, then T [N ] ≤ (M − ξˆ )(1 +A). (3.12)
3.3.4 Mode 3
The CE x is of mode 3 and specified by k if
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
N ≥ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ N ;
xi2 > 0, i ∈ J1, kK;
xi2 = 0, i ∈ {0} and, if k < N, i ∈ Jk + 1, NK.
(3.13)
Mode 3 T 1 · · · Tk Tk+1 · · · TN T 0
arc 1 x11 · · · xk1 Tk+1 · · · TN T 0
arc 2 x12 · · · xk2 0 · · · 0 0
The following two results follow from (3.2):
(i) ifN > k, then, for i ∈ Jk+1, NK, c1(ξ1)+T i c′1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2) or, equivalently, T i ≤ h(ξ1);
(ii) for i ∈ J1, kK, c1(ξ1)+xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2)+xi2 c′2(ξ2) or, equivalently, xi1 = T i a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) .
It is not difficult to deduce the following two results from the constraint that 0 < xi1 < T i:
(i) T i > −h(ξ1)/a(ξ1), which is always true, because h(ξ1) ≥ 0 and a(ξ1) > 0;
(ii) T i > h(ξ1).
Besides, ξ1 =
∑k
i=1 x
i
1 +M − T [k] = M − T
[k]−k h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) or, equivalently,
Fk(ξ1) = T [k].
On account of the strict monotonicity of Fk, ξ1 is also the unique solution to the equation
Fk(·) = T [k].
Therefore, the total weight on arc 1 is the unique solution to equation (3.14) below, and
the weights of the atomic (resp. nonatomic) players on arc 1 is given by (3.15) and (3.16)
(resp. (3.17)):
ξ1 = M − T
[k] − k h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
; (3.14)
xi1 =
T i a(ξ1) + h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
, i ∈ J1, kK; (3.15)
If k < N, xi1 = T i, i ∈ Jk + 1, NK; (3.16)
x01 = T 0. (3.17)
If H ≤ 0, then ξ1 < ξˆ according to Proposition 3.12. This implies that T [k] = Fk(ξ1) >
Fk(ξˆ) = (M − ξˆ)(1 +A).
These results entail the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.15. The sufficient and necessary conditions for the CE x of Γ(T) to be of
mode 3 and specified by k (cf. (3.13)) are the following:
if H ≤ 0, T [k] > (M − ξˆ)(1 +A) (⇔ ξ1 < ξˆ ); (3.18)
T i > h(ξ1), i ∈ J1, kK; (3.19)
if k < N, T i ≤ h(ξ1), i ∈ Jk + 1, NK, (3.20)
where ξ1 is the unique solution to the equation Fk(·) = T [k].
Besides, the flow at x is given by (3.14)-(3.17).
The following lemma will be needed later.
Lemma 3.16. Suppose that the CE x of the Γ(T) is of mode 3 and specified by k, and x,
ξ1 are given by (3.14)-(3.17). Let a function ν be defined on the real interval (−η, M + η )
by ν(x) = x c1(x) + (M − x) c2(M − x). Then, if x > ξ1, ν(x) > ν(ξ1).
Proof. It follows from (3.2) that c1(ξ1)+xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2)+xi2 c′2(ξ2) for i ∈ J1, kK. Summing
the equation over all i ∈ J1, kK leads to k c1(ξ1)+[ ξ1−(M−T [k]) ] c′1(ξ1) = k c2(ξ2)+ξ2 c′2(ξ2).
Consequently, c1(ξ1)+ξ1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ)+ξ2 c′2(ξ2)+(k−1)
[
c2(ξ2)−c1(ξ1)
]
+(M−T [k]) c′1(ξ1).
According to Proposition 3.12, c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2). Besides, k ≥ 1. Thus, there exists a
constant B > 0 such that c1(ξ1) + ξ1 c′1(ξ1) ≥ B ≥ c2(ξ2) + ξ2 c′2(ξ2). According to A3.1, c1
and c2 are both strictly increasing while c′1 and c′2 are non-decreasing. Hence, for any s such
that ξ1 < s ≤M and any t such that 0 ≤ t < ξ2,
c1(s) + s c′1(s) > B > c2(t) + t c′2(t). (3.21)
For any x ∈ ( ξ1,M ],
ν(x)− ν(ξ1)
=
[
x c1(x) + (M − x) c2(M − x)
]− [ ξ1 c1(ξ1) + (M − ξ1) c2(M − ξ1) ]
=
[
x c1(x)− ξ1 c1(ξ1)
]− [ (M − ξ1) c2(M − ξ1)− (M − x) c2(M − x) ]
=
∫ x
ξ1
[u c1(u)]′ du−
∫ M−ξ1
M−x
[u c2(u)]′ du
=
∫ x
ξ1
[
c1(u) + u c′1(u)
]
du−
∫ M−ξ1
M−x
[
c2(u) + u c′2(u)
]
du
> (x− ξ1)B − (M − ξ1 −M + x)B
= 0,
where the inequality is due to (3.21).
3.4 The composition of the players and the CE costs
3.4.1 Two scenarios
The arc cost functions c and the total weight M of the players are fixed. We will focus
on the relation between the composition of the players and the social cost, the individuals’
cost as well as the (per-unit) costs to the atomic players at the CE. In particular, we will
be interested in how these values change when an atomic player l is replaced by a composite
set of players, i.e. a group of individual and several atomic players, who together hold the
same stocks T l as her.
Let us consider two scenarios.
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Scenario 1 The atomic player l is replaced by a group of individuals of total weight T l.
The new profile of N−1 atomic players (with non-increasing sizes) and a group of individuals
is denoted by γ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γN−1) such that there is a bijection σ from J1, NK \ {l} toJ1, N − 1K defined by
σ(i) =
{
i, if i ∈ J1, l − 1K;
i− 1, if l ≤ N − 1 and i ∈ Jl + 1, NK. (3.22)
Then, T i = γσ(i) for all i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}. The inverse function of σ is denoted by σ−1. In
other words, for any atomic player i in the profile T other than l, σ(i) is her name in the
profile γ. Conversely, for any atomic player i in γ, σ−1(i) is her name in T. As a result,
γi = T i, γ[i] = T [i], if i ∈ J1, l − 1K;
γi = T i+1, γ[i] = T [i+1] − T l, if l ≤ N − 1 and i ∈ Jl, N − 1K;
γ0 = T 0 + T l,
(3.23)
where γ[p] = ∑pi=1 γi.
In the game Γ(γ), let us denote the unique CE by y, and ηr =
∑N
i=0 y
i
r. The social cost
v(y) and the players’ costs Y 0(y), Y i(y), ui(y) are defined in the same way for y as for x.
Scenario 2 The atomic player l is replaced by two atomic players of total weight T l. The
new profile of N + 1 atomic players (with non-increasing sizes) and a (possibly empty) set
of individuals is denoted by τ = (τ0, τ1, . . . , τN+1) such that there is an injection pi fromJ1, NK \ {l} to J1, N + 1K which satisfies:{
T i = τpi(i), for i ∈ J1, NK \ {l};
T l = τp + τ q, where {p, q} = J1, N + 1K \ pi[ J1, NK \ {l} ], (3.24)
where pi
[ J1, NK \ {l} ] stands for the image of pi.
Indeed, pi is a bijection from J1, NK \ {l} to J1, N + 1K \ pi[ J1, NK \ {l} ], and the inverse
of pi from the latter to the former is denoted by pi−1. The interpretation of pi is similar to
that of σ in Scenario 1.
Notice that pi can be defined in such a way that{
i ≤ pi(i) ≤ i+ 2, if i ∈ J1, l − 1K;
pi(i) = i+ 1, if l ≤ N − 1 and i ∈ Jl + 1, NK.
As a result,
τ i = T i, τ [i] = T [i], if i ∈ J 1, l − 1 K;
T i+1 ≤ τ i ≤ T i−1, T [i−1] ≤ τ [i] < T [i], if l ≤ N − 1 and i ∈ J l, N K;
τ0 = T 0, τN+1 ≤ TN , τ [N+1] = T [N ],
(3.25)
where τ [p] = ∑pi=1 τ i.
In the game Γ(τ ), let us denote the CE by z, and ζr =
∑N
i=0 z
i
r. The social cost v(z) and
the players’ costs Y 0(z), Y i(z), ui(z) are defined in the same way for z as for x.
The following two sections study how the equilibrium costs in Γ(γ) and Γ(τ ) change with
respect to those in Γ(T). In §3.4.3, the cases where the equilibrium costs do not change are
discussed, while §3.4.2 is focused on the cases where they change.
Before this, let us recall that, according to Proposition 3.12, c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2), c1(η1) ≤
c2(η2) and c1(ζ1) ≤ c2(ζ2).
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3.4.2 Cases where the equilibrium costs do not change
In three cases, the equilibrium costs do not change after the replacement of the atomic
player l in both scenarios: if x is of mode 1, or mode 2, or mode 3 and specified by k but
k < l.
Lemma 3.17. Suppose that the CE x of Γ(T) is of mode 1 (cf. (3.6)). For any l ∈ J1, NK,
let two profiles γ and τ be defined by (3.23) and (3.24) respectively. Then,
v(x) = v(y) = v(z); Y 0(x) = Y 0(y) = Y 0(z); Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y) = Y pi(i)(z), ∀i ∈ J1, NK\{l},
where y is the CE of Γ(γ) and z is the CE of Γ(τ ).
Proof. According to (3.22),γi = T σ−1(i) ≤ H for i ∈ J1, N − 1K, where the inequality is
due to fact that x is of mode 1. Similarly, τ i = T pi−1(i) ≤ H for i ∈ pi[ J1, NK \ {l} ], and
τ i < T l ≤ H for i ∈ J1, N + 1K \ pi[ J1, NK \ {l} ].
Therefore, the conditions (3.7) and (3.8) are satisfied in Γ(γ) and Γ(τ ), with T i being
replaced by, respectively, γi (1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1) and τ i (1 ≤ i ≤ N + 1). It follows from
Proposition 3.13 that both y and z are of mode 1. Consequently, v(x) = v(y) = v(z) =
M c1(M), Y 0(x) = Y 0(y) = Y 0(z) = c1(M) and Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y) = Y pi(i)(z) = c1(M) for
i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}.
Lemma 3.18. Suppose that the CE x of Γ(T) is of mode 2 (cf. (3.9)). For any l ∈ J1, NK,
let two profiles γ and τ be defined by (3.23) and (3.24) respectively. Then,
v(x) = v(y) = v(z); Y 0(x) = Y 0(y) = Y 0(z); Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y) = Y pi(i)(z), ∀i ∈ J1, NK\{l},
where y is the CE of Γ(γ) and z is the CE of Γ(τ ).
Proof. According to (3.23) and (3.12), 0 ≤ γ[N−1] = T [N ] − T l < T [N ] < (M − ξˆ )(1 + A).
Similarly, 0 ≤ τ [N+1] = T [N ] < (M − ξˆ )(1 +A).
Therefore, the conditions (3.11) and (3.12) are satisfied in Γ(γ) and Γ(τ ), with T [N ]
being replaced by, respectively, γ[N−1] and τ [N+1]. Then, it follows from Proposition 3.14
that y and z are of mode 2. Consequently, v(x) = v(y) = v(z) = M c1(ξˆ), Y 0(x) = Y 0(y) =
Y 0(y) = c1(ξˆ), and Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y) = Y pi(i)(y) = c1(ξˆ) for i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}.
Lemma 3.19. Suppose that the CE x of Γ(T) is of mode 3 and specified by k, where k < N
(cf. (3.13)), and x is given by (3.14)-(3.17). For any l ∈ Jk+ 1, NK, let two profiles γ and τ
be defined by (3.23) and (3.24) respectively. Then,
v(x) = v(y) = v(z); Y 0(x) = Y 0(y) = Y 0(z); Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y) = Y pi(i)(z), ∀i ∈ J1, NK\{l},
where y is the CE of Γ(γ) and z is the CE of Γ(τ ).
Proof. Let us prove that the CE y of Γ(γ) is of mode 3 and specified by k. For Γ(τ ), the
proof is similar.
For i ∈ J1, kK, γi = T i by the definition (3.22); in particular, γ[k] = T [k]. Besides, it
follows from Proposition 3.15 that T i > h(ξ1), thus, γi > h(ξ1).
For i ∈ Jk + 1, N − 1K, γi = T i or γi = T i+1 by the definition (3.22). According to
Proposition 3.15, T i+1 ≤ T i < h(ξ1) and thus γi < h(ξ1)
If H ≤ 0, γ[k] = T [k] ≥ (M − ξˆ)(1 +A), where the inequality is due to Proposition 3.15.
By combining these three results and the fact that ξ1 is the unique solution to the equation
Fk+1(·) = T [k] = γ[k], one deduces from Proposition 3.15 that the CE y of the game Γ(γ) is
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of mode 3 and specified by k. Furthermore, for yi1 =
γi a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) = x
i
1 for i ∈ J1, kK, yi1 = γi
for i ∈ Jk + 1, N − 1K, y01 = T 0 + T l and η1 = ξ1.
Because η1 = ξ1 and thus η2 = ξ2, v(x) = ξ1 c1(ξ1) + ξ2 c2(ξ2) = η1 c1(η1) + η2 c2(η2) =
v(y). Therefore, the social costs v(x) and v(y) are equal.
For the individuals, Y 0(x) = c1(ξ1) = c1(η1) = Y 0(y).
For the atomic player i ∈ J1, kK, according to (3.22), σ(i) = i. Because yi1 = xi1 and,
consequently, yi2 = xi2, ui(x) = xi1c1(ξ1) + xi2c2(ξ2) = yi1c1(η1) + yi2c2(η2) = uσ(i)(y) or,
equivalently, Y i(x) = Y σ(i)(y).
For the atomic player i ∈ Jk + 1, NK \ {l}, according to (3.22), σ(i) > k. Thus, Y i(x) =
c1(ξ1) = c1(η1) = Y σ(i)(y).
3.4.3 Cases where the equilibrium costs change
If x is of mode 3 and specified by k but l ≤ k, then the equilibrium costs change after
the replacement of player l, both in Γ(γ) and Γ(τ ).
First, let us consider Scenario 1.
Lemma 3.20. Suppose that the CE x of Γ(T) is of mode 3 and specified by k (cf. (3.13)),
and x is given by (3.14)-(3.17). For any l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ k, let profile γ be defined by
(3.23). Then,
v(x) < v(y); Y 0(x) < Y 0(y); Y i(x) < Y σ(i)(y), ∀i ∈ J1, NK \ {l},
where y is the CE of Γ(γ).
Proof. The proof is made in 3 steps.
1) Let us show that the equation
Fk−1(x) = γ[k−1] (3.26)
admits a unique solution w1. Besides, ξ1 < w1 < M if k > 1, and w1 = M if k = 1.
Notice that γ[k−1] = T [k] − T l according (3.24), and Fk(ξ1) = T [k] according to (3.14).
On the one hand,
Fk−1(ξ1) = Fk(ξ1)− h(ξ1) = T [k] − h(ξ1) > T [k] − T l
{
= 0, if k = 1;
> 0, if k > 1,
where the first inequality is due to (3.19).
On the other hand,
Fk−1(M) = (k − 1)h(M)
{
= 0 = T [k] − T l, if k = 1;
< (k − 1)h(ξ1) < T [k] − T l, if k > 1,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that ξ1 < M and the strict monotonicity of
h, and the second inequality is due to (3.19).
By combining these two results while noticing that Fk−1 is strictly decreasing, one deduces
that the equation (3.26) admits a unique solution w1, and ξ1 < w1 < M if k > 1 while
w1 = M if k = 1.
2) Suppose that the following assumption A3.21 holds.
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A 3.21. For some p ∈ J1, N − k+ 1K, a sequence of numbers w1, w2, . . . , wp is obtained such
that
(i) ξ1 < wp < · · · < w1 ≤M ;
(ii) for q = 1, . . . , p, Fk+q−2(wq) = γ[k+q−2];
(iii) if H > 0 and p ≥ 2 for q = 1, . . . , p− 1, γk+q−1 > h(wq);
(iv) if H ≤ 0 and p ≥ 2, for q = 1, . . . , p− 1, either γk+q−1 > h(wq) or wq ≥ ξˆ.
Let us prove the two statements below by analyzing the five possible cases.
1. If p = N − k + 1, one can find the CE y of Γ(γ).
2. If p ≤ N − k, either one can find the CE y of Γ(γ), or one can go on and find wp+1
such that A3.21 holds for p+ 1.
Case 1. p ≤ N − k and γk+p−1 > h(wp).
One can show that the equation
Fk+p−1(·) = γ[k+p−1] (3.27)
admits a unique solution wp+1, and ξ1 < wp+1 < wp.
Indeed, on the one hand, Fk+p−1(ξ1) = Fk(ξ1) + (p − 1)h(ξ1) = T [k] + (p − 1)h(ξ1) ≥
T [k] + T k+1 + · · · + T k+p−1 = T [k+p−1] = γ[k+p−2] + T l = γ[k+p−1] − T k+p + T l > γ[k+p−1],
where the first inequality is due to (3.20), and the last two equalities are due to (3.23).
On the other hand, Fk+p−1(wp) = Fk+p−2(wp) + h(wp) = γ[k+p−2] + h(wp) < γ[k+p−2] +
γk+p−1 = γ[k+p−1], where the second equality is due A3.21(iii) and the inequality is due to
the hypothesis that γk+p−1 > h(wp).
By combining these two results while noticing that Fk+p−1 is strictly decreasing, one
deduces that the equation (3.27) admits a unique solution wp+1, and ξ1 < wp+1 < wp.
Case 2. H ≤ 0; p ≤ N − k and wp ≥ ξˆ.
One can show that the equation Fk+p−1(·) = γ[k+p−1] admits a unique solution wp+1,
and ξ1 < wp+1 < wp.
Indeed, on the one hand, Fk+p−1(ξ1) > γ[k+p−1] as in Case 1. On the other hand,
Fk+p−1(wp) = Fk+p−2(wp) + h(wp) = γ[k+p−2] + h(wp) ≤ γ[k+p−2] + h(ξˆ) = γ[k+p−2] <
γ[k+p−1], where the inequality is due to the hypothesis that wp ≥ ξˆ.
Case 3. H > 0; either p ≤ N − k and γk+p−1 ≤ h(wp), or p = N − k + 1.
Suppose that wp = M . Then, according to A3.21(i), p = 1. Step 1 of the proof shows
that k = 1. In other words, there is no atomic player in the profile γ, and the CE y of Γ(γ)
is thus of mode 1. Consequently, η1 = M > ξ1. If N ≥ 2, yσ(i)1 = xi1 = T i for i ∈ J2, NK.
Suppose that wp < M . First, let us show that γk+p−2 > h(wp). There are two cases:
p = 1 and p ≥ 2.
In the case where p = 1, γk−1 = T k > h(ξ1) > h(w1) according to (3.23), (3.19), A3.21(i)
and the strict monotonicity of h.
In the case where p ≥ 2. By A3.21(ii), Fk+p−2(wp) = γ[k+p−2], hence Fk+p−3(wp) +
h(wp) = γ[k+p−3] +γk+p−2. If γk+p−2 ≤ h(wp), then Fk+p−3(wp) ≤ γ[k+p−3] = Fk+p−3(wp−1),
where the equation is due to A3.21(ii). As a result, wp ≥ wp−1 because Fk+p−3 is decreasing.
But this contradicts A3.21(i). Thus, γk+p−2 < h(wp).
Therefore, for all i ∈ J1, k + p− 2K, γi ≥ γk+p−2 > h(wp).
If p ≤ N − k, for all i ∈ Jk + p − 1, N − 1K, γi ≤ γk+p−1 ≤ h(wp) according to the
hypothesis that γk+p−1 ≤ h(wp).
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By combining these two results and the fact that Fk+p−2(wp) = γ[k+p−2], it follows from
Proposition 3.15 that the CE y of Γ(γ) is of mode 3 and specified by k + p − 2. The same
proposition further implies that
yi1 =
γi a(wp) + h(wp)
1 + a(wp)
, if i ∈ J1, k + p− 2K; (3.28)
yi1 = γi, if p ≤ N − k, and i ∈ Jk + p− 1, N − 1K; (3.29)
y01 = γ0, (3.30)
η1 = wp. (3.31)
Next, let us prove the two statements below.
1. For i ∈ J1, k + p− 1K \ {l}, T i ≥ xi1 > yσ(i)1 .
2. If N ≥ k + p, then xi1 = yσ(i)1 = T i for i ∈ Jk + p,NK.
If N ≥ k + 1, then, according to (3.22), σ(i) = i− 1 for i ∈ Jk + 1, NK.
On the one hand, if p ≤ N − k, for i ∈ Jk + p,NK, it follows from (3.29) that xi1 = T i =
γi−1 = yσ(i)1 .
On the other hand, if p ≥ 2, for i ∈ Jk+ 1, k+ p− 1K, xi1 = T i = γi−1 > γi−1 a(η1)+h(η1)1+a(η1) =
y
σ(i)
1 , where the inequality is due to the fact that γi−1 > h(wp) = h(η1), and the equality is
due to (3.28).
For i ∈ J1, kK \ {l}, xi1 = T i a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) by (3.15). Besides, as σ(i) ≤ k + p − 2 by (3.22),
y
σ(i)
1 =
T i a(η1)+h(η1)
1+a(η1) by (3.28). One can show that x
i
1 > y
σ(i)
1 . Indeed, this is equivalent to
T i − xi1 < T i − yσ(i)1 or, still, T
i−h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) <
T i−h(η1)
1+a(η1) . The last inequality is true because, since
ξ1 < η1, one has a(ξ1) ≥ a(η1) and h(ξ1) > h(η1).
Case 4. H ≤ 0; either p ≤ N − k, γk+p−1 ≤ h(wp) and wp < ξˆ, or p = N − k + 1 and
wp < ξˆ.
The same analysis as in Case 3 and the fact that γ[k+p−2] = Fk+p−2(wp) > Fk+p−2(ξˆ) =
(M − ξˆ)(1 +A) show that the CE y of Γ(γ) is given by (3.28)-(3.30).
Case 5. H ≤ 0; p = N − k + 1 and wp ≥ ξˆ.
It follows from A3.21(ii), the monotonicity of FN−1 and the hypothesis that wp ≥ ξˆ that,
γ[N−1] = FN−1(wp) ≤ FN−1(ξ˜) = (M − ξ˜ )(1 +A ).
Proposition 3.14 implies that the CE y of Γ(γ) is of mode 2. Besides, for i ∈ J1, N − 1K,
yi1 = Aγ
i
1+A ; y01 = ξˆ − Aγ
[N−1]
1+A ; η1 =
∑N
i=0 y
i
1 = ξˆ > ξ1.
Next, let us show that xi1 > y
σ(i)
1 for all i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}.
If k < N , for i ∈ Jk+1, NK, σ(i) = i−1, γi−1 = T i. Thus, xi1 = T i > AT i1+A = Aγi−11+A = yσ(i)1 .
For i ∈ J1, kK \ {l}, xi1 = T i a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) and yσ(i)1 = Aγσ(i)1+A = T i a(ξˆ)+h(ξˆ)1+a(ξˆ) . One can show
that xi1 > y
σ(i)
1 . Indeed, this is equivalent to T i− xi1 < T i− yσ(i)1 or, equivalently, T
i−h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) <
T i−h(ξˆ)
1+a(ξˆ) . The last inequality is true because, since ξ1 < ξˆ, one has a(ξ1) ≥ a(ξˆ) and h(ξ1) >
h(ξˆ).
3) Till now, one has shown that η1 > ξ1, yσ(i)1 < xi1 for all i ∈ J1, kK \ {l}, and, if N > k,
y
σ(i)
1 ≤ xi1 for all i ∈ Jk + 1, NK.
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The fact that η1 > ξ1 immediately implies that Y 0(y) = c1(η1) > c1(ξ1) = Y 0(x) and,
according to Lemma 3.16, v(y) = ν(η1) > ν(ξ1) = v(x).
Let us show that Y σ(i)(y) > Y i(x) for all i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}.
For i ∈ J1, kK \ {l}, (3.2) implies that c1(ξ1) + xi1c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + xi2c′2(ξ2) and, con-
sequently, xi1c′1(ξ1) > xi2c′2(ξ2) because c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2). Let B be a constant such that
xi1c
′
1(ξ1) > B > xi2c′2(ξ2). Thus, by the monotonicity of c1 and c2, for all s ∈ (x−i1 ,M − xi1]
and all t ∈ [−xi2, x−i2 ),
xi1c
′
1(xi1 + s) > B > xi2c′2(xi2 + t). (3.32)
It follows from the relation η1 > ξ1 that η1 − xi1 > x−i1 and η2 − xi2 < x−i2 . Therefore,[
xi1 c1(η1) + xi2 c2(η2)
]− [xi1 c1(ξ1) + xi2 c2(ξ2) ]
=
[
xi1 c1(xi1 + η1 − xi1) + xi2 c2(xi2 + η2 − xi2)
]− [xi1 c1(xi1 + x−i1 ) + xi2 c2(xi2 + x−i2 ) ]
= xi1
[
c1(xi1 + η1 − xi1)− c1(xi1 + x−i1 )
]− xi2 [ c1(xi2 + x−i2 )− c2(xi2 + η2 − xi2) ]
=
∫ η1−xi1
x−i1
xi1 c
′
1(xi1 + s) ds−
∫ x−i2
η2−xi2
xi2 c
′
2(xi2 + t) dt
> [η1 − xi1 − x−i1 ]B − [x−i2 − η2 + xi2]B = 0,
where the inequality is due to (3.32), and
[
y
σ(i)
1 c1(η1) + y
σ(i)
2 c2(η2)
]− [xi1 c1(η1) + xi2 c2(η2) ]
=
[
y
σ(i)
1 − xi1
]
c1(η1) +
[
y
σ(i)
2 − xi2
]
c2(η2) =
[
y
σ(i)
1 − xi1
] [
c1(η1)− c2(η2)
] ≥ 0
because yσ(i)1 < xi1 and c1(η1) ≤ c2(η2). As a result,
uσ(i)(y)− ui(x) =[ yσ(i)1 c1(η1) + yσ(i)2 c2(η2) ]− [xi1 c1(ξ1) + xi2 c2(ξ2) ]
=
[
y
σ(i)
1 c1(η1) + y
σ(i)
2 c2(η2)
]− [xi1 c1(η1) + xi2 c2(η2) ]
+
[
xi1 c1(η1) + xi2 c2(η2)
]− [xi1 c1(ξ1) + xi2 c2(ξ2) ] > 0.
If N > k, xi1 = T i ≥ yσ(i)1 for i ∈ Jk + 1, NK. Recall that c2(η2) ≥ c1(η1) and η1 > ξ1.
Therefore,
uσ(i)(y)− ui(x) = [ yσ(i)1 c1(η1) + yσ(i)2 c2(η2) ]− T i c1(ξ1) ≥ T i c1(η1)− T i c1(ξ1) > 0.
Next, let us consider Scenario 2.
Lemma 3.22. Suppose that the CE x of Γ(T) is of mode 3 and specified by k (cf. (3.13)),
and x is given by (3.15)-(3.17). For any l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ k, let profile τ be defined by
(3.24). Then,
v(x) < v(z); Y 0(x) < Y 0(z); Y i(x) < Y pi(i)(z), ∀i ∈ J1, NK \ {l},
where z is the CE of Γ(τ ).
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Proof. There are two cases.
Case 1. τ [k] > kH.
First, let us show that the equation Fk(·) = τ [k] admits a unique solution w0, and
ξ1 < w0 < M .
Indeed, Fk(ξ1) = T [k] > τ [k] according to (3.25), and Fk(M) = kH < τ [k] by the
hypothesis.
Next, suppose that for some p ∈ {0}∪J1, N−k+1K, a sequence of numbers w0, w1, . . . , wp
is obtained such that (i) ξ1 < wp < · · · < w0 < M , (ii) for q = 0, 1, . . . , p, Fk+q(wq) = τ [k+q],
(iii) if H > 0 and p > 0, for q = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1, γk+q+1 > h(wq), and (iv) if H ≤ 0 and p > 0,
for q = 0, 1, . . . , p− 1, either γk+q+1 > h(wq) or wp > ξˆ.
The rest of the proof for this case is nearly the same as the proof for Lemma 3.20. The
only difference is that z cannot have mode 1, because w0 < M .
Case 2. τ [k] ≤ kH. Notice that this is only possible if H > 0.
According to (3.25) and condition (3.19), for i ∈ J1, k − 1K, τ i ≥ T i+1 ≥ T k > h(ξ1),
which implies that τ [k−1] > (k − 1)h(ξ1) > (k − 1)H, where the second inequality is owing
to the fact that ξ1 < M (otherwise x is of mode 1, contradiction); in particular,
τ [k−1] > (k − 1)H. (3.33)
The relation (3.33) and the hypothesis τ [k] ≤ kH imply that
τk < H. (3.34)
Let us show that the equation Fk−1(·) = τ [k−1] admits a unique solution w1. Moreover,
ξ1 < w1 < M if k > 1, and w1 = M if k = 1.
Indeed, on the one hand,
Fk−1(ξ1) = Fk(ξ1)− h(ξ1) = T [k] − h(ξ1) > T [k] − T k =
{
T [k−1] ≥ τ [k−1], if k > 1,
0 = τ [k−1], if k = 1,
where the first inequality is due to condition (3.19) and the second due to (3.25). On the
other hand,
Fk−1(M) = (k − 1)H
{
< (k − 1)h(ξ1) < τ [k−1], if k > 1,
= 0 = τ [k−1], if k = 1.
If k = 1 and, consequently, w1 = M because H > 0 and τ1 = τ [1] ≤ H by hypothesis, it
follows from Proposition 3.13 that the CE z of Γ(τ ) is of mode 1.
If k > 1 and, consequently, w1 < M , let us show that the CE z of Γ(τ ) is of mode 3 and
specified by k − 1.
For i ∈ J1, k − 1K, τ i ≥ τk−1 ≥ T k > h(ξ1) > h(w1) according to (3.25), (3.19) and the
fact that w1 > ξ1. For i ∈ Jk,N + 1K, τ i ≤ τk < H ≤ h(w1) because of (3.25), (3.34) and
the fact that w1 ≤M .
Combining these two results and the fact that w1 is the unique solution to the equation
Fk−1(·) = τ [k−1], one deduces from Proposition 3.15 that z is of mode 3 and specified by
k − 1. Moreover, for i ∈ J1, k − 1K, zi1 = τ i a(w1)+h(w1)1+a(w1) ; for i ∈ Jk,N + 1K or i = 0, zi1 = τ i;
ζ1 =
∑N+1
i=0 z
i
1 = w1 > ξ1.
The rest of the proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.20.
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3.4.4 Main result
The following theorem combines Lemma 3.17, Lemma 3.18, Lemma 3.19, Lemma 3.20
and Lemma 3.22.
Theorem 3.23. Let x be the CE of Γ(T). For any l such that 1 ≤ l ≤ N , let two profiles
γ and τ be defined by (3.23) and (3.24) respectively. Then,
v(x) ≤ v(y), v(x) ≤ v(z); Y 0(x) ≤ Y 0(y), Y 0(x) ≤ Y 0(z);
Y i(x) ≤ Y σ(i)(y), Y i(x) ≤ Y pi(i)(z), ∀ i ∈ J1, NK \ {l},
where y is the CE of Γ(γ) and z is the CE of Γ(τ ).
Besides, the equalities hold if, and only if, Y l(x) = Y 0(x).
The family of the composite routing games played, in the fixed two-terminal two-parallel-
arc network specified by c, by a finite number of atomic players and a set of individu-
als such that the total weight of all the players is M is denoted by Ξ =
{
Γ(T) |T =(
T 0, T 1, . . . , TN
)
, N ∈ N, T 0 +∑Ni=0 T i = M, T i > 0 ∀ i ∈ J1, NK, T 0 ≥ 0 }.
Definition 3.24. Let Γ(T) and Γ(R) be two games in Ξ, with T =
(
T 0, T 1, . . . , TN
)
and
R =
(
R0, R1, . . . , RM
)
. The game Γ(R) is called a direct successor of the game Γ(T), if
there exists some l ∈ J1, NK, a subset R of J1,MK and a non-negative number R˜ such that
T l = ∑j∈RRj+R˜, R0 = T 0 +R˜, and there exists a bijection θ from J1, NK\{l} to J1,MK\R
such that Rθ(i) = T i for all i ∈ J1, NK \ {l}.
In other words, the atomic player l is replaced by a composite set of players consisting
of the atomic players in R and a group of individuals of total weight R˜.
Definition 3.25. Let Γ(T) and Γ(R) be two games in Ξ. The game Γ(R) is called a
successor of the game Γ(T) if there exists a finite sequence of games Γ(T0),Γ(T1), . . . ,Γ(Tk)
in Ξ such that Γ(T0) = Γ(T), Γ(Tk) = Γ(R), and Γ(Tl) is a direct successor of Γ(Tl−1) for
all l ∈ J1, kK.
Remark 3.26. If Γ(R) (with M atomic players) is a successor of Γ(T) (with N atomic
players), then there exists a subset T of J1, NK such that, for all l ∈ T , there is a distinct
subset Rl of J1,MK as well as a non-negative number R˜l satisfying that, for all l ∈ T ,
T l = ∑j∈Rl Rj + R˜l, and T 0 = R0 +∑l∈T R˜l. Besides, there exists a bijection from θ fromJ1, NK \ T to J1,MK \ ∪l∈TRl such that Rθ(i) = T i for all i ∈ J1, NK \ T .
Theorem 3.27. Suppose that Γ(T) and Γ(R) are two games in Ξ, and Γ(R) is a successor
of Γ(T). Let x and y be, respectively, the CE of Γ(T) and that of Γ(R). The sets N , M ,
T , Rl’s and the bijection θ are those described in Remark 3.26. Then,
v(x) ≤ v(y); Y 0(x) ≤ Y 0(y); Y i(x) ≤ Y θ(i)(y), ∀ i ∈ J1, NK \ T .
Besides, the equalities hold if, and only if, for all l ∈ T , Y l(x) = Y 0(x).
3.4.5 Coalition members
Theorem 3.27 can also be interpreted in this way: the formation of coalitions benefits the
social cost and the players not involved in these coalitions. However, whether the formation of
a coalition benefits or does not benefit its own members remains an open problem. Explicitly,
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for l ∈ T and j ∈ Rl in Theorem 3.27, the relation between Y l(x) and Y j(y) is not clear.
On the one hand, one can cite an example where the coalition benefits its members: all the
nonatomic players form a coalition, then their average cost is the minimal social cost which
cannot be higher than the Wardrop equilibrium cost. On the other hand, the following two
examples, which are based on Example 5.2 in [91] (cf. Example 2.20), show that, sometimes,
it may be better not to form a coalition.
Example 3.28. The cost functions of the two arcs are, respectively, c1(x) = x + 10 and
c2(x) = 10x+ 1.
Consider two games: ΓI = Γ( 110 ,
1
2 ,
2
5) and ΓII = Γ(
3
10 ,
1
2 ,
1
5). The atomic player of weight2
5 (called I.2) in ΓI can be seen as the coalition of the atomic player of weight
1
5 (called II.2)
and a group of individuals of weight 15 in ΓII . The per-unit cost to player I.2 is
839
99 ≈ 8.47
at the CE of ΓI , and the per-unit cost to player II.2 is 9111 ≈ 8.27 at the CE of ΓII . Thus,
the coalition with nonatomic players has increased the per-unit cost to II.2.
Consider two other games: ΓIII = Γ(0, 12 ,
1
2) and ΓIV = Γ(0,
1
2 ,
1
4 ,
1
4). The second atomic
player of weight 12 (called III.2) in ΓIII can be seen as a coalition of the two atomic players
of weight 14 (called IV.2 and IV.3) in ΓIII . The per-unit cost to player III.2 is
91
11 ≈ 8.273
at the CE of ΓIII , and the per-unit costs to players IV.2 and IV.3 are both 334 = 8.250 at
the CE of ΓIV . Thus, both members of the coalition have seen their per-unit cost increased
after the alliance.
3.5 Remarks and discussion
3.5.1 Social cost in the case of more than two singleton-choices
When there are more than two parallel arcs in a routing game or, equivalently, more than
two singleton-choices in a single commodity congestion game, Theorem 3.27 is no longer valid.
Huang [46, Theorem 1] provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the social cost
to be reduced after every formation of coalitions in a single commodity atomic congestion
game. His result is reformulated here.
Theorem 3.29. In a single commodity atomic routing game where arc cost functions satisfy
A3.1, the following two conditions are necessary and sufficient for that the equilibrium social
cost is reduced or do not change after each formation of disjoint coalition(s):
(i) The network is well-designed.
(ii) All the cost functions of the arcs are affine.
For the definition of a well-designed network, the reader is referred to [46]. Here, let us
just mention that a single-origin single-destination series-parallel network with cost functions
satisfying A3.1 is always well-designed [46, Proposition 1].
For this, Huang defines a partial order on the profiles of atomic players with a fixed
set of single commodity stocks. He shows that, if the network is well-designed and the cost
functions are affine, the social cost with profile A is bounded by that with profile B whenever
A majorizes B according to the partial order. This partial order is close to the partial order
defined on the composite profiles of players developed in this paper.
Huang [47] gave two counter-examples. In each of them, one of the two conditions in
Theorem 3.29 is violated, and the social cost is increased after the formation of a coalition
between some players. In particular, the counter-example A.2 in [47] shows that, in a two-
terminal three-parallel-arc network where the arc cost functions are, respectively, 20x+5000,
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x2 + 500 and x11, the social cost at the unique equilibrium with three atomic players of
weight, respectively, 200, 20.9 and 0.1 is lower than that with two atomic players of weight,
respectively, 200 and 21. This example also shows that our results cannot be extended to
the case where there are more than two parallel arcs.
3.5.2 Price of anarchy and price of collusion
The results in §3.4.5 and §3.5.1 imply that one might define a more general notion of
price of collusion or price of anarchy in congestion games, which takes the following two
questions into consideration. First, for the impact of the coalitions on the social cost, the
game before the formation of coalitions need not be nonatomic. Second, the study of the
impact of the coalitions need not be limited to the social cost, but how each player’s cost
is affected should also be measured. In the same vein as our analysis, Altman et al. [5]
suggested several alternative definitions of price of collusion.
3.5.3 Delegation
In the two-parallel-arc routing game discussed in this work, although the other players’
costs at the equilibrium are increased when one atomic player l is replaced by a composite
set of players, the sum of the costs to these players at the equilibrium after the replacement
can be lower than player l’s cost at the equilibrium before the replacement. This is the case
in the second part in Example 3.28, where the cost to player III.2 is 9122 ≈ 4.136, while the
sum of the costs to player IV.2 and player IV.3 is 338 = 4.125. Notice that this is different
from the discussion in §3.4.5. There, one compares the average cost to a coalition (after its
formation) and the cost to each of its members (before the formation of their coalition), so
as to deduce whether it is beneficial for the players to cooperate. Here, one compares the
total cost to a coalition (after its formation) and the sum of the costs to its members (before
their cooperation).
The problem may be easier to understand in the converse direction. Let us see the
replacement of player l by a composite set of players as a choice of player l to delegate her
stock to these ones, so that they play independently in the congestion game instead of her.
If player l’s cost is counted as the sum of the cost to her delegates, it may be advantageous
for her to delegate. For instance, in Example 3.28, by delegating her stock to players IV.2
and IV.3, player III.2 gets a lower cost (4.125) than what she would have got if she had
played herself (4.136).
One can define a delegation game associated to a composite game, where each atomic
player’s choice is to delegate her stock to a group of atomic and/or nonatomic delegates, and
her cost is the sum of the cost to these ones in the composite routing game played by all
the delegates and the initial individuals (those who do not delegate because their stock is
already infinitesimal). The existence of an equilibrium in this delegation game is not sure.
As a matter of fact, even if the number of atomic delegates of an atomic player is restricted
to finite integers, the space of her choices of delegation is not only infinite but even not a
compact set in a Euclidean space. As a result, even whether an atomic player has a best
choice of delegation, in response to the other players, remains a question. Furthermore, an
atomic delegate may well have incentive to delegate as well. In this way, the delegation
should not be restricted to only one step. Sorin and Wan [88] (cf. Chapter 5) defined a
delegation game associated to an integer-splittable congestion game, where each player has
integer weight, and she can only split her stock into parts of integer weight. Each player
has thus only a finite ways to delegate, and after at most M turns of delegation, where M
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is the total weight of all the players, all the players have weight 1 and the delegation cannot
continue. Therefore, a delegation game can be well defined in this case. However, in our
model of composite congestion game with infinitesimally splittable stocks, even the definition
of delegation remains an open problem.
3.5.4 Assumptions on the cost functions and the topology of the network
Finally let us give some explanation for the assumptions made in this work on the arc
cost functions and those on the topology of the network.
In a network with general topology, it is sufficient to assume that the arc cost functions are
of class C1 for a composite congestion game to admit an equilibrium. For this, one can use the
variational inequality formulation for composite equilibrium (cf Chapter 2, equation (2.5)).
Theorem 3.1 in Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [49, p.12] states that the variational inequality
problem (2.5) admits a solution if the space of feasible flows is a convex compact set, and if
the arc costs functions as well as the marginal arc cost functions are continuous.
However, our objective is to compare the equilibrium costs for different composition of
the players. To this end, multiple equilibria for each composition may cause the problem of
equilibrium selection. Thus, one would like to guarantee the uniqueness of the composite
equilibrium by adding more stringent conditions on the arc cost functions or the network
topology. That is why the model of two-terminal parallel-arc network with strictly increasing
and convex arc costs is used here. Orda et al. [66] proved the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in atomic splittable congestion games taking place in such network. The same
property for composite congestion games can be obtained by an analysis in the same vein
(cf. Richman and Shimkin [71]). Furthermore, as stated at the end of §3.5.1, our result does
not hold for the case with more than two parallel links.
As a matter of fact, Richman and Shimkin [71] and Bhaskar et al. [10] extended the
result of [66] to some more general network topologies under the same assumptions on arc
cost functions, while Altman et al. [3] proved the uniqueness for a specific class of arc cost
functions but with no constraints on the network topology. These more general settings are
not discussed in this work (and neither in Chapter 2) because the computation of the equi-
librium costs would become much more complicated. However, it may well be an interesting
issue for further research work.
Chapter 4
One-shot delegation games and
delegation processes
This chapter is based on the paper One-shot delegation games and delegation processes.
Abstract. This work studies the behavior of delegation and its impact on the equilibrium
costs in composite congestion games. Any atomic player can split her stock into several parts
in order to delegate them to independent atomic splittable or nonatomic players. Her cost
is the sum of the costs to her delegates. It is shown that, if all the players have the same
two choices which are singletons, and the choice cost functions meet a standard convexity
condition, then, facing the composition of the other players, an atomic player’s delegation
strategies are dominated by single-atomic ones, which consist in delegating to at most one
atomic player in addition to nonatomic ones. A fortiori, she possesses at least one best reply
in terms of delegation strategies. In a one-shot delegation game where the atomic players
play each a delegation strategy once and simultaneously, if the cost functions of the two
choices are affine and there are only two atomic players, the game admits pure equilibria.
In the same context, if the atomic players play a single-atomic best reply in an alternating
way so that there are always at most two players in the network, the process either stops
after a finite number of steps when there are no more atomic players willing to delegate, or
it converges to a limit at an exponential rate. The outcomes of the alternating best reply
process, called myopic ones, are different from the equilibria of the one-shot delegation game.
At each myopic outcome, the initial atomic players may have a lower or higher cost than if
they had not delegated, while the nonatomic players’ cost and the social cost are all higher
than if there was no delegation.
4.1 Introduction
In a network congestion game, namely, a routing game, if a player holds a stock of strictly
positive weight which can be arbitrarily divided, she is called atomic arbitrarily splittable
(or atomic splittable for short). A player holding a stock of infinitesimal weight is called
nonatomic, and a player who cannot split her stock of strictly positive weight is called
atomic unsplittable. Each player has to send her stock from its origin to its destination and,
in the meanwhile, minimize her cost. The cost of using a certain path depends upon the
quantity of stocks on it. While a nonatomic player or an atomic unsplittable player has to
choose only one path, an atomic splittable player can split her stock so as to send different
parts by different paths.
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In Sorin and Wan [88] (cf. Chapter 5), the players are integer-splittable, in the sense
that they each have an integer weight and they can split their stock into several parts of
integer weight. A player can commit each part to an independent delegate who ensures its
transportation, and her cost will be the sum of the costs to her delegates. Sorin and Wan
showed that, when there are more than one player, a player may be interested in delegating
her stock. They further introduced a delegation game associated to the original congestion
game, where a delegate can also delegate her stock and this continues until that all the players
have weight 1. They proved the existence of equilibria and so-called consistent equilibria in
a delegation game.
This paper studies the behavior of delegation in a more general setting where the atomic
players are arbitrarily splittable and there can also be nonatomic players. A congestion game
with such players is called composite [15, 32, 91]. Two difficulties arise. The first one is that,
because of the fact that the stock is arbitrarily splittable, the strategies of delegation of an
atomic player are no longer finitely many as in the integer-splittable case. As one will see
later, the space of such strategies is not even a convex compact subset of a Euclidean space.
The second difficulty is that, unlike the integer-splittable case where no one continues to
delegate when all the players have weight 1, in our setting, the delegation can always go on
as long as the players are not all nonatomic.
In view of these two difficulties, the delegation game associated to a composite congestion
game cannot be defined and studied in exactly the same way as for integer-splittable games.
This paper is a first tentative to deal with the problem. All the players are assumed to have
the same two choices which are singletons. In the setting of network congestion games, it
is equivalent to saying that the network contains two vertices which are the common origin
and the common destination of the players, and they are linked by two parallel arcs.
The main results of the paper are:
1. Facing the composition of the other players, an atomic player’s delegation strategies
are dominated by single-atomic ones, which consist in delegating to at most one atomic
player in addition to nonatomic ones. A fortiori, she possesses at least one best reply in
terms of delegation strategies.
2. In a one-shot delegation game where each atomic player plays a delegation strategy, if
the cost functions of the two arcs are affine and there are only two atomic players, the game
admits pure equilibria.
3. In the same context as for the second result, suppose that the atomic players play a
single-atomic best reply in an alternating way, so that there are always at most two players.
The process stops when there are no more atomic players who would like to delegate. Such a
process either stops after a finite number of steps, or converges to a limit at an exponential
rate.
4. The outcomes of this alternating best reply process are called myopic ones. They are
different from the equilibria in the one-shot delegation game.
5. At a myopic outcome, the initial atomic players may have a lower or higher cost than
at the equilibrium of the original game (without delegation), while the nonatomic players’
cost and the social cost are all higher than at the equilibrium of the original game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the network setting of our
model, and recalls the properties of composite routing games in such a setting. In Section 4.3,
the definition of a one-shot delegation game and that of the delegation strategies are provided.
The special role of the single-atomic strategies is pointed out. In Section 4.4, it is shown
that an atomic player possesses a best reply to the composition of the other players in the
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network, in terms of delegation strategies, under a standard condition on the convexity of
the cost functions. Section 4.5 establishes the existence of (pure) Nash equilibria in a specific
class of one-shot delegation games, where there are only two atomic players in addition to
the nonatomic players, and the arc cost functions are affine. A dynamical process in the
same class of games as in Section 4.5 is analyzed in Section 4.6, where the atomic players
play, in an alternating way, a best delegation strategy in reply to the composition of her
opponents. Section 4.7 is contributed to remarks and general discussions.
4.2 Model and known results
In this work, Jm,nK stands for the set of successive positive integers [m,n] ∩ N =
{m,m+ 1, . . . , n− 1, n}. Recall that N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and N∗ = N \ {0}.
First, let us recall the model of a composite routing game in a two-terminal two-parallel-
arc and some preliminary results.
4.2.1 Model of a two-terminal two-parallel-arc composite routing game
O D
c1(x)
c2(x)
Vertices O and D are linked by two arcs 1 and 2. Their per-unit cost functions are,
respectively, c1 and c2, which are real-valued functions defined on the real interval (−η,M +
η), where M > 0 and η > 0. When the total weight of stocks on arc r is x, the cost to each
unit of them is cr(x). Denote c = (c1, c2). The following assumption on the cost functions
is made throughout this work.
A 4.1. Cost functions c1 and c2 are strictly increasing, convex and continuously differentiable
on (−η, M + η), and non-negative on [0,M ].
The profile of the players is described by a vector T = (T 0, T 1, T 2, . . . , TN ) with N ∈ N,
where T 0 is the total weight of the nonatomic players and, for p ≥ 1, T p is the weight of the
atomic player p. The total weight of the players is M = ∑Ni=0 T i.
Each player aims to send her stock from O to D at a minimal cost. A nonatomic player
takes one of the two arcs. The profile of the nonatomic players’ strategies is specified by a
vector x0 = (x01, x02), where x0r is the total weight of the nonatomic players on arc r. An
atomic player i splits her stock into two parts and send them by two arcs respectively. Her
strategy is specified by a vector xi = (xi1, xi2), where xir is the weight that she sends by arc
r. Denote ξr =
∑N
i=0 x
i
r, the total weight on arc r. The vector x = (xi)Ni=0 is called the flow
(induced by the players’ strategies).
For i ∈ J1, NK, denote x−i = ∏0≤j≤N, j 6=i xj and x−ir = ξr − xir. For i ∈ {0} ∪ J1, NK,
denote Xi = {xi ∈ R2 |xi1 ≥ 0, xi2 ≥ 0, xi1 + xi2 = T i}. Finally, denote X =
∏N
i=0X
i.
When the flow is x, the cost to a nonatomic player taking arc r is cr(ξr). The cost to
the atomic player i is ui(x) = xi1c1(ξ1) + xi2c2(ξ2). The social cost is defined as v(x) =
ξ1c1(ξ1) + ξ2c2(ξ2).
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A composite game taking place in a two-terminal two-parallel-arc network with cost
functions c with the profile of the players being T is denoted by Γ(c,T). For the sake of
simplicity, if the network is fixed and only the profile of the players changes, one can simply
write Γ(T).
Definition 4.2 (Harker [32]). In the game Γ(T), a flow x ∈ X is a composite equilibrium if
it meets the two conditions below:
(i) For all r ∈ {1, 2}, if x0r > 0, then cr(ξr) ≤ ct(ξt) for all t ∈ {1, 2}.
(ii) For all i ∈ J1, NK, xi minimizes Y i( ·, x−i) on Xi.
4.2.2 Notations and known results
The following auxiliary functions and notations are introduced in Wan [92] (cf. Chap-
ter 3).
Two functions h, a, and a family of functions {Fn}n∈N are defined on the real line R. Let
 be a strictly positive constant.
h(x) =

c2(M − x)− c1(x)
c′1(x)
, if 0 ≤ x ≤M ;
h(0)− x, if x < 0;
h(M)− (x−M), if x > M,
a(x) =

c′2(M − x)
c′1(x)
, if 0 ≤ x ≤M ;
a(0), if x < 0;
a(M), if x > M,
Fn(x) = (M − x)
(
1 + a(x)
)
+ nh(x), n ∈ N.
Functions h and Fn’s are strictly decreasing and continuous on R, and their ranges are
all R. Hence, their inverse functions h−1 and F−1n ’s are all strictly decreasing and continuous
on R. Function a is non-increasing, strictly positive and continuous on R.
Proposition 4.3. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) There exists ξˆ ∈ [0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ).
(ii) c1(M) ≥ c2(0) and c2(M) ≥ c1(0) or, equivalently, h(M) ≤ 0 and h(0) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, there is at most one ξˆ ∈ [0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ).
Proof. Clear by A4.1.
Notation. H = h(M). A = a(ξˆ) if there exists ξˆ ∈ [0,M ] such that c1(ξˆ) = c2(M − ξˆ).
The following results, cited from Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2), have been reformulated for
our context.
Theorem 4.4. A vector x ∈ X is a CE of the game Γ(T) if, and only if, for all r ∈ {1, 2},
x0r > 0 ⇒ cr(ξr) = min
s∈{1,2}
cs(ξs) (4.1)
and, for all r ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ J1, NK,
xir > 0 ⇒ cr(ξr) + xir c′(ξr) = min
s∈{1,2}
cs(ξs) + xis c′(ξs). (4.2)
Theorem 4.5. The game Γ(T) admits one and only one CE.
By definition, the nonatomic players take the arcs of the lowest cost at the CE x.
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Theorem 4.6. At the CE x of the game Γ(T), for r ∈ {1, 2},
1. if x0r > 0, then xir > 0 for all i ∈ J1, NK;
2. for i, j ∈ J1, NK, if T i ≥ T j, then xir ≥ xjr, and the equality holds if, and only if,
T i = T j or xir = xjr = 0;
3. for i ∈ J1, NK and s ∈ {1, 2} \ {r}, if xir > 0 and xis = 0, then cr(ξr) < cs(ξs).
As in Wan [92] (cf. A3.9), the following assumption will also be made throughout this
work and it does not lose generality.
A 4.7. One and only one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) c1(M) < c2(0) or, equivalently, H > 0;
(ii) c1(M) ≥ c2(0), c2(M) ≥ c1(0) or, equivalently, H ≤ 0, h(0) ≥ 0; and
ξˆ c′1(ξˆ) ≥ (M − ξˆ) c′2(M − ξˆ); (4.3)
consequently,
(M − ξˆ)(1 +A) ≤ M ≤ ξˆ 1 +A
A
. (4.4)
Because of to A4.7, the flow of the CE x takes some special form as the following propo-
sition shows.
Proposition 4.8 (Wan [92] (cf. Proposition 3.12)). At the CE x of the game Γ(T),
1. c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2);
2. if c2(0) ≤ c1(M) or, equivalently, H ≤ 0, then ξ1 ≤ ξˆ;
3. h(ξ1) ≥ 0, and the equality holds if, and only if, c2(0) ≤ c1(M) and ξ1 = ξˆ.
4.3 Delegation
4.3.1 Incentive of delegation
The following example shows that an atomic player may have incentive to delegate.
Example 4.9. The cost functions of the two arcs are, respectively, c1(x) = x + 10 and
c2(x) = 10x+ 1. Suppose that there are two atomic players both of weight 12 and there are
no nonatomic players. Each atomic player’s cost at the CE is 9122 ≈ 4.136. Now, the atomic
player 2 commits her stock to two atomic delegates so that they both have weight 14 . At
the CE of the routing game played by the atomic player 2’s two delegates and the atomic
player 1 of weight 12 , the sum of the costs to the two delegates is
33
4 = 4.125. Therefore, the
atomic player 2 benefits from her delegation.
4.3.2 Delegation strategies
Let us give a rigorous definition of a one-shot delegation game D1(T) associated to the
composite routing game Γ(T).
The players of the game are the same as in Γ(T).
Definition 4.10. The delegation strategy space of any nonatomic player is ∅, i.e. they have
no choice.
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Definition 4.11. An atomic player p of weight T p delegates her stock if she is replaced by
a finite number n ∈ N of atomic players of weight, respectively, α1, α2, . . . , αn (in a non-
increasing order) and a group of nonatomic players of total weight α0, where αi > 0 for all
i ∈ J1, nK, α0 ≥ 0, and ∑ni=1 αi + α0 = T p.
These nonatomic players of total weight α0 and the n atomic players are called delegates
of the atomic player p.
A delegation strategy of the atomic player p is a profile α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn) according to
which she designates her delegates.
The space of delegation strategies of the atomic player p is denoted by Sp. Then,
Sp =
+∞⋃
n=0
Sp,n, where
Sp,n = {α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn+1 ∣∣α0 ≥ 0, α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αn > 0; n∑
i=0
αi = T p
}
, ∀n ∈ N.
Remark 4.12. The set Sp,n contains all the delegation strategies that designate n atomic
delegates (in addition to a set of nonatomic delegates). For all n ∈ N∗, Sp,n is a proper
subset of the simplex of n dimension ∆n. The set Sp,0 is a singleton set.
From now on, a delegation strategy will simply be called a strategy.
Definition 4.13. Let α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn) be in Sp.
Strategy α is the nonatomic strategy, denoted by α0, if α0 = T p or, equivalently, n = 0.
It is the unique element in Sp,0.
Strategy α is the trivial strategy, denoted by α1, if n = 1 and α1 = T p. (Rigorously, by
choosing the trivial strategy, the atomic player p does not delegate.)
Strategy α is a single-atomic strategy, if α = α0 or n = 1 and α1 ∈ (0, T p ]. The set of
single-atomic strategies is Sp,0 ∪ Sp,1.
A single-atomic strategy is determined and denoted by α1 ∈ [ 0, T p ] so that the space
of single-atomic strategies is isometric to the closed interval Sp = [0, T p]. The value of the
strategy α1 corresponds to the weight of the unique atomic delegate. (Rigorously, there is
no atomic delegate when α1 = 0.)
Suppose that the profile of the delegation strategies of the N atomic players in the profile
T is (αp)Np=1, where αp ∈ Sp. This induces a profile of atomic and nonatomic delegates. In
order to define the cost to a specific atomic player p in T, let her strategy be denoted by
α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn), and the profile of all the atomic and nonatomic delegates appointed
by the other N − 1 atomic players in addition to the nonatomic players in T be denoted by
β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm). Explicitly, β0 is the total weight of the nonatomic players in T and all
the nonatomic delegates appointed by the atomic players in T except p, while β1, . . . , βm are
the weights, in a non-increasing order, of all the atomic delegates appointed by the atomic
players in T except p. Let T−p = M −T p be the total weight of all the players other than p.
Notation. For α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Sp, denote α[k] = ∑ki=1 αi, for k ∈ J1, nK. Similarly,
β[l] = ∑lj=1 βj , for l ∈ J1,mK.
Let Γ(α,β) denote the composite routing game whose profile of players is (α0+β0, α1, . . . , αn,
β1, . . . , βm). According to Theorem 4.5, it admits a unique CE. Let it be denoted by x(α,β).
The following notations are adopted.
4.3. Delegation 107
At x(α,β) =
(
(xi)ni=0, (yj)mj=0
)
, with xi = (xi1, xi2) and yj = (y
j
1, y
j
2), the atomic player
αi sends a stock of weight xir on arc r, and nonatomic players of total weight x0r among α0
choose arc r, r = 1, 2. Let xr =
∑n
i=0 x
i
r be the total weight put on arc r by the delegates of
the atomic player p.
Notations yjr (for j ∈ J1,mK), y0r and yr have similarly meanings for β1, . . . , βm and β0.
Let ξr = xr + yr be the total weight on arc r. The per-unit cost of arc r is thus cr(ξr).
The cost function of the atomic player p in D1(T) is defined by
up(α,β) = x1 c1(ξ1) + x2 c2(ξ2). (4.5)
In other words, the atomic player p’s cost is the total cost to her delegates at the CE of
the game Γ(α,β), which is induced by the delegation strategies of the atomic players in T.
The cost function of the nonatomic players or, more rigorously, the lowest arc cost in the
network in D1(T) is denoted by c0(α,β). According to Proposition 4.8, arc 1 always costs
less than arc 2, hence c0(α,β) = c1(ξ1).
The one-shot delegation game D1(T) is thus defined.
Notice that, by Definition 4.5, the atomic player p’s cost in D1(T) depends only on ξ1
and x1. This property inspires the following definition of equivalence between the delegation
strategies.
Definition 4.14. Two strategies α and α˜ in Sp are equivalent with respect to a profile β if
the flows of x(α,β) and x(α˜,β) satisfy
ξ1 = ξ˜1, x1 = x˜1,
and, consequently, up(α,β) = up(α˜,β).
4.3.3 Five modes of the CE of the induced routing game
This section studies the flow of the CE x(α,β) of the composite routing game Γ(α,β)
induced by the delegation strategies of the atomic players in T. According to Theorem 4.6,
A4.7 and Proposition 4.8, x(α,β) can have five modes, which will be analyzed below.
Mode 1
The CE x(α,β) is of mode 1 if
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
xi1 = αi, i ∈ {0} ∪ J1, nK;
yj1 = βj , j ∈ {0} ∪ J1,mK. (4.6)
Mode 1 α1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βm β0
arc 1 α1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βm β0
arc 2 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
In this mode,
x1 = T p, y1 = T−p, ξ1 = M. (4.7)
Because ξ1 = M and c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2), one has c1(M) < c2(0) or, equivalently, H > 0.
If n ≥ 1, then it follows from (4.2) that, for i ∈ J1, nK, c1(M) + αi c′1(M) ≤ c2(0) or,
equivalently, αi ≤ H. Similarly, if m ≥ 1, then βj ≤ H for j ∈ J1,mK.
These results entail the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.15. Assume that H > 0.
(1) A necessary and sufficient condition on the profile β for the atomic player p to have a
strategy α such that the CE x(α,β) is of mode 1 (cf. (4.6)) is that
m = 0, or m ≥ 1 but β1 ≤ H. (4.8)
(2) Suppose that condition (4.8) is satisfied. Then, a strategy α of the atomic player p is in
the following subset of S1:
Sp1 =
{
α ∈ Sp ∣∣n = 0, or n ≥ 1 but α1 ≤ H }
if, and only if, it induces a CE x of mode 1.
Furthermore, the strategies in Sp1 are equivalent to each other with respect to β. They
induce the same total weight on arc 1, which is M , the same total weight put by the
delegates of the atomic player p on arc 1, which is T p, and thus the same cost to the
atomic player p.
(3) In particular, the nonatomic strategy α0 is in Sp1 .
Mode 2
The CE x(α,β) is of mode 2 and specified by k and l, if
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
n ≥ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ n; xi2 > 0, i ∈ J1, kK; xi2 = 0, i ∈ Jk + 1, nK ∪ {0};
m ≥ 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ m; yi2 > 0, j ∈ J1, lK; yi2 = 0, j ∈ Jl + 1,mK ∪ {0}. (4.9)
Mode 2 α1 · · · αk αk+1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βl βl+1 · · · βm β0
arc 1 x11 · · · xk1 αk+1 · · · αn α0 y11 · · · yl1 βl+1 · · · βm β0
arc 2 x12 · · · xk2 0 · · · 0 0 y12 · · · yl2 0 · · · 0 0
The following two results follow from (4.2).
(i) If n > k, then, for i ∈ Jk+1, NK, c1(ξ1)+T i c′1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2) or, equivalently, αi ≤ h(ξ1).
(ii) For i ∈ J1, kK, c1(ξ1) + xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + xi2 c′2(ξ2) or, equivalently,
xi1 =
αi a(ξ1) + h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
. (4.10)
For i ∈ J1, kK, it is not difficult to deduce the following two results from (4.10) and the
constraint that 0 < xi1 < αi:
(i) αi > −h(ξ1)/a(ξ1), which is always true, because h(ξ1) ≥ 0 and a(ξ1) > 0;
(ii)
αi > h(ξ1). (4.11)
Similarly, if l < m, then, for j ∈ Jl + 1,mK,
βj ≤ h(ξ1) (4.12)
and, for j ∈ J1, lK,
yj1 =
βj a(ξ1) + h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
, (4.13)
βj > h(ξ1). (4.14)
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According to (4.10) and (4.13),
x1 =
k∑
i=1
xi1 + T p − α[k] = T p −
α[k] − k h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
, (4.15)
y1 =
l∑
j=1
yj1 + T−p − β[l] = T−p −
β[l] − l h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
, (4.16)
⇒ ξ1 = x1 + y1 = M − α
[k] + β[l] − (k + l)h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
(4.17)
⇔ Fk+l(ξ1) = α[k] + β[l]. (4.18)
Because Fk+l is strictly decreasing, ξ1 is the unique solution to the equation Fk+l(·) =
α[k] + β[l].
Four constraints on ξ1 can be deduced.
(i) Relation (4.11) implies that
α[k] > k h(ξ1) (4.19)
or, equivalently, according to (4.18),
Fk+l(ξ1) = (M − ξ1)
(
1 + a(ξ1)
)
+ (k + l)h(ξ1) > k h(ξ1) + β[l]
⇒ Fl(ξ1) = (M − ξ1)
(
1 + a(ξ1)
)
+ l h(ξ1) > β[l]
⇒ ξ1 < F−1l (β[l]). (4.20)
(ii) Relation (4.14) implies
ξ1 > h
−1(βl). (4.21)
(iii) It follows from (4.12) that, if l < m, then
ξ1 ≤ h−1(βl+1). (4.22)
(iv) If H ≤ 0, then, according to Proposition 4.8,
ξ1 < ξˆ. (4.23)
These four constraints on ξ1 (cf. (4.20)-(4.23)), together with (4.11), (4.18) and (4.19),
imply that
T p ≥ α[k] > kh(ξ1) > k h(F−1l (β[l])); (4.24)
α[k] = Fk+l(ξ1)− β[l] < Fk+l(h−1(βl))− β[l]; (4.25)
if l < m, then T p ≥ α[k] = Fk+l(ξ1)− β[l] ≥ Fk+l(h−1(βl+1))− β[l];
if H ≤ 0, then T p ≥ α[k] = Fk+l(ξ1)− β[l] ≥ F0(ξˆ)− β[l].
Among these relations, (4.24) and (4.25) imply that
k h(F−1l (β
[l])) < Fk+l(h−1(βl))− β[l] ⇒ β[l] + k h(F−1l (β[l])) < Fl(h−1(βl)) + k βl
⇒ F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl).
These results entail the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.16. (1) A set of necessary and sufficient conditions on the profile β for the
atomic player p to have a strategy α such that the CE x(α,β) is of mode 2 and specified
by some k and l in N∗ (cf. (4.9)) is that
m ≥ l;
F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl);
T p > k h(F−1l (β[l]));
if m ≥ l + 1, then Fk+l(h−1(βl+1))− β[l] ≤ T p;
if H ≤ 0, then F0(ξˆ)− β[l] < T p.
(4.26)
(2) Suppose that the conditions in (4.26) are satisfied. Given α ∈ R such that 0 < α ≤ T p
and 
α > k h(F−1l (β[l]));
α < Fk+l(h−1(βl))− β[l];
if m ≥ l + 1, then α ≥ Fk+l(h−1(βl+1))− β[l];
if H ≤ 0, then α > F0(ξˆ)− β[l],
(4.27)
denote ξ1 = F−1k+l
(
α+ β[l]
)
. Then, a strategy α of the atomic player p is in the following
subset of Sp:
Sp2 (α,β; k, l) =
{
α ∈ Sp ∣∣n ≥ k; α[k] = α; ∀ i ∈ J1, kK, αi > h(ξ1); ∀ i ∈ Jk+1, nK, αi ≤ h(ξ1)}
if, and only if, it induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 2 and specified by k and l and, at
x(α,β), the total weight on arc 1 is ξ1 while the total weight put by the delegates of the
atomic player p on arc 1 is T p − α−kh(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) .
As a result, the strategies in Sp2 (α,β; k, l) are equivalent to each other with respect to β,
and they induce the same cost to the atomic player p.
(3) The single-atomic strategy α− (k−1)h(ξ1) is equivalent to the strategies in Sp2 (α,β; k, l)
with respect to β.
Proof. Only (3) needs to be proved.
In five steps, let us show that, if the conditions in (4.26) and those in (4.27) are satisfied
for k and α, then they are also satisfied when k is replaced by 1 and α is replaced by
α− (k − 1)h(ξ1).
3.1) If h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
< 0, then T p ≥ α > h(F−1l (β[l])). If h(F−1l (β[l])) > 0, T p ≥ α >
k h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
> h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
.
3.2) If l < m, then
T p ≥ Fk+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l] = F1+l(h−1(βl+1))− β[l] + (k − 1)βl+1
≥ F1+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l],
where the second inequality is due to the fact that k ≥ 1.
3.3) According to (4.21), ξ1 > h−1(βl), and it implies that F1+l(ξ1) < F1+l
(
h−1(βl)
)
.
Besides, by the definition of ξ1, α−(k−1)h(ξ1) = Fk+l(ξ1)−β[l]−(k−1)h(ξ1) = F1+l(ξ1)−β[l].
Therefore, α− (k − 1)h(ξ1) < F1+l
(
h−1(βl)
)− β[l].
3.4) If l < m, the relation ξ1 ≤ h−1(βl+1) (cf. (4.22)) implies that F1+l(ξ1) ≥ F1+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)
.
As a result, α− (k − 1)h(ξ1) = F1+l(ξ1)− β[l] ≥ F1+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l].
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3.5) If H ≤ 0, the relation ξ1 ≤ ξˆ (cf. (4.23)) implies that α− (k − 1)h(ξ1) = F1+l(ξ1)−
β[l] ≥ F0(ξˆ)− β[l].
Therefore, the CE x(α− (k − 1)h(ξ1),β) of the composite routing game induced by the
single-atomic strategy α − (k − 1)h(ξ1) and the profile β, denoted by x˜, is of mode 3 and
specified by 1 and l. Statement (2) can thus be applied to compute the total weight on arc 1
and the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic player p on arc 1 at x˜.
Firstly, the definition of ξ1 implies that α+β[l] = Fk+l(ξ1) = F1+l(ξ1)+(k−1)h(ξ1). One
deduces that α− (k− 1)h(ξ1) + β[l] = F1+l(ξ1) or, equivalently, ξ1 = F−11+l
(
α− (k− 1)h(ξ1)
)
.
Then, according to statement (2), the total weight on arc 1 at x˜ is also ξ1.
Secondly, in statement (2), by replacing α by α−(k−1)h(ξ1) and k by 1 in T p− α−kh(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) ,
one obtains that, at x˜, the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic player p on arc 1
is also T p − α−kh(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) .
These two results imply that the single-atomic strategy α− (k− 1)h(ξ1) is equivalent to
the strategies in Sp2 (α,β; k, l) with respect to β.
Mode 3
The CE x(α,β) is of mode 3 and specified by l, if
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
n ≥ 0; xi2 = 0, i ∈ {0} ∪ J1, nK;
m ≥ 1, 1 ≤ l ≤ m; yj2 > 0, j ∈ J1, lK; yj2 = 0, j ∈ Jl + 1,mK ∪ {0}. (4.28)
Mode 3 α1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βl βl+1 · · · βm β0
arc 1 α1 · · · αn α0 y11 · · · yl1 βl+1 · · · βm β0
arc 2 0 · · · 0 0 y12 · · · yl2 0 · · · 0 0
An analysis similar to that for mode 2 yields the following results.
For j ∈ J1, lK, yj1 = βj a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) and
βj > h(ξ1). (4.29)
If l < m, then βj ≤ h(ξ1) for j ∈ Jl + 1,mK. If n > 0, then αi ≤ h(ξ1) for i ∈ J1, nK.
Besides, x1 = T p, y1 = T−p − β
[l]−l h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) , ξ1 = x1 + y1 = M −
β[l]−l h(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1) or, equivalently,
Fl(ξ1) = β[l]. Moreover, ξ1 is the unique solution to the equation Fl(·) = β[l].
If H ≤ 0, it follows from Proposition 4.8 that ξ1 < ξˆ1 or, equivalently, β[l] = Fl(ξ1) >
Fl(ξˆ) = (M − ξˆ)(1 +A).
One deduces the following proposition.
Proposition 4.17. (1) A set of necessary and sufficient conditions on the profile β for the
atomic player p to have a strategy α such that the CE x(α,β) is of mode 3, specified by
l ∈ J1,mK (cf. (4.28)), is that
m ≥ l;
F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl);
if m ≥ l + 1, then F−1l (β[l]) ≤ h−1(βl+1);
if H ≤ 0, then β[l] > F0(ξˆ).
(4.30)
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(2) Suppose that the conditions in (4.30) are satisfied. Then, a strategy α of the atomic
player p is in the following subset of Sp:
Sp3 (β; l) =
{
α ∈ S1 ∣∣n = 0, or n ≥ 1 but α1 ≤ h(F−1l (β[l])) }
if, and only if, it induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 3 and specified by l and, at x(α,β), the
total weight on arc 1 is F−1l (β[l]) and the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic
player p on arc 1 is T p.
As a result, the strategies in Sp3 (β; l) are equivalent to each other with respect to β and
they induce the same cost to the atomic player p.
(3) In particular, the nonatomic strategy α0 is in Sp3 (β; l).
Mode 4
The CE x(α,β) is of mode 4 and specified by k, if
c1(ξ1) < c2(ξ2);
n ≥ 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ n; xi2 > 0, i ∈ J1, kK; xi2 = 0, i ∈ Jk + 1, nK ∪ {0}.
m ≥ 0; yi2 = 0, y ∈ {0} ∪ J1,mK. (4.31)
Mode 4 α1 · · · αk αk+1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βm α0
arc 1 x11 · · · xk1 αk+1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βm β0
arc 2 x12 · · · xk2 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 0
An analysis similar to that for mode 2 yields the following results.
For i ∈ J1, kK, xi1 = αj a(ξ1)+h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) , and
αi > h(ξ1). (4.32)
This further implies that α[k] > kh(ξ1).
If k < n, then αi ≤ h(ξ1) for i ∈ Jk + 1, nK.
If m ≥ 1, then βj ≤ h(ξ1) for j ∈ J1,mK. In particular, ξ1 ≤ h−1(β1).
x1 =
l∑
i=1
xi1 + T p − α[k] = T p −
α[k] − k h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
(4.33)
y1 = T−p (4.34)
ξ1 = x1 + y1 = M − α
[k] − k h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
or, equivalently, Fk(ξ1) = α[k].
Moreover, ξ1 is the unique solution to the equation Fk(·) = α[k].
If H ≤ 0, ξ1 < ξˆ1.
One deduces the following proposition.
Proposition 4.18. (1) A set of necessary and sufficient conditions on the profile β for the
atomic player p to have a strategy α such that the CE x(α,β) is of mode 4 and specified
by k (cf. (4.31)), is that
T p > kH;
if m ≥ 1, then T p ≥ Fk(h−1(β1));
if H ≤ 0, then T p > F0(ξˆ).
(4.35)
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(2) Suppose that the conditions in (4.35) are satisfied. Given α ∈ R such that 0 < α ≤ T p
and 
kH < α ≤ T p;
if m ≥ 1, α ≥ Fk(h−1(β1));
if H ≤ 0, α > F0(ξˆ),
(4.36)
denote ξ1 = F−1k (α). Then, a strategy α of the atomic player p is in the following subset
of Sp
Sp4 (α,β; k) =
{
α ∈ S1 |n ≥ k; α[k] = α; ∀ i ∈ J1, kK, αi > h(ξ1); ∀ i ∈ Jk + 1, nK, αi ≤ h(ξ1)}
if, and only if, it induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 4 and specified by k and, at x(α,β),
the total weight on arc 1 is ξ1 and the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic
player p on arc 1 is T p − α−k h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) .
As a result, the strategies in Sp4 (α,β; k) are equivalent to each other with respect to β
and they induce the same cost to the atomic player p.
(3) The single-atomic strategy α− (k− 1)h(ξ1) is equivalent to the strategies in Sp4 (α,β; k).
Mode 5
The CE x(α,β) is of mode 5 if
c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2). (4.37)
Mode 5 α1 · · · αn α0 β1 · · · βm β0
arc 1 x11 · · · xn1 x01 y11 · · · ym1 y01
arc 2 x12 · · · xn2 x02 y12 · · · ym2 y02
Clearly, in this case, ξ1 = ξˆ and, according to Proposition 4.3, H ≤ 0.
If n ≥ 1, then it follows from (4.2) that c1(ξ1) + xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + (xi2) c′2(ξ2) for
i ∈ J1, nK. This implies that xi1 = Aαi1+A because c1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2). Similarly, if m ≥ 1, then
yj1 =
Aβj
1+A for j ∈ J1,mK.
These two results imply that
x01 + y01 = ξ1 −
n∑
i
xi1 −
m∑
j
yj1 = ξˆ −
A(α[n] + β[m])
1 +A . (4.38)
It follows from 0 ≤ x01 ≤ α0 and 0 ≤ y01 ≤ β0 that
0 ≤ x01 + y01 ≤ T p − α[n] + T−p − β[m] = M − α[n] − β[m].
One deduces, by considering (4.38), that α[n]+β[m] ≤ ξˆ · 1+AA and α[n]+β[m] ≤ (M−ξˆ)(1+A).
But, ξˆ · 1+AA ≥ (M − ξˆ)(1 +A) according to (4.4). Therefore,
α[n] + β[m] ≤ (M − ξˆ)(1 +A) = F0(ξˆ), (4.39)
These results lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 4.19. Assume that H ≤ 0.
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(1) A necessary and sufficient condition on the profile β for the atomic player p to have a
strategy α such that the CE x(α,β) is of mode 5 (cf. (4.37)) is that
m = 0, or m ≥ 1 but β[m] ≤ F0(ξˆ). (4.40)
(2) Suppose that the condition (4.40) is satisfied. Then, a strategy α of the atomic player p
is in the following subset of Sp
Sp5 =
{
α ∈ S1 ∣∣n = 0, or n ≥ 1 but α[n] ≤ F0(ξˆ)− β[m]}
if, and only if, it induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 5.
Furthermore, facing β, all the strategies in Sp5 induce the same cost to the atomic
player p, which is T p c1(ξˆ).
(3) In particular, the nonatomic strategy α0 is in Sp5 .
4.3.4 Special role of single-atomic strategies
By combining Propositions 4.15-4.19, one deduces the following theorem on the special
role of single-atomic strategies in one-shot delegation games.
Theorem 4.20. Given a profile β, for any strategy α ∈ Sp, the atomic player p can obtain
the cost up(α,β) by playing a single-atomic strategy. In other words, the delegation strategies
in Sp are weakly dominated by the single-atomic strategies in Sp.
Therefore, facing a profile β, if the atomic player p has best replies to β, then at least
one of them is a single-atomic one. In the following section, one will show that, given any
β, a best reply, which is a single-atomic strategy, always exists.
4.4 Best replies
Notation. For a profile β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) induced by the delegation strategies of all
the atomic players except p in addition to the nonatomic players in T, denote β0 = β[0] = 0,
and
Bl = Fl+1
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l], for l = 0 and, if m > 1, for all l ∈ J1,m− 1K. (4.41)
4.4.1 Preliminary results
Lemma 4.21. Suppose that x and x˜ are, respectively, the CE of the composite routing games
Γ(α,β) and that of Γ(α˜, β˜). If x is of mode 2 (cf. (4.9)) or mode 4 (cf. (4.31)), and x1 < x˜1,
y1 ≤ y˜1, then
up(α˜, β˜) > up(α,β).
Proof. Suppose that x is specified by k ∈ N∗. According to (4.2), for the k largest atomic
delegates of the atomic player p, i.e. those who have weight α1, . . . , αk,
c1(ξ1) + xi1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + xi2 c′2(ξ2), i ∈ J1, kK.
Summing over all i ∈ J1, kK leads to
k c1(ξ1) +
[
x1 − (T p − α[k])
]
c′1(ξ1) = k c2(ξ2) + x2 c′2(ξ2).
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Consequently,
c1(ξ1) + x1 c′1(ξ1) = c2(ξ2) + x2 c′2(ξ2) + (k − 1)
[
c2(ξ2)− c1(ξ1)
]
+ (T p − α[k]) c′1(ξ1).
Recall that, according to Proposition 4.8, c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2). Then, one deduces from the
previous equation that c1(ξ1) + x1 c′1(ξ1) ≥ c2(ξ2) + x2 c′2(ξ2). Moreover, there exists B > 0
such that
c1(ξ1) + x1 c′1(ξ1) ≥ B ≥ c2(ξ2) + x2 c′2(ξ2). (4.42)
Because of the strict monotonicity and the convexity of c1 and c2, (4.42) and the fact that
c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2) imply that, for all s ∈ (x1, T p ] and t ∈ [ 0, x2),
c1(s+ y1) + s c′1(s+ y1) > B > c2(t+ y2) + t c′2(t+ y2), (4.43)
c1(s+ y1) < c1(ξ1) ≤ c2(ξ2) < c2(t+ y2).
They further imply that s c′1(s + y1) > t c′2(t + y2) and, moreover, there exists C > 0 such
that for any w ∈ ( y1, T−p ] and z ∈ [ 0, y2 ),
s c′1(s+ w) > C > t c′2(t+ z). (4.44)
Let us compare up(α˜, β˜) and up(α,β):
up(α˜, β˜)− up(α,β) = [ x˜1 c1(ξ˜1) + x˜2 c2(ξ˜2) ]− [x1 c1(ξ1) + x2 c2(ξ2) ]
=
[
x˜1 c1(ξ˜1)− x˜1 c1(x˜1 + y1)
]
+
[
x˜1 c1(x˜1 + y1)− x1 c1(ξ1)
]
+
[
x˜2 c2(ξ˜2)− x˜2 c2(x˜2 + y2)
]
+
[
x˜2 c2(x˜2 + y2)− x2 c2(ξ2)
]
=
∫ y˜1
y1
[ x˜1 c1(x˜1 + t) ]′ dt +
∫ x˜1
x1
[ t c1(t+ y1) ]′ dt
−
∫ y2
y˜2
[ x˜2 c2(x˜2 + t) ]′ dt −
∫ x2
x˜2
[ t c2(t+ y2) ]′ dt
=
∫ y˜1
y1
x˜1 c
′
1(x˜1 + t) dt+
∫ x˜1
x1
[
c1(t+ y1) + t c′1(t+ y1)
]
dt
−
∫ y2
y˜2
x˜2 c
′
2(x˜2 + t) dt−
∫ x2
x˜2
[
c2(t+ y2) + t c′2(t+ y2)
]
dt
> (y˜1 − y1)C + (x˜1 − x1)B − (y2 − y˜2)C − (x2 − x˜2)B
= 0,
where the inequality is due to (4.43) and (4.44).
Lemma 4.22. If H and β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) satisfy one of the two conditions below:
(i) H > 0, m ≥ 1, β1 > H;
(ii) H ≤ 0, m ≥ 1, β[m] ≥ F0(ξˆ),
then one has:
(1) The CE x(α0,β) induced by the atomic player p’s nonatomic strategy and the profile β
is of mode 3 and specified by l0, where l0 is the unique number in J1,mK that meets the
conditions in (4.30).
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(2)
F−11 (β[1]) > F−12 (β[2]) > · · · > F−1l0 (β[l0]); (4.45)
F−1l (β
[l]) > h−1(βl), ∀ l ∈ J1, l0K. (4.46)
If l0 < m, then
F−1l0 (β
[l0]) ≤ F−1l0+1(β[l0+1]) ≤ · · · ≤ F−1m (β[m]); (4.47)
F−1l (β
[l]) ≤ h−1(βl), ∀ l ∈ Jl0 + 1,mK. (4.48)
(3) For all k ∈ N,
Fk+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l]{> k h(F−1l (β[l])), if l0 > 1 and l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K,≤ k h(F−1l (β[l])), if l0 < m and l = l0. (4.49)
In particular, if l0 > 1, then Bl > h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
for all l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K.
(4) If l0 > 1, then, for all k ∈ N and l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K,
Fk+l(h−1(βl+1))− β[l] > k h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
. (4.50)
(5) If l0 > 1, then B0 ≥ B1 ≥ · · · ≥ Bl0−1.
For l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K, Bl = Bl−1 if, and only if, βl+1 = βl.
(6) Bl0−1 > h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
.
(7) For all strategy α ∈ Sp, one and only one of the three statements below is true:
(i) x(α,β) is of mode 3 and specified by l0. Besides, α is equivalent to α0 with respect
to β;
(ii) x(α,β) is of mode 4 and specified by some k ∈ N∗;
(iii) x(α,β) is of mode 2 and specified by some k ∈ N∗ and some l ∈ J1, l0K;
Proof. (1) The CE x(α0,β) is not of mode 1 when H > 0, because (4.8) is not satisfied.
And it is not of mode 5 when H ≤ 0, because (4.40) is not satisfied. It is neither of mode 2
nor of mode 4, because n = 0. Thus, it is of mode 3. Proposition 4.17 shows that x(α0,β)
is specified by l if, and only if, l meets the conditions in (4.30). Such an l0 ∈ J1,mK exists
and it is unique because, otherwise, the composite routing game Γ(α0,β) has no CE or more
than one CE, which contradicts Theorem 4.5.
(2) One has only to prove for the case where m > 1.
First, suppose that l0 < m. Let us prove (4.47) and (4.48) by induction.
The fact that m 6= l0 implies that m does not meet all the four conditions in (4.30). How-
ever, in this case, only the second condition can be violated. Thus, F−1m (β[m]) ≤ h−1(βm).
Now, suppose that for some l ∈ Jl0 + 1,mK,
F−1l (β
[l]) ≤ F−1l+1(β[l+1]) ≤ · · · ≤ F−1m (β[m]);
F−1p (β[p]) ≤ h−1(βp), ∀ p ∈ Jl,mK.
The relation F−1l (β[l]) ≤ h−1(βl) implies that h
(
F−1l (β[l])
) ≥ βl and, consequently,
β[l] = Fl
(
F−1l (β
[l])
)
= Fl−1
(
F−1l (β
[l])
)
+ h
(
F−1l (β
[l])
) ≥ Fl−1(F−1l (β[l]))+ βl
⇒ β[l−1] ≥ Fl−1
(
F−1l (β
[l])
)
⇒ F−1l−1(β[l−1]) ≤ F−1l (β[l]) ≤ h−1(βl).
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In particular, F−1l−1(β[l−1]) ≤ F−1l (β[l]) and F−1l−1(β[l−1]) ≤ h−1(βl).
If F−1l−1(β[l−1]) > h−1(βl−1), then all the conditions in (4.30) are satisfied so that l0 = l−1.
Otherwise, one continues the induction by considering l − 1. In this way, (4.47) and (4.48)
are proved.
Next, let us prove (4.45) and (4.46) by induction.
According to (4.30), F−1l0 (β
[l0]) > h−1(βl0). Suppose that l0 > 1 and, for some l ∈ J2, l0K,
F−1l (β
[l]) > F−1l+1(β
[l+1]) > · · · > F−1l0 (β[l0]);
F−1p (β[p]) > h−1(βp), ∀ p ∈ Jl, l0K;
If F−1l−1(β[l−1]) ≤ F−1l (β[l]), then
Fl−1
(
F−1l−1(β
[l−1])
) ≥ Fl−1(F−1l (β[l]))
⇒ β[l−1] ≥ Fl
(
F−1l (β
[l])
)− h(F−1l (β[l])) = β[l] − h(F−1l (β[l]))
⇒ h(F−1l (β[l])) ≥ βl
⇒ F−1l (β[l]) ≤ h−1(βl).
It contradicts the hypothesis that F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl). Therefore, F
−1
l−1(β[l−1]) > F
−1
l (β[l]).
Furthermore, F−1l−1(β[l−1]) > F
−1
l (β[l]) > h−1(βl) ≥ h−1(βl−1). In particular, F−1l−1(β[l−1]) >
h−1(βl−1). In this way, (4.45) and (4.46) are proven.
(3) For all k ∈ N,
Fk+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l] − k h(F−1l (β[l]))
= Fl
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l] + k[βl+1 − h(F−1l (β[l])) ]
{
> 0, if h−1(βl+1) < F−1l (β[l]),
≤ 0, if h−1(βl+1) ≥ F−1l (β[l]).
(4.51)
If l0 > 1, then, for all l ∈ J1, l0−1K, (4.45) and (4.46) show that F−1l (β[l]) > F−1l+1(β[l+1]) >
h−1(βl+1); in particular, F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl+1).
If l0 < m, then, according to (4.30), F−1l0 (β
[l0]) ≤ h−1(βl0+1).
These two inequalities and (4.51) lead to the conclusion.
(4) For l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K, it is proven in (3) that F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl+1) and, consequently,
β[l] < Fl(h−1(βl+1)).
Besides, (4.30) implies that h−1(βl0) < F−1l0 (β
[l0]) and, in consequence, βl0 > h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
.
Therefore, βl+1 ≥ βl0 because βl+1 > h(F−1l0 (β[l0])).
These two results imply that
Fk+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
)−β[l]−k h(F−1l0 (β[l0])) = Fl(h−1(βl+1))−β[l] +k [βl+1−h(F−1l0 (β[l0])) ] > 0,
which gives rise to the conclusion.
(5) For l ∈ N such that 0 ≤ l ≤ l0 − 2,
Bl −Bl+1 =
[
Fl+1
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− β[l] ]− [Fl+2(h−1(βl+2))− β[l+1] ]
=
[
Fl+2
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− βl+1 − β[l] ]− [Fl+2(h−1(βl+2))− β[l] − βl+1 ]
= Fl+2
(
h−1(βl+1)
)− Fl+2(h−1(βl+2)) ≥ 0
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because βl+1 ≥ βl+2. Clearly, the equality holds if, and only if, βl+1 = βl+2.
(6) According to (4.30), F−1l0 (β
[l0]) > h−1(βl0). As a result, β[l0] < Fl0
(
h−1(βl0)
)
and
h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])) < βl0 . This implies that
Fl0
(
h−1(βl0)
)
> β[l0] = β[l0−1] + βl0 > β[l0−1] + h(F−1l0 (β
[l0]))
⇒ Bl0−1 = Fl0
(
h−1(βl0)
)− β[l0−1] > h(F−1l0 (β[l0])).
(7) Given an arbitrary strategy α ∈ Sp. Because β1 > H in the case where H > 0, and
β[m] ≥ F0(ξˆ) in the case where H ≤ 0, x(α,β) cannot be of mode 1 or mode 5 according to
Propositions 4.15 and 4.19.
If x(α,β) is of mode 3 and specified by l, then l meets the conditions in (4.30). However,
l0 is the unique number in J1,mK that meets the conditions in (4.30), hence l = l0.
If x(α,β) is of mode 2 and specified by k and l, then F−1l (β[l]) > h−1(βl) by (4.26).
According to (4.46) and (4.48), l ∈ J1, l0K.
Lemma 4.23. Suppose that H ≤ 0. If β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p are such that m ≥ 1,
β[m] ≤ F0(ξˆ) and F0(ξˆ)− β[m] < T p < F1
(
h−1(β1)
)
, then one has:
(1) The CE x(α1,β) induced by the atomic player p’s trivial strategy and profile β is of
mode 2 and specified by 1 and some l1 ∈ J1,mK.
(2) F−1m (β[m]) > h−1(βm).
If m > 1, then, for all l ∈ J1,mK, h−1(βl) < F−1l (β[l]) < F−1l−1(β[l−1]).
(3) B0 ≥ B1 ≥ · · · ≥ Bm−1.
If m > 1, then, for all l ∈ J1,m− 1K, Bl = Bl−1 if, and only if, βl+1 = βl.
(4) F0(ξˆ)− β[m] < Bm−1.
If m > 1, then, for all l ∈ J1,m− 1K, F0(ξˆ)− β[l] < Bl.
(5) If m = 1, or if m > 1 but T p < Bm−1, then l1 = m. If m > 1 and T p ≥ Bm−1, then
l1 < m and Bl1 ≤ T p < Bl1−1.
Proof. (1) Clear by Propositions 4.15–4.19.
(2) On the one hand, βm > 0 = h(ξˆ), hence h−1(βm) < ξˆ. On the other hand, by hypothesis,
β[m] ≤ F0(ξˆ) = Fm(ξˆ) and thus F−1m (β[m]) ≥ ξˆ. Therefore, F−1m (β[m]) > h−1(βm). The rest
of the proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.22 (2).
(3) Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.22 (5).
(4) In order to prove that Bm−1 = Fm
(
h−1(βm)
) − β[m−1] > F0(ξˆ) − β[m], it is enough
to show that Fm
(
h−1(βm)
)
+ βm > F0(ξˆ). In (2), it is shown that h−1(βm) < ξˆ, hence
Fm
(
h−1(βm)
)
> Fm(ξˆ) = F0(ξˆ). As a result, Fm
(
h−1(βm)
)
+βm > F0(ξˆ). For l ∈ J1,m−1K,
the proof is similar.
(5) The conclusion follows from Proposition 4.16, in particular, condition (4.27), and the
previous statements.
In the following two sections, the atomic player p’s best replies in the case H > 0 and in
the case H ≤ 0 will be discussed respectively.
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4.4.2 Case H > 0
One will see that, face to different β’s, the atomic player p can have three types of best
replies. In the first case, which will be called nonatomic, all her delegation strategies, in
particular, the nonatomic one α0, are best replies. In the second case, which will be called
trivial, the trivial strategy α1 is the unique best reply. In the third case, which will be called
nontrivial, there exists a best reply which is a single-atomic strategy, but it is not necessarily
the trivial one or the nonatomic one.
Nonatomic case
Lemma 4.24. Suppose that H > 0. If β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p satisfy one of the two
conditions below:
(i) m = 0, or m ≥ 1 but β1 ≤ H; T p ≤ H;
(ii) m ≥ 1 and β1 > H; H < T p ≤ h(F−1l0 (β[l0])), where l0 is the one in Lemma 4.22,
then every strategy in Sp is equivalent to the nonatomic strategy α0 with respect to β. As a
result, every strategy of the atomic player p is a best reply to β.
Besides, in case (i), x(α0,β) is of mode 1, while in case (ii), it is of mode 3 and specified
by l0.
Proof. The results follow immediately from Propositions 4.15 and 4.17.
Trivial case
Lemma 4.25. Suppose that H > 0. If β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p are such that T p > H,
m = 0 or m ≥ 1 but β1 ≤ H, then the atomic player p’s unique best reply is the trivial
strategy α1.
Besides, x(α1,β) is of mode 4 and specified by 1.
Proof. For any strategy α ∈ Sp, the CE x(α,β) cannot be of mode 5, because H > 0. It
cannot be of mode 2 (resp. of mode 3) because, otherwise, (4.14) (resp. (4.29)) implies that
β1 > h(ξ1) > h(M) = H, which contradicts the hypothesis that β1 ≤ H. Therefore, x(α,β)
is of mode 1 or mode 4.
According to Proposition 4.15, x(α,β) is of mode 1 if, and only if, α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn)
is in Sp1 , i.e. n = 0, or n ≥ 1 but α1 ≤ H. In particular, a single-atomic strategy α is in Sp1
if, and only if, α ≤ H.
For any α 6∈ Sp1 , x(α,β) is of mode 4. It follows from Proposition 4.18 that there
exists some α ∈ ( 0, T p ] and some k ∈ N∗ which satisfy the conditions in (4.36) so that
α ∈ Sp4 (α,β; k) and x(α,β) is specified by k.
The rest of the proof is made in four steps.
1) It is easy to verify that α1 is in Sp4 (T p,β; 1) so that x(α1,β), denoted by x∗ from now
on, is of mode 4 and specified by 1. According to Proposition 4.18 and equation (4.34),
x∗1 = T p − T
p−h(ξ∗1)
1+a(ξ∗1)
< T p, y∗1 = T−p and ξ∗1 = F−11 (T p).
2) Consider a strategy α ∈ Sp1 , i.e. n = 0, or n ≥ 1 but α1 ≤ H. Let x(α,β) be denoted by
x, which is of mode 1. Then, x1 = T p and y1 = T−p by (4.7). Because x1 > x∗1 and y1 = y∗1,
it follows from Lemma 4.21 that u1(x) > u1(x∗). In other words, no strategy in Sp1 is a best
reply.
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3) Consider a single-atomic strategy α ∈ (H,T p]. It is not in Sp1 , hence x(α,β) is of mode 4.
Besides, x(α,β) is specified by 1 because α is single-atomic. In order to verify that α ∈
(H,T p] and k = 1 meet the conditions in (4.36), one has only to show that α > H ≥
F1
(
h−1(β1)
)
if m > 0. Indeed, the hypothesis β1 ≤ H = h(M) implies that h−1(β1) ≥ M
and, consequently, F1
(
h−1(β1)
) ≤ F1(M) = H.
For any α ∈ (H,T p], the total weight on arc 1 at x(α,β) is ξ1 = F−11 (α) by Proposi-
tion 4.18. Because F1 is strictly decreasing, a bijection θ can be defined from interval (H,T p],
the domain of α, to the interval [F−11 (T p),M), the domain of ξ1, such that θ = F−11 . Then,
for this fixed profile β, the atomic player p’s cost up(α,β) induced by (α,β) can be written
as a function v of ξ1 on [F−11 (T p),M): v(ξ1) = up(θ−1(ξ1),β) = up(F1(ξ1),β), where θ−1
denotes the inverse function of θ.
According to (4.33), x1 = T p−F1(ξ1)−h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) = T p−M+ξ1. Then, for all ξ1 ∈ [F
−1
1 (T p),M),
v(ξ1) = x1c1(ξ1) + (T p − x1) c2(M − ξ1) = (T p −M + ξ1)c1(ξ1) + (M − ξ1)c2(M − ξ1).
Its derivative function is
v′(ξ1) = c1(ξ1) + (T p −M + ξ1) c′1(ξ1)− c2(M − ξ1)− (M − ξ1)c′2(M − ξ1)
= c′1(ξ1)
(
T p − F1(ξ1)
)
= c′1(ξ1)
(
T p − α) ≥ 0
and the equality holds if, and only if, α = T p or, equivalently, ξ1 = F−11 (T p).
Therefore, v(ξ1) attains its unique minimum on the interval [F−11 (T p),M) at F−11 (T p),
and it is strictly increasing on [F−11 (T p),M). Equivalently, as a function of α, up(α,β)
attains its unique minimum on the interval (H,T p] at T p, and it is strictly decreasing on
(H,T p].
Therefore, the trivial strategy α1 is a best reply, and this is the unique single-atomic
strategy that is a best reply.
4) Finally, let us show that α1 is the unique best reply. It is proved that no strategy in Sp1
is a best reply, hence it is enough to show that no strategy in Sp \ Sp1 other than the trivial
one is a best reply.
Given an arbitrary strategy α ∈ Sp \ Sp1 , suppose that it is in Sp4 (α,β; k) for some
α ∈ (0, T p] and some k ∈ N∗. According to Proposition 4.18, α is equivalent to the single-
atomic strategy α− (k − 1)h(ξ1), where ξ1 = F−1k (α). As a result, α induces the same cost
to the atomic player p as the single-atomic strategy α− (k − 1)h(ξ1).
If the single-atomic strategy α− (k − 1)h(ξ1) is not the trivial strategy, then, according
to (3), it is not a best reply to β, hence neither is α.
If the single-atomic strategy α−(k−1)h(ξ1) is the trivial strategy, i.e. α−(k−1)h(ξ1) =
T p, then α induces the same total weight on arc 1, i.e. ξ1 = ξ∗1 = F−11 (T p). As a result,
α = T p + (k − 1)h(F−11 (T p)).
On the one hand, ξ∗1 = F−11 (T p) < M and, consequently, h
(
F−11 (T p)
)
> h(M) = H > 0.
It follows that α = T p + (k − 1)h(F−11 (T p)) ≥ T p, and the equality holds if, and only if,
k = 1. On the other hand, α ≤ T p. Therefore, k = 1 and α = T p. In other words, α is
nothing else but α1.
One concludes that the unique best reply of the atomic player p is the trivial strategy
α1.
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Nontrivial case
Lemma 4.26. Suppose that H > 0. If β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) is such that m ≥ 1, β1 > H,
and T p > h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])), where l0 is the one in Lemma 4.22, then the atomic player p has at
least one best reply which is a single-atomic strategy.
Besides, if α ∈ Sp is a best reply, then x(α,β) can be of mode 3 and specified by l0, or
of mode 2 and specified by some k ∈ N∗ and some l ∈ J1, l0K, or of mode 4 and specified by
some k ∈ N∗.
Proof. Theorem 4.20 implies that all the strategies in β are dominated by the single-atomic
strategies in Sp = [0, T p]. One can thus consider only the single-atomic strategies α (0 ≤
α ≤ T p) to find the minimum cost that the atomic player p can get. The rest of the proof is
made up of six parts.
1) For an arbitrary α ∈ [0, T p], x(α,β) is not of mode 5, because H > 0. It is not of mode 1,
because the hypothesis β1 > H violates the condition (4.8). It is not of mode 4 because, by
hypothesis, T p < B0, which violates the second condition in (4.35). Therefore, x(α,β) is of
mode 2 or 3.
2) Suppose that a single-atomic strategy α ∈ [0, T p] induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 3.
According to Lemma 4.22 (7), x(α,β) is specified by l0, and it is equivalent to the
nonatomic strategy α0 with respect to β.
It follows from Proposition 4.17 that a necessary and sufficient condition on α for x(α,β)
to be of mode 3 is α ≤ h(F−1l0 (β[l0])), which is always possible since, by hypothesis, T p >
h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])). Therefore, this incurs no more conditions on T p.
Still according to Proposition 4.17, at x(α,β), the weight on arc 1 is ξ1 = F−1l0 (β
[l0]), and
the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic player p on arc 1 is T p. The cost to the
atomic player p is thus up(α;β) = T p c1(F−1l0 (β
[l0])).
3) Suppose that a single-atomic strategy α ∈ [0, T p] induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 4.
The necessary and sufficient conditions on T p for the atomic player p to possess a strategy
which induces a CE of mode 4 and specified by 1 are given by (4.35) in Proposition 4.18:
T p > H and T p ≥ F1(h−1(β1)) = B0. The condition T p > H always holds. Indeed, recall
that F−1l0 (β
[l0]) is the total weight on arc 1 at x(α0,β), hence F−1l0 (β
[l0]) < M . One deduces
from this result and the hypothesis T p > h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])) that T p > h(M) = H. Thus, the
only condition on T p is T p ≥ B0.
Notice that F1(h−1(β1)) > F1(h−1(H)) = H because β1 > H.
When T p ≥ B0, according to (4.36) and the fact that F1(h−1(β1)) > H, the sufficient
and necessary condition on the single-atomic strategy α for x(α,β) to be of mode 4 is
F1(h−1(β1)) ≤ α ≤ T p, i.e. B0 ≤ α ≤ T p.
Proposition 4.18 implies that, at x(α,β), the total weight on arc 1 is ξ1 = F−11 (α). As in
the trivial case discussed in Lemma 4.25, one can define a continuous and strictly decreasing
bijection θ from the interval [B0, T p], the domain of α, to the interval [F−11 (T p), h−1(β1) ],
the domain of ξ1, such that θ = F−11 and ξ1 = θ(α). The atomic player p’s cost up(α,β)
at x(α,β) can then be written as a function v of ξ1 on [F−11 (T p), h−1(β1) ]: v(ξ1) =
up(θ−1(ξ1),β). Explicitly, because the total weight put by the delegates of the atomic player p
on arc 1 is x1 = T p− F1(ξ1)−h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) according to Proposition 4.18, v(ξ1) = x1 c1(ξ1)+x2 c2(ξ2) =
T p c1(ξ1) + (M − ξ1)
(
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
.
4) Suppose that a single-atomic strategy α ∈ [0, T p] induces a CE x(α,β) of mode 2.
According to Lemma 4.22 (7), x(α,β) is specified by 1 and some l ∈ J1, l0K.
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First, consider the case where m > 1, l0 > 1 and l ∈ J1, l0−1K. Two necessary conditions
on T p for the atomic player p to possess a strategy which induces a CE of mode 2 and specified
by 1 and l are given by (4.26): T p > h(F−1l
(
β[l])
)
and T p ≥ F1+l
(
h−1(βl+1)
) − β[l] = Bl.
According to Lemma 4.22 (3), Bl > h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
. Thus, the only necessary condition on T p
is T p ≥ Bl.
When T p ≥ Bl, according to (4.27), the sufficient and necessary conditions on the single-
atomic strategy α for x(α,β) to be specified by 1 and l are Fl+1(h−1(βl+1)) − β[l] ≤ α <
Fl+1(h−1(βl)) − β[l], α > h(F−1l
(
β[l])
)
and α ≤ T p. Notice that Fl+1(h−1(βl)) − β[l] =
Fl(h−1(βl)) + βl − β[l] = Fl(h−1(βl))− β[l−1] = Bl−1, and Bl > h
(
F−1l (β[l])
)
as shown in the
previous paragraph. Thus, the sufficient and necessary conditions on α are Bl ≤ α < Bl−1
and 0 ≤ α ≤ T p.
Proposition 4.16 implies that, at x(α,β), the total weight on arc 1 is ξ1 = F−11+l(α +
β[l]). Thus, one can define a continuous and strictly decreasing bijection from the interval
[Bl, Bl−1) ∩ [0, T p], the domain of α, to the interval
(
h−1(βl), h−1(βl+1)
] ∩ [F−1l+1(T p +
β[l]), +∞), the domain of ξ1, such that θ = F−11+l(·+β[l]) and ξ1 = θ(α). The atomic player p’s
cost up(α,β) at x(α,β) can then be written as a function v of ξ1 on
(
h−1(βl), h−1(βl+1)
]∩[
F−1l+1(T p+β[l]), +∞
)
: v(ξ1) = up
(
θ−1(ξ1),β
)
. Explicitly, as x1 = T p− α−h(ξ1)1+a(ξ1) according to
Proposition 4.16, v(ξ1) = x1 c1(ξ1) +x2 c2(ξ2) = T p c1(ξ1) +
[
(M − ξ1)− β
[l]−lh(ξ1)
1+a(ξ1)
] (
c2(M −
ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
.
In the case where l = l0, by similar arguments, the necessary and sufficient condition
on T p for x(α,β) to be of mode 2 and specified by 1 and l0 is T p > h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])), which is
always satisfied by hypothesis. The sufficient and necessary conditions on α for x(α,β) to
be of mode 2 and specified by 1 and l0 are h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])) < α < Bl0−1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ T p.
Besides, at x(α,β), the total weight on arc 1 is ξ1 = F−1l0+1(α + β
[l0]). One can define a
continuous and strictly decreasing bijection θ from the interval (h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])), Bl0−1)∩[0, T p],
the domain of α, to the interval
(
h−1(βl0), F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)∩[F−1l0+1(T p+β[l0]), +∞), the domain
of ξ1, such that θ = F−1l0+1(· + β[l0]) and ξ1 = θ(α). The atomic player p’s cost up(α,β) at
x(α,β) can then be written as a function v of ξ1 on
(
h−1(βl0), F−1l0 (β
[l0])
) ∩ [F−10l0+1(T p +
β[l0]), +∞). Its explicit form is the same as in the case where l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K, except that l is
replaced by l0.
Table 4.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions on T p and α for that, at
x(α,β), there are k delegates of the atomic player p and l other delegates who use arc 2.
The third line (for l ∈ J1, l0 − 1K) is possible only if m ≥ l0 > 1.
mode k l T p (> h(F−1l0 (β
[l0]))) α (0 ≤ α ≤ T p)
3 0 l0 α ≤ h(F−1l0 (β[l0]))
2 1 l0 h(F−1l0 (β
[l0])) < α < Bl0−1
2 1 l0 − 1, l0 − 2, . . . , 1 T p ≥ Bl Bl ≤ α < Bl−1
4 1 0 T p ≥ B0 α ≥ B0
Table 4.1: necessary and sufficient conditions on T p and α
5) In parts 2–4, a map θ is defined from [0, T p], the domain of α, to J , the domain of
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ξ1, where J =
[
F−1
lˆ+1(T
p + β[lˆ]), F−1l0 (β
[l0])
]
, lˆ = l0 if T p < Bl0−1, and lˆ = arg min
{
l ∈
{0, 1, . . . , l0 − 1}
∣∣T p ≥ Bl } if T p ≥ Bl0−1. In particular, θ has the following proper-
ties: (i) for α ∈ [ 0, h(F−1l0 (β[l0])) ], θ(α) = F−1l0 (β[l0]); (ii) θ is strictly decreasing in α on(
h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
, T p
]
and, in consequence, θ is a bijection between α ∈ (h(F−1l0 (β[l0])), T p ]
and ξ1 ∈ J \{F−1l0 (β[l0])}; (iii) θ is piecewise continuous and, indeed, one can easily verify that
it is continuous on [0, T p]. Besides, recall that θ−1(ξ1) =
{
α ∈ [0, h(F−1l0 (β[l0])) ] ∣∣ θ(α) = ξ1 }
for all ξ1 ∈ J . In particular, θ−1(β[l0]) is the interval
[
0, h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
) ]
and, for any
ξ1 ∈ J \ {F−1l0 (β[l0])}, θ−1(ξ1) is a singleton.
6) In parts 2–4, a one-variable cost function v(ξ1) is defined for the atomic player p for
ξ1 ∈ J . Here is its explicit expression:
• ξ1 = F−1l0 (β
[l0]) and, correspondingly, α ∈ [0, h(F−1l0 (β[l0])) ] (so that the flow x(α,β)
is of mode 3 and specified by l0):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1)
• ξ1 ∈
(
h−1(βl0), F−1l0 (β
[l0])
) ∩ [F−1l0+1(T p + β[l0]), +∞) and, correspondingly, α =
Fl0+1(ξ1)− β[l0] ∈
(
h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
, Bl0−1
)∩ [0, T p] (so that the flow x(α,β) is of mode 2 and
specified by 1 and l0):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) +
[
(M − ξ1)− β
[l0] − l0h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
] (
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
• l = l0 − 1, l0 − 2, . . . , 1, ξ1 ∈
(
h−1(βl), h−1(βl+1)
] ∩ [F−1l+1(T p + β[l]), +∞) and,
correspondingly, α = Fl+1(ξ1) − β[l] ∈ [Bl, Bl−1) ∩ [0, T p] (so that the flow x(α,β) is of
mode 2 and specified by 1 and l):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) +
[
(M − ξ1)− β
[l] − l h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
] (
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
• ξ1 ∈ [F−11 (T p), h−1(β1) ] and, correspondingly, α = F1(ξ1) ∈ [B0, T p] (so that the
flow x(α,β) is of mode 4 and specified by 1):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) + (M − ξ1)
(
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
Therefore, one has shown that v(ξ1) is a piecewise continuous function on the closed
interval J . It is not difficult to verify that it is in fact continuous. As a result, it attains
its minimum on J . Suppose that ξ∗1 is a minimum. If ξ∗1 = F−1l0 (β
[l0]), then any α ∈[
0, h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
) ]
is a best reply of the atomic player p. If ξ∗1 ∈ J \ {F−1l0 (β[l0])}, then
α∗ = θ−1(ξ∗1) is a best reply.
4.4.3 Case H ≤ 0
Lemma 4.27. Suppose that H ≤ 0. If β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p satisfy one of the three
conditions below:
(i) m = 0 and T p ≤ F0(ξˆ);
(ii) m ≥ 1, β[m] ≤ F0(ξˆ), and T p ≤ F0(ξˆ)− β[m];
(iii) m ≥ 1, β[m] > F0(ξˆ), and T p ≤ h(F−1l0 (β[l0])), where l0 the one in Lemma 4.22,
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then every strategy in Sp is equivalent to the nonatomic strategy α0. As a result, every
strategy of the atomic player p is a best reply to β.
Beside, in case (i) and case (ii), x(α0,β) is of mode 5 while, in case (iii), it is of mode 3
and specified by l0.
Proof. The results follow immediately from Propositions 4.17 and 4.19.
Lemma 4.28. Suppose that H ≤ 0, and β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p are such that m = 0
and T p > F0(ξˆ), then the atomic player p’s unique best reply is the trivial strategy α1.
Besides, x(α1,β) is of mode 4 and specified by 1.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.25.
Lemma 4.29. Suppose that H ≤ 0, and β = (β0, β1, . . . , βm) and T p satisfy one of the
two conditions below:
(i) m ≥ 1, β[m] ≤ F0(ξˆ), T p > F0(ξˆ)− β[m];
(ii) m ≥ 1, β[m] > F0(ξˆ), T p > h
(
F−1l0 (β
[l0])
)
,
then the atomic player p has at least one best reply which is a single-atomic strategy.
Proof. (i) Similar analysis to that in the proof of Lemma 4.26 yields Table 4.2, which sum-
marizes the necessary and sufficient conditions on T p and α for that, at x(α,β), there are
k delegates of the atomic player p and l other delegates who use arc 2. The third line (for
l ∈ J1,m− 1K) is possible only if m > 1.
mode k l T p (> F0(ξˆ)− β[m]) α (0 ≤ α ≤ T p)
5 0 0 α ≤ F0(ξˆ)− β[m]
2 1 m F0(ξˆ)− β[m] < α < Bm−1
2 1 m− 1, m− 2, . . . , 1 T p ≥ Bl Bl ≤ α < Bl−1
4 1 0 T p ≥ B0 α ≥ B0
Table 4.2: necessary and sufficient conditions on T p and α
Besides, a continuous non-increasing function θ can be defined from [0, T p], the domain
of α, to J , the domain of ξ1, where J =
[
F−1
lˆ+1(T
p + β[lˆ]), ξˆ
]
, lˆ is equal to l1 which is defined
in Lemma 4.23 if T p < B0, and lˆ = 0 if T p ≥ B0. For α ∈ [ 0, F0(ξˆ) − β[m] ], θ(α) = ξˆ.
Function θ is strictly decreasing in α on
(
F0(ξˆ) − β[m], T p
]
, thus it is a bijection between
α ∈ (F0(ξˆ)− β[m], T p ] and ξ1 ∈ J \ {ξˆ}. For all ξ1 ∈ J , θ−1(ξ1) = {α ∈ [0, T p] ∣∣ θ(α) = ξ1 }.
In particular, θ−1(ξˆ) is the interval [ 0, F0(ξˆ) − β[m] ], while θ−1(ξ1) is a singleton for any
ξ1 ∈ J \ {ξˆ}.
Finally, a one-variable cost function v(ξ1) is defined for the atomic player p for ξ1 ∈ J ,
whose explicit expression is as follows:
• ξ1 = ξˆ and, correspondingly, α ∈ [ 0, F0(ξˆ) − β[m] ] (so that the flow x(α,β) is of
mode 5):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξˆ)
• ξ1 ∈
(
h−1(βm), ξˆ
) ∩ [F−1m+1(T p + β[m]),+∞) and, correspondingly, α = Fm+1(ξ1) −
β[m] ∈ (F0(ξˆ)− β[m], Bm−1)∩ [0, T p] (so that the flow x(α,β) is of mode 2 and specified by
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1 and m):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) +
[
(M − ξ1)− β
[m] −mh(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
] (
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
• l = m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 1, ξ1 ∈
(
h−1(βl), h−1(βl+1)
] ∩ [F−1l+1(T p + β[l]), +∞) and,
correspondingly, α = Fl+1(ξ1) − β[l] ∈ [Bl, Bl−1) ∩ [0, T p] (so that the flow x(α,β) is of
mode 2 and specified by 1 and l):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) +
[
(M − ξ1)− β
[l] − l h(ξ1)
1 + a(ξ1)
] (
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
• ξ1 ∈ [F−11 (T p), h−1(β1) ] and, correspondingly, α = F1(ξ1) ∈ [B0, T p] (so that the
flow x(α,β) is of mode 4 and specified by 1):
v(ξ1) = T p c1(ξ1) + (M − ξ1)
(
c2(M − ξ1)− c1(ξ1)
)
Similar to Lemma 4.26, v(ξ1) is a continuous function on the closed interval J . As a
result, it attains its minimum on J .
(ii) Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.26.
This section is concluded by the following theorem which combines Lemmas 4.24-4.29.
Theorem 4.30. In the one-shot delegation game D1(T) associated to the composite routing
game Γ(T), every player has a best reply, in particular, a single-atomic one, facing the
strategies of the other players.
4.5 One-shot delegation game with two atomic players and
affine costs
Based on Theorem 4.30, this section will show that, in a one-shot delegation game taking
place in a two-parallel-arc network, if the cost functions of the two arcs are affine and there
are two atomic players, a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) always exists. This specific
case is adopted because the equilibria can be computed explicitly.
4.5.1 A model with affine costs and two atomic players
The cost functions of the two arcs are assumed to be affine. The assumptions A4.1 and
A4.7 must hold. Only the case where H > 0 is considered as an example. For all these
considerations, the following assumption is made in §4.5 and §4.6:
A 4.31. The arc cost functions are, respectively, c1(x) = a1x + b1 and c2(x) = a2x + b2,
where a1 > 0, a2 > 0 and b2 ≥ b1 > 0.
The parameter H > 0, where H = b2−b1a1 −M .
In the definition of the function h (cf. §4.2.2),  = 1 +A.
Consider an atomic player 1 of weight α ∈ (0,M ], who faces either another atomic
player 2 of weight β ∈ (0,M − α] and a set of nonatomic players of total weight M − α− β,
or a set of nonatomic players of total weight M − α (which corresponds to the case where
β = 0). Let the set-valued function of α’s single-atomic best replies be denoted by α∗, which
is a function in β for β ∈ [0,M − α].
After some computation, the results in §4.4.2 applied to this affine model yield the explicit
expression of α∗ stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.32. Suppose that A4.31 holds. The explicit expression of the set-valued
function α∗ is as follows:
(1) If β ≤ H and α ≤ H, then α∗(β) is the interval [0, α].
(2) If β ≤ H and α > H, then α∗(β) = {α}.
(3) If β > H and α ≤ β+H2 , then α∗(β) is the interval [0, α].
(4) If β > H, β+H2 < α ≤ β +H and α < 2β −H, then α∗(β) is the interval
[
0, β+H2
]
.
(5) If β > 2H and β +H < α < 2β −H, then α∗(β) = {34(α− β+H3 )}.
(6) If H < β ≤ 2H and 2β −H ≤ α ≤ β +H, then
α∗(β) =

[
0, β+H2
]
, if α < β +
√
β2 −H2;[
0, β+H2
] ∪ {α}, if α = β +√β2 −H2;
{α}, if α > β +√β2 −H2.
(7) If β > H, 2β −H ≤ α < 3β −H and α > β +H, then
α∗(β) =

{34(α− β+H3 )}, if α < (
√
2 + 1)β −H;
{34(α− β+H3 ), α}, if α = (
√
2 + 1)β −H;
{α}, if α > (√2 + 1)β −H.
(8) If β > H and α ≥ 3β −H, then α∗(β) = {α}.
The simplex ∆ = { (α, β) |α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, α + β = M } can thus be divided into eight
disjoint regions:
Rα1 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β ≤ H, α ≤ H }
Rα2 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β ≤ H, α > H }
Rα3 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β > H, α ≤ β+H2 }
Rα4 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β > H, β+H2 < α ≤ β +H, α < 2β −H }
Rα5 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β > 2H, β +H < α < 2β −H }
Rα6 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, H < β ≤ 2H, 2β −H ≤ α ≤ β +H }
Rα7 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β > H, 2β −H ≤ α < 3β −H, α > β +H }
Rα8 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, β > H, α ≥ 3β −H }
Each of the statements in Proposition 4.32 corresponds to one region. In the same way,
if β > 0, one can divide ∆ into eight regions corresponding to β∗, the set-valued functions
of the best replies of the atomic player 2, which are denoted by Rβ1 , . . . , R
β
8 . The definition
of Rβi is symmetric to that of Rαi , in the sense that one has only to swap the roles of α and
β in the conditions. For example, Rβ3 = { (α, β) | (α, β) ∈ ∆, α > H, β ≤ α+H2 }.
Remark 4.33. It is not difficult to see that the two partitions of the simplex ∆, {Rαi }8i=1
and {Rβj }8j=1, have the following properties.
1. Rα1 = R
β
1 , R
α
3 = R
β
2 ∪Rβ6 ∪Rβ7 ∪Rβ8 , Rβ5 ⊂ Rα4 , Rα4 ∪Rα5 = Rβ4 ∪Rβ5 .
2. If M ≤ H, then Rα1 6= ∅ and, for i = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Rαi = ∅.
3. If H < M ≤ 2H, then, for i = 1, 2, 3, Rαi 6= ∅ and, for i = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, Rαi = ∅.
4. If 2H < M ≤ 3H, then, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, Rαi 6= ∅ and, for i = 5, 7, 8, Rαi = ∅.
5. If 3H < M ≤ 5H, then, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, Rαi 6= ∅ and Rα5 = ∅.
6. If M > 5H, then Rαi 6= ∅ for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.
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7. All these statements are also true if one swaps the roles of α and β.
Recall that the interior of the simplex ∆ is int ∆ = { (α, β) |α > 0, β > 0, α+ β = M }.
The following particular case will be used as an example in the rest of the paper.
A 4.34. In addition to A4.31, M > 3H. Besides, the atomic player 1’s weight α0 and the
atomic player 2’s weight β0 are such that (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆, H < β0 ≤ 2H, 2β0 −H ≤ α0 ≤
β0 +H, α0 < β0 +
√
(β0)2 −H2 and 2H < α0 < (
√
2 + 1)H.
4.5.2 Equilibria
Let us consider a one-shot delegation game D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0), where there are
two atomic players of weight α0 and β0, where (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆, and the total weight of the
nonatomic players is M − α0 − β0.
Theorem 4.35. Suppose that A4.31 holds. For all (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆, the one-shot delegation
game D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0) admits a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that a Nash equilibrium with two atomic players using single-
atomic strategies exists. As an example, let us prove the result for the case where A4.34
holds.
0 α
β
H
H
α20+H2
2α0
α0
β0
β0+H
2
2β0 −H(α0+H)2
4α0
β20+H2
2β0
α0+H
3
Figure 4.1: best replies of the two atomic players
For the atomic player 1 of weight α0, facing an atomic player of weight β and a set of
nonatomic players of total weightM−α0−β, the set-valued function of her best single-atomic
replies is
α∗(β) =

{α0}, if 0 ≤ β < α
2
0+H2
2α0 ;
{α0} ∪
[
0, β+H2
]
if β = α
2
0+H2
2α0 ;[
0, β+H2
]
, if α
2
0+H2
2α0 < β ≤ β0.
The graph of α∗(β) contains thus the black segment on the right and the darkly shadowed
area on the top.
For the atomic player 2 of weight β0, facing an atomic player of weight α and a set of
nonatomic players of total weightM−α−β0, the set-valued function of her best single-atomic
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replies is
β∗(α) =

{β0}, if 0 ≤ α < β
2
0+H2
2β0 ;
{β0} ∪
[
0, α+H2
]
, if α = β
2
0+H2
2β0 ;[
0, α+H2
]
, if β
2
0+H2
2β0 ≤ α ≤ 2β0 −H;
[0, β0], if 2β0 −H < α ≤ α0.
The graph of β∗(α) contains thus the dashed segment on the top and the lightly shadowed
area on the right.
Clearly, the intersection of the two graphs is the black segment on the right, denoted by
Iα, and the dashed segment on the top, denoted by Iβ. In other words, the set of the Nash
equilibria (in pure strategies) of the game D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0) is Iα ∪ Iβ, where
Iα =
{
(α, β) ∈ ∆ ∣∣α = α0, 0 ≤ β ≤ α20+H22α0 }, Iβ = { (α, β) ∈ ∆ ∣∣ 0 ≤ α ≤ β20+H22β0 , β = β0 }.
Notation. In a one-shot delegation game D1(M−α0−β0, α0, β0), let E1(M−α0−β0, α0, β0)
be the set of equilibrium cost profiles of the players. Explicitly,
E1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0) =
⋃
(α,β)
{ (
c0(α, β), u1(α, β), u2(α, β)
) }
,
where the union is taken over all the equilibria of D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). Recall that
c0(α, β), u1(α, β) and u2(α, β) are, respectively, the costs to the nonatomic players and the
two atomic players 1 and 2, when these two play delegation strategies α and β.
For the particular case where A4.34 holds, a computation shows that, for all (α, β) ∈ Iα,
c0(α, β) ≡ a1M + b1 − a1 α0−H2(1+A) ,
u1(α, β) ≡ (a1 + a2)
[ α0−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1α0) α0−H2(1+A) + α0(a1M + b1),
u2(α, β) ≡ β0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 α0−H2(1+A)
]
.
(4.52)
Let this profile of costs be denoted by
(
c0Iα , u
1
Iα
, u2Iα
)
.
For all (α, β) ∈ Iβ,
c0(α, β) ≡ a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A) ,
u1(α, β) ≡ α0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A)
]
,
u2(α, β) ≡ (a1 + a2)
[ β0−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1β0) β0−H2(1+A) + β0(a1M + b1).
(4.53)
Let this profile of costs be denoted by
(
c0Iβ , u
1
Iβ
, u2Iβ
)
.
4.5.3 Robustness of the equilibrium
However, in a one-shot delegation game, if, at an equilibrium, at least one of the players
plays neither a trivial strategy nor a nonatomic strategy, then her unique atomic delegate
may, in her turn, have her own interest to delegate her stock. Thus, such an equilibrium
need not to be robust.
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Example 4.36. Suppose that H = 0.28, M = 2, and the two atomic players both have
weight one, i.e. α0 = β0 = 1. There are no nonatomic players. Then, an equilibrium
is α = β = 3−H5 = 0.544, where α and β are, respectively, the single-atomic strategy of
player 1 and that of player 2.
However, player 1’s delegate, who has weight α, is not glad with the actual situation.
Some computation allows to see that, facing an atomic player of weight β and a set of
nonatomic players of total weight M − α − β, her best reply is not the trivial strategy.
Indeed, the pair (α, β) is in region Rα4 . Consequently, the set of her best replies is the
interval
[
0, β+H2
]
. The delegate of player 2 is faced with the same situation.
This example shows that it is not enough to consider one-shot delegation games in our
study of the delegation behavior in congestion games. An outcome of the game is robust only
if no atomic player has incentive to delegate any more, or if there are no more atomic players.
For example, all equilibrium in Iα ∪ Iβ in the proof of Theorem 4.35 is robust because there
is at least one atomic player playing a trivial strategy.
If all atomic delegates are allowed to delegate in their turn, what will happen? As long
as there is an atomic player, no matter how small her weight is, she can always delegate.
Will the game come to an end?
In §4.6, a dynamic approach will be employed to study the possible outcomes of a dele-
gation process.
4.6 Alternating best reply delegation processes
From now on, an atomic player is called by her weight.
4.6.1 Rules of the delegation process
Initially, two atomic players and a set of nonatomic players coexist in the network. At
every stage, an atomic player plays a best single-atomic delegation strategy in reply to the
composition of the other players around her. By playing this strategy, she is replaced by
an atomic player and/or a set of nonatomic players. At the next stage, the atomic player
different from her atomic delegate or herself (if she has played a trivial strategy) plays.
Suppose that, the initial two atomic players have weight, respectively, α0 and β0, where
(α0, β0) ∈ int ∆. The total weight of the nonatomic players is M − α0 − β0.
In the first process, the atomic player α0 begins. Here are the rules.
1. At the first stage, the atomic player α0 plays a single-atomic best delegation strategy
α1 ∈ [0, α0] in reply to the composition of the rest of the players. By playing this
strategy, she is replaced by an atomic delegate α1 and a set of nonatomic players of
total weight α1−α0 if α1 > 0, or a set of nonatomic players of total weight α0 if α1 = 0.
If α1 = α0, i.e. it is the trivial strategy, player α2 is just player α1 herself.
2. At the second stage, the atomic player β0 plays a single-atomic best reply β1 ∈ [0, β0],
so that she is replaced by her delegates if β1 < β0, or she goes on to play herself if
β1 = β0.
3. Suppose that, for m ≥ 3, the process is not yet stopped after stage m− 2. In each of
the two cases below, the game stops after stage m− 1, otherwise it continues.
(i) If the strategies played at stage m− 2 and stage m− 1 are both trivial ones.
(ii) If the strategy played at stage m− 2 is a nonatomic one, and the strategy played
at stage m− 1 is a trivial one.
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If the game stops after stage m− 1, and m = 2n+ 1 or 2n+ 2 for some n ∈ N∗, then,
for all k ≥ n, αk ≡ αn, βk ≡ βn.
4. Suppose that, at stage m ≥ 3, the process is not yet stopped. If m = 2n + 1 (resp.
m = 2n+ 2) for some n ∈ N∗, and if αn = 0 (resp. βn = 0), then nobody plays and the
process goes on to stage m + 1; otherwise, if αn > 0 (resp. βn > 0), then the atomic
player αn (resp. the atomic player βn) plays a single-atomic best reply αn+1 ∈ [0, αn]
(resp. βn+1 ∈ [0, βn]).
The second process where the atomic player β0 begins is defined in the same way.
Remark 4.37. Case (i) in rule 3 means that, since the player who plays at stage m is the
one who plays at stage m − 2 (because she has chosen the trivial strategy at stage m − 2),
and she faces the same opponents as at stage m − 2 (because the other atomic player has
chosen the trivial strategy at stage m− 1), she will do as at stage m− 2, i.e. to choose the
trivial strategy. The same argument holds for the player who plays at stage m + 1, and so
on. Therefore, there is no need to continue the process. Similar interpretation can be made
for case (ii).
Definition 4.38. Suppose that (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆. The two processes described above are
called the alternating best reply delegation processes associated to the composite routing
game Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). The sequence {(αn, βn)}n∈N induced by an alternating best
reply delegation process is called a trajectory with initial point (α0, β0).
Proposition 4.39. Suppose that (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆. All trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N of an alter-
nating best reply delegation process associated to Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0) converges.
Proof. The sequences {αn}n∈N and {βn}n∈N are both bounded and decreasing, hence they
converge.
Notation. Suppose that {(αn, βn)}n∈N is a trajectory of one of the two alternating best
reply delegation processes. Let its limit be denoted by (α∞, β∞).
For all n ≥ 0, let c0(αn, βn) (resp. u1(αn, βn), resp. u2(αn, βn), resp. v(αn, βn)) be the
nonatomic players’ cost (resp. the atomic player α0’s cost, resp. the atomic player β0’s cost,
resp. the social cost) in the one-shot delegation game D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0), if α0 plays
the single-atomic strategy αn and β0 plays the single-atomic strategy βn. The cost profile(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
and the social cost v(α∞, β∞) are defined in the same
way.
By the continuity of the cost functions, the sequence of the cost profiles
{(
c0(αn, βn),
u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)
)}
n∈N converges to
(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
. The latter
is called a myopic outcome of the process.
Let E(α0, β0) be the set of all the myopic outcomes of the two alternating best reply
delegation processes associated to the composite routing game Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). In
other words,
E(α0, β0) =
{ (
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
) ∣∣ (α∞, β∞) is the limit of
some trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N with initial point (α0, β0)
}
4.6.2 Trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗
To illustrate the idea, let us take the case where A4.34 holds to obtain all the trajectory
{(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ induced by the two alternating best reply processes. All the best replies are
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deduced according to Proposition 4.32, hence the argument will not be repeated every time
it is used.
First, consider the process where the atomic player α0 begins.
At stage 1, any number in the interval
[
0, β0+H2
]
is a best reply of player α0 because
H < β0 ≤ 2H, 2β0 −H ≤ α0 ≤ β0 +H, α0 < β0 +
√
(β0)2 −H2. Three cases are possible.
Case 6.1: 0 ≤ α1 ≤ H.
At stage 2, player β0 plays. The pair (α1, β0) is in Rβ2 because α1 ≤ H and β0 > H. The
unique best reply is the trivial one, i.e. β1 = β0.
If α1 = 0, the process stops after stage 2. For all n ≥ 1, αn ≡ 0, βn ≡ β0.
If 0 < α1 ≤ H, then player α1 plays at stage 3.
Let us show that, for all n ≥ 1,
H ≥ α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · ·αn ≥ 0, β0 = β1 = · · · = βn. (4.54)
This is true for n = 1. Suppose that the process has not yet stopped after stage 2n, and
that (4.54) holds for some n ≥ 1.
At stage 2n+1, it is player αn’s turn to play. The pair (αn, βn) is in Rα3 because αn ≤ H
and βn = β0 > 2H. The set of the best replies of player αn is the interval [0, αn].
If player αn chooses the trivial strategy, i.e. αn+1 = αn, the process stops. Clearly, (4.54)
holds for all m > n.
If 0 ≤ αn+1 < αn, it is not difficult to verify that the pair (αn+1, βn) is in region Rβ2 . The
unique best reply of player βn is the trivial one, i.e. βn+1 = βn. Therefore, (4.54) holds for
n + 1. Besides, if αn+1 = 0, the process stops, and (4.54) holds for all m > n. Otherwise,
one can continue the induction for n+ 2.
In summary, once player α0 has chosen 0 ≤ α1 ≤ H, the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ can
only take one of the two forms below:
(i) there exists some m ∈ N∗ such that α0 > H ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · > αm ≥ 0 and, for all
n ≥ m, αn = αm ∈ [0, H]; for all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0; hence, α∞ = αm, β∞ = β0;
(ii) α0 > H ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · , hence, {αn}n∈N converges to a limit α∞ in [0, H); for all
n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0, hence β∞ = β0.
Case 6.2: H < α1 ≤ (β0)
2+H2
2β0 .
At stage 2, player β0 plays. Firstly, H < α1 ≤ 3H2 < 2H because H < β0 ≤ 2H.
Secondly, β0 ≥ 2α1 − H, because α1 ≤ (β0)
2+H2
2β0 <
β0+H
2 . Thirdly, β0 ≤ α1 + H. Indeed,
otherwise, β0 > α1 + H > 2H, which contradicts the fact that β0 ≤ 2H. Fourthly, β0 ≥
α1 +
√
(α1)2 −H2 because of the relation (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ≥ α1. These four relations imply that
the pair (α1, β0) is in region Rβ6 , and the unique best reply of player β0 is the trivial one
if α1 < (β0)
2+H2
2β0 . If α1 =
(β0)2+H2
2β0 , the trivial strategy is one of the best replies, and it is
assumed to be adopted. Hence, β1 = β0.
At stage 3, player α1 plays. Because of the fact that β0 > H and α1 < β0+H2 =
β1+H
2 ,
the pair (α1, β1) is in region Rα3 and, consequently, any number in [0, α1] is a best reply. Two
subcases are to be discussed.
Case 6.2.1: 0 ≤ α2 ≤ H
By a similar analysis to that in Case 6.1, the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ takes one of the
following forms:
(i) there exists some m ≥ 2 such that α2 > α3 > · · · > αm ≥ 0 and, for all n ≥ m,
αn ≡ αm; for all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0; hence, α∞ = αm, β∞ = β0;
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(ii) α2 > α3 > · · · , and the sequence {αn}n∈N converges to a limit α∞ in [0, H); for all
n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0, hence β∞ = β0.
Case 6.2.2: H < α2 ≤ α1
If α2 = α1, the process stops after stage 5.
If H < α2 < α1, it is not difficult to see that, as at the beginning of case 6.2, the pair
(α2, β1) is in region Rβ6 , and the set of the best reply of the atomic player β1 is the trivial
one, i.e. β2 = β1. The actual situation for (α2, β2) is the same as for (α1, β1) in the case 6.2,
except that H < α2 < α1 and β2 = β1. There is no need to repeat the analysis.
In summary, if player α0 has chosen H < α1 ≤ (β0)
2+H2
2β0 , and in the case where
α1 = (β0)
2+H2
2β0 , player β0 chooses the trivial strategy, i.e. β1 = β0, then the trajectory{(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ takes one of the four forms below:
(i) there exists some k ≥ 2 and m ≥ k such that H ≥ αk > αk+1 > · · · > αm ≥ 0 and,
for all n ≥ m, αn ≡ αm; for all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0; hence, α∞ = αm, β∞ = β0;
(ii) there exists some m ≥ 2 such that H ≥ αm > αm+1 > · · · > 0, and αn converges to
a limit α∞ in [0, H); for all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0, hence β∞ = β0;
(iii) there exists some m ≥ 1 such that (β0)2+H22β0 ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · > αm > H and, for all
n ≥ m, αn ≡ αm ∈
(
H, (β0)
2+H2
2β0
]
; for all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0; hence, α∞ = αm, β∞ = β0;
(iv) (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ≥ α1 > α2 > · · · > H, and αn converges to a limit α∞ in
[
H, (β0)
2+H2
2β0
)
; for
all n ∈ N, βn ≡ β0, hence β∞ = β0.
Case 6.3: (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ≤ α1 ≤
β0+H
2 .
A similar argument to the one at the beginning of case 6.2 implies that the pair (α1, β0)
is in region Rβ6 , and the set of the best replies of player β0 is the interval [0, α1+H2 ] if
α1 >
(β0)2+H2
2β0 . If α1 =
(β0)2+H2
2β0 , the set of the best replies of β0 is the union of the trivial
strategy and the interval [0, α1+H2 ]. The trivial strategy is studied in Case 6.2. Here, let us
assume that β1 ∈ [0, α1+H2 ]. Three subcases are to be considered.
Case 6.3.1: 0 ≤ β1 ≤ H.
The situation is the same as in the beginning of case 6.1, except that α1 there is replaced
by β1 here, and β0 there is replaced by α1 here. Therefore, the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗
takes one of the two forms below:
(i) there exists some m ∈ N∗ such that β0 > H ≥ β1 > β2 > · · · > βm ≥ 0 and, for
all n ≥ m, βn ≡ βm ∈ [0, H]; for all n ≥ 1, αn ≡ α1 ∈ [ (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ,
β0+H
2 ]; hence, α∞ = α1,
β∞ = βm;
(ii) β0 > H ≥ β1 > β2 > · · · ≥ 0, and there exists β∞ ∈ [0, H) such that βn → β∞; for
all n ≥ 1, αn ≡ α1 ∈ [ (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ,
β0+H
2 ], hence α∞ = α1.
Case 6.3.2: H < β1 ≤ (α1)
2+H2
2α1 and, in the case where β1 =
(α1)2+H2
2α1 , α2 = α1.
The situation is the same as at the beginning of case 6.2, except that α1 there is replaced
by β1 here, and β0 there is replaced by α1 here. Therefore, the sequence {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗
takes one of the four forms below:
(i) there exists some k ≥ 2 and m ≥ k such that H ≥ βk > βk+1 > · · · > βm ≥ 0 and, for
all n ≥ m, βn ≡ βm; for all n ∈ N, αn ≡ α1; hence, α∞ = α1, β∞ = βm;
(ii) there exists some m ≥ 2 such that H ≥ βm > βm+1 > · · · > 0, and βn converges to a
limit β∞ in [0, H); for all n ∈ N, αn ≡ α1, hence α∞ = α1;
(iii) there exists some m ≥ 1 such that (α1)2+H22α0 ≥ β1 > β2 > · · · > βm > H and, for all
n ≥ m, βn ≡ βm ∈
(
H, (α1)
2+H2
2α1
]
; for all n ∈ N, αn ≡ α1; hence, α∞ = α1, β∞ = βm;
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(iv) (α1)
2+H2
2α1 ≥ β1 > β2 > · · · > H, and βn converges to a limit β∞ in
[
H, (α0)
2+H2
2α0
)
; for
all n ∈ N, αn ≡ α1, hence α∞ = α1.
Case 6.3.3: (α1)
2+H2
2α1 ≤ β1 ≤ α1+H2 and, in the case where β1 =
(α1)2+H2
2α1 , α2 ∈ [0,
β1+H
2 ].
A similar argument to the one at the beginning of case 6.3 implies that α2 ∈ [0, β1+H2 ].
The situation is the same as that at stage 1, except that (α0, β0) is replaced by (α1, β1),
where (β0)
2+H2
2β0 ≤ α1 ≤
β0+H
2 and
(α1)2+H2
2α1 ≤ β1 ≤ α1+H2 . The rest of the analysis is the
same, hence one can conclude by recurrence.
To this end, let us first define three real sequences {Bn}n∈N, {An}n∈N and {Cn}n∈N∗ such
that A0 = B0 = β0 and, for n ≥ 1,
Bn = Bn−1+3H4 =
β0−H
4n +H,
An =
[( (An−1)2+H2
2An−1
)2 +H2]/[ (An−1)2+H2An−1 ],
Cn = (An−1)
2+H2
2An−1 .
(4.55)
Remark 4.40. It is not difficult to see that, for all n ∈ N∗, Bn > H, An > H, Cn > H, and
all the three sequences are strictly decreasing and converge to H.
Proposition 4.41. Suppose that A4.34 holds. Then, any trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of the
alternating best reply delegation process associated to the composite routing game Γ(M−α0−
β0, α0, β0), where player α0 begins, takes one of the following five forms (The parameters An,
Bn and Cn are defined by (4.55)):
Form 1 There exists l ∈ N which satisfies the following three conditions:
1.1) if l ≥ 1, then, for all n ∈ J1, lK, (βn−1)2+H22βn−1 ≤ αn ≤ βn−1+H2 , (αn)2+H22αn ≤ βn ≤
αn+H
2 and, consequently, Cn ≤ αn ≤ Bn−1+H2 , An ≤ βn ≤ Bn;
1.2) for all n ≥ l, βn ≡ βl, hence β∞ = βl;
1.3) there exists m ≥ l + 1 such that (βl)2+H22βl ≥ αl+1 > αl+2 > · · · > am > H ≥
αm+1 ≥ 0, and αn → α∞ as n→∞, where α∞ ∈ [0, H].
Form 2 There exists l ∈ N which satisfies the following three conditions:
2.1) if l ≥ 1, then, for all n ∈ J1, lK, (βn−1)2+H22βn−1 ≤ αn ≤ βn−1+H2 , (αn)2+H22αn ≤ βn ≤
αn+H
2 and, consequently, Cn ≤ αn ≤ Bn−1+H2 , An ≤ βn ≤ Bn;
2.2) for all n ≥ l, βn ≡ βl, hence β∞ = βl;
2.3) (βl)
2+H2
2βl ≥ αl+1 > H, and αn → α∞ as n → ∞, where α∞ ∈
[
H, (βl)
2+H2
2βl
] ⊂[
H, (Bl)
2+H2
2Bl
]
.
Form 3 There exists l ∈ N∗ which satisfies the following three conditions;
3.1) if l ≥ 2, then, for all n ∈ J1, l − 1K, (βn−1)2+H22βn−1 ≤ αn ≤ βn−1+H2 , (αn)2+H22αn ≤ βn ≤
αn+H
2 and, consequently, Cn ≤ αn ≤ Bn−1+H2 , An ≤ βn ≤ Bn;
3.2) for all n ≥ l, αn ≡ αl, hence α∞ = αl, where (βl−1)
2+H2
2βl−1 ≤ αl ≤
βl−1+H
2 and, in
consequence, Cl ≤ αl ≤ Bl−1+H2 ;
3.3) βl−1 > H ≥ βl ≥ 0, and βn → β∞ as n→∞, where β∞ ∈ [0, H).
Form 4 There exists l ∈ N∗ which satisfies the following three conditions:
4.1) if l ≥ 2, then, for all n ∈ J1, l − 1K, (βn−1)2+H22βn−1 ≤ αn ≤ βn−1+H2 , (αn)2+H22αn ≤ βn ≤
αn+H
2 and, consequently, Cn ≤ αn ≤ Bn−1+H2 , An ≤ βn ≤ Bn;
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4.2) for all n ≥ l, αn ≡ αl, hence α∞ = αl, where (βl−1)
2+H2
2βl−1 ≤ αl ≤
βl−1+H
2 and, in
consequence, Cl ≤ αl ≤ Bl−1+H2 ;
4.3) (αl)
2+H2
2αl ≥ βl > H, and βn → β∞ as n → ∞, where β∞ ∈
[
H, (αl)
2+H2
2αl
] ⊂[
H,
(Bl+H2 )
2+H2
2(Bl+H2 )
]
.
Form 5 For all n ≥ 1, (βn−1)2+H22βn−1 ≤ αn ≤
βn−1+H
2 ,
(αn)2+H2
2αn ≤ βn ≤ αn+H2 and, conse-
quently, Cn ≤ αn ≤ Bn−1+H2 , An ≤ βn ≤ Bn.
By a similar analysis, one can obtain that, any trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of the alternat-
ing best reply process where player β0 begins converges, and it takes one of the following
forms.
1. 1.1) For all n ≥ 0, αn ≡ α0;
1.2) there exists m ≥ 1 such that βm−1 > H ≥ βm ≥ 0, and βn → β∞ as n→∞, with
β∞ ∈ [0, H].
2. 2.1) For all n ≥ 0, αn ≡ α0;
2.2) there exists m ≥ 1 such that βm−1 > α0+H3 ≥ βm ≥ H, and βn → β∞ as n→∞,
with β∞ ∈ [H, α0+H3 ].
3. 3.1) For all n ≥ 0, αn ≡ α0;
3.2) β1 > α − H > β2 > β3 · · · > α0+H3 , and βn → β∞ as n → ∞, with β∞ ∈
[α0+H3 , α−H).
4. For all n ∈ N, denote β˜n = βn+1. Then, β˜0 ∈
[ (α0)2+H2
2α0 , β0
]
, and {(αn, β˜n)}n∈N∗ may
take any form in Proposition 4.41.
4.6.3 Sequence of cost profiles
In order to compute the set of all the myopic outcomes of the two alternating best reply
delegation processes in the case where A4.34 holds, let us discuss the myopic outcomes of
trajectories of each of the five forms in Proposition 4.41.
Form 1 Suppose that the sequence {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ has form 1 and l is the natural number
that satisfied the three conditions. Then, at the CE of Γ(M − α∞ − β∞, α∞, β∞), which is
of mode 3, the total weight on arc 1 is F−1(β∞) = M − β∞−H2(1+A) , the total weight of the stocks
on arc 1 initially belonging to α0 is α0, and the total weight of the stocks on arc 1 initially
belonging to β0 is β0 − β∞−H2(1+A) .
The costs to the nonatomic players, atomic players α0 and β0 are, respectively,
c0(α∞, β∞) = a1M + b1 − a1 β∞−H2(1+A) ,
u1(α∞, β∞) = α0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β∞−H2(1+A)
]
,
u2(α∞, β∞) = (a1 + a2)
[ β∞−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1β0) β∞−H2(1+A) + β0(a1M + b1).
Besides, it is clear that, for all n ≥ l, (c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)) = (c0α(α∞, β∞),
u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
. In other words, the sequence of cost profiles
{(
c0(αn, βn),
u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)
)}
n∈N∗ is a constant one except the first finite number of terms.
Finally, a simple computation shows that c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞) and u2(α∞, β∞) are all
strictly decreasing in β∞ for β∞ ∈ (H,β0]. Therefore, for all the trajectories {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗
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of form 1, the range of the myopic outcomes are as follows:
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A) ≤ c0(α∞, β∞) < a1M + b1,
α0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A)
] ≤ u1(α∞, β∞) < α0(a1M + b1),
(a1 + a2)
[ β0−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1β0) β0−H2(1+A) + β0(a1M + b1)
≤ u2(α∞, β∞) < β0(a1M + b1).
(4.56)
Form 2 Same as form 1.
Form 3 Suppose that the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ has form 3 and l is the natural number
that satisfied the three conditions. Then, at the CE of Γ(M −α∞−β∞, α∞, β∞), which is of
mode 4, the total weight on arc 1 is F−1(α∞) = M − α∞−H2(1+A) , the total weight of the stocks
on arc 1 initially belonging to α0 is α0 − α∞−H2(1+A) , and the total weight of the stocks on arc 1
initially belonging to β0 is β0.
The costs to the nonatomic players, atomic players α0 and β0 are, respectively,
c0(α∞, β∞) = a1M + b1 − a1 α∞−H2(1+A) ,
u1(α∞, β∞) = (a1 + a2)
[ α∞−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1α0)α∞−H2(1+A) + α0(a1M + b1),
u2(α∞, β∞) = β0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 α∞−H2(1+A)
]
.
Besides, for all n ≥ l, (c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)) = (c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞),
u2(α∞, β∞)
)
, the cost sequence
{(
c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)
)}
n∈N∗ is a constant one
except the first finite number of terms.
Similar to the analysis for form 1, one can show that c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞) and
u2(α∞, β∞) are all strictly decreasing in α∞ for α∞ ∈ (H, β0+H2 ]. Therefore, for all the
trajectories {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of form 3, the range of the myopic outcomes are as follows:
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H4(1+A) ≤ c0(α∞, β∞) < a1M + b1,
(a1 + a2)
[ β0−H
4(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1α0) β0−H4(1+A) + α0(a1M + b1)
≤ u1(α∞, β∞) < α0(a1M + b1),
β0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H4(1+A)
] ≤ u2(α∞, β∞) < β0(a1M + b1).
(4.57)
Form 4 Same as form 3.
Form 5 Suppose that the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ has form 5. Then, at the CE of Γ(M −
α∞ − β∞, α∞, β∞), which is of mode 1, the total weight on arc 1 is M , the total weight of
the stocks on arc 1 initially belonging to α0 is α0, and the total weight of the stocks on arc 1
initially belonging to β0 is β0.
The costs to the nonatomic players, atomic players α0 and β0 are, respectively,
c0(α∞, β∞) = a1M + b1
u1(α∞, β∞) = α0(a1M + b1)
u2(α∞, β∞) = β0(a1M + b1)
(4.58)
Besides, recall that, for all n ∈ N, βn ≤ Bn = β0−H4n +H and αn ≤ βn−1+H2 = β0−H2·4n−1 +H,
αn and βn converge to H at an exponential rate. By the linearity of the cost functions,(
c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)
)
also converges to
(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
at an exponential rate. This idea is formulated in the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.42. Suppose that (α0, β0) satisfies A4.34. If the trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N of an
alternating best reply delegation process with initial point (α0, β0) is of form 5 (cf. Proposi-
tion 4.41), then there exist a constant C > 0 such that, for all n ∈ N∗,
‖(c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn))− (c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞))‖∞ < C/4n,
where ‖ · ‖∞ stands for the uniform norm in R3.
Proof. On the one hand, for all n ∈ N, the CE of Γ(M − αn − βn;αn, βn) is of mode 4, and
the costs to the nonatomic players is c0(αn, βn) = a1M + b1 − a1 αn−H2(1+A) . On the other hand,
according to (4.58), c0(H,H) = a1M + b1.
According to (4.55), αn ≤ βn−1+H2 and βn−1 ≤ Bn−1 = β0−H4n−1 +H.Thus,∣∣ c0(αn, βn)− c0(H,H) ∣∣ = ∣∣ a1 αn−H2(1+A) ∣∣ < ∣∣ a1 β0−H2(1+A)4n−1 ∣∣ = ∣∣ a1(β0−H)1+A ∣∣ 14n < C04n ,
where C0 is a positive constant greater than a1(β0−H)1+A .
In the same way, one can show that |u1(αn, βn) − u1(H,H) | < C1/4n, |u2(αn, βn) −
u2(H,H) | < C2/4n, where C1 and C2 are two positive constants.
Finally, it is enough to take C = max{C0, C1, C2 }.
More generally, by a similar analysis for all the initial points (α0, β0), one can obtain the
following theorem on the trajectories of the alternating best reply delegation processes.
Theorem 4.43. Suppose that A4.31 holds and (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆. Then, for any trajectory
{(αn, βn)}n∈N of an alternating best reply process associated to Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0), one
has:
(1) The sequence of cost profiles
{(
c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn)
)}
n∈N converges to(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
, where (α∞, β∞) is the limit of {(αn, βn)}n∈N.
(2) One of the following holds:
(i) There exists some l ∈ N∗ such that, for all n ≥ l, (c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn), u2(αn, βn))
=
(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)
)
.
(ii) There exist a constant C > 0 such that, for all n ∈ N∗, ∥∥ (c0(αn, βn), u1(αn, βn),
u2(αn, βn)
)− (c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞), u2(α∞, β∞)) ∥∥∞ < C/4n.
Besides, in the particular case where A4.34 holds, by gathering together the previous
results on the range of the myopic outcomes for the five forms, one can compute the range
of all the myopic outcomes of the delegation process where player α0 begins. Similar com-
putation shows that the range of the myopic outcomes of the delegation process where β0
begins is the same.
Lemma 4.44. Suppose that (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆ satisfies A4.34, then the set of myopic outcomes
E(α0, β0) is a convex compact set in R3. Explicitly,
E(α0, β0) =
{
(c0, u1, u2) ∈ R3 such that
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A) ≤ c0 ≤ a1M + b1, α0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A)
] ≤ u1 ≤ α0(a1M + b1),
(a1 + a2)
[ β0−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1β0) β0−H2(1+A) + β0(a1M + b1) ≤ u2 ≤ β0(a1M + b1)}
Proof. According to (4.56), (4.57) and (4.58), it is enough to prove that a1M+b1−a1 β0−H2(1+A) <
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H4(1+A) , α0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H2(1+A)
]
< (a1 + a2)
[ β0−H
4(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 +
a1α0) β0−H4(1+A) +α0(a1M+b1), and (a1+a2)
[ β0−H
2(1+A)
]2−(a1M+b1−b2+a1β0) β0−H2(1+A) +β0(a1M+
b1) < β0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 β0−H4(1+A)
]
. The computation is omitted.
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4.6.4 Comparison of the costs
Comparison with the equilibrium costs without delegation
In order to know whether the behavior of delegation benefits or, on the contrary, harm
the players, one can compare the costs to the nonatomic players and the two atomic players
α0, β0 in all the myopic outcomes with the costs in the original composite game without
delegation, i.e. Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). The case where A4.34 holds will still be taken as an
example.
Let us first compute the players’ costs at the CE of Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). A simple
computation shows that it is of mode 4. At the CE, the total weight on arc 1 is F−1(α0) =
M − α0−H2(1+A) , the total weight of the stocks on arc 1 sent by player α0 is α0− α0−H2(1+A) , and the
total weight of the stocks on arc 1 sent by player β0 is β0. Then,
c0(α0, β0) = a1M + b1 − a1 α0−H2(1+A) ,
u1(α0, β0) = (a1 + a2)
[ α0−H
2(1+A)
]2 − (a1M + b1 − b2 + a1α0) α0−H2(1+A) + α0(a1M + b1),
u2(α0, β0) = β0
[
a1M + b1 − a1 α0−H2(1+A)
]
.
(4.59)
Now, let us compare the costs in (4.59) to the outcomes of the trajectories of form 1 and
form 2. Recall that, for trajectories {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of form 1 and form 2, the costs in the
myopic outcome c0α(α∞, β∞), u1α(α∞, β∞) and u2α(α∞, β∞) are all independent of α∞ and
strictly decreasing in β∞.
For the atomic player α0, one can obtain that
u1(α∞, β∞)

> u1(α0, β0), if H < β∞ < (α0)
2+H2
2α0 ;
= u1(α0, β0), if β∞ = (α0)
2+H2
2α0 ;
< u1(α0, β0), if (α0)
2+H2
2α0 < β∞ ≤ β0.
For all β∞ ∈ (H,β0], u2(α∞, β∞) > u2(α0, β0), c0(α∞, β∞) > c0(α0, β0).
By similar computations, one finds that, for any trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of form 3 or
form 4, for all α∞ ∈ (H, β0+H2 ], c0(α∞, β∞) > c0(α0, β0), u1(α∞, β∞) > u1(α0, β0), and
u2(α∞, β∞) > u2(α0, β0).
Finally, for any trajectory {(αn, βn)}n∈N∗ of form 5, c0(H,H) > c0(α0, β0), u1(H,H) >
u1(α0, β0), and u2(H,H) > u2(α0, β0).
Lemma 4.45. Suppose that (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆ satisfies A4.34 and
(
c0(α∞, β∞), u1(α∞, β∞),
u2(α∞, β∞)
)
is a myopic outcome of the alternating best reply delegation processes associated
to Γ(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0). Then, c0(α∞, β∞) > c0(α0, β0), u2(α∞, β∞) > u2(α0, β0), while
u1(α∞, β∞) may be greater than, or less than, or equal to u1(α0, β0).
In other words, the behavior of delegation does not always benefit or harm the atomic
players.
For the impact of delegation on the social costs and the nonatomic players’ costs, a more
general result in Wan [92] (cf. Theorem 3.23) gives rise to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.46. Suppose that A4.31 holds and (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆. Then, for any trajec-
tory {(αn, βn)}n∈N of an alternating best reply delegation process associated to Γ(M − α0 −
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β0, α0, β0), for all n ∈ N∗,
v(αn+1, βn+1) ≥ v(αn, βn), c0(αn+1, βn+1) ≥ c0(αn, βn),
v(αn, βn) ≥ v(α0, β0), c0(αn, βn) ≥ c0(α0, β0),
v(α∞, β∞) ≥ v(αn, βn), c0(α∞, β∞) ≥ c0(αn, βn).
Proof. See Theorem 4.7 in Wan [92].
Comparison with the equilibrium costs in the one-shot delegation game
Recall that, in the proof of Theorem 4.35, the set of equilibrium costs of the one-shot
delegation game D1(M − α0 − β0, α0, β0), denoted by E1(α0, β0), contains two elements:(
c0Iα , u
1
Iα
, u2Iα
)
and
(
c0Iβ , u
1
Iβ
, u2Iβ
)
whose explicit expressions are given by (4.52) and (4.53).
By a simple computation, one can see that
(
c0Iα , u
1
Iα
, u2Iα
)
/∈ E(α0, β0), while
(
c0Iβ , u
1
Iβ
, u2Iβ
) ∈
E(α0, β0).
This implies that E(α0, β0) neither contains nor is contained in E1(α0, β0).
Theorem 4.47. Suppose that A4.31 holds. There exists (α0, β0) ∈ int ∆ such that none of
the two relations below is true:
(i) E(α0, β0) ⊂ E1(α0, β0);
(ii) E1(α0, β0) ⊂ E(α0, β0).
4.7 Remarks and discussion
4.7.1 More general delegation games and dynamic programming
In this paper, the behavior of delegation in the congestion games are studied in some
specific cases. Firstly, the network is restrained to a two-terminal two-parallel-arc one.
Secondly, a one-shot delegation game is defined for a general composition of players and
general cost functions, but the existence of equilibria are proved only for the case where
there are two atomic players in addition to nonatomic players, and the cost functions are
affine. Thirdly, the atomic players use single-atomic delegation strategies only. The extension
of the results of this paper to more general contexts remains an open problem.
Besides, Example 4.9 shows that, in a one-shot delegation game, an equilibrium might
be not robust, in the sense that the delegates created by the delegation strategies may have
incentive to delegate in their turn. Therefore, other definitions of delegation games should
be considered. A dynamical approach is adopted in this paper, where the atomic players
play a best reply in an alternating way. However, one need not consider only this kind
of myopic behavior. A discrete dynamic programming model could be considered, where
the players optimize in the long run. Nevertheless, there are two differences with a usual
dynamic programming problem. First, there is not only one decision maker, but at least two
players who interact with each other. Moreover, if the atomic players use not only simple-
atomic delegation strategies, the number of players may even increase throughout the process.
Second, in a usual dynamic programming process, the decision maker anticipates what she
will do at later stages, and she makes her decisions based upon her anticipation. In our
context, when an atomic player plays a delegation strategy, she is replaced by her delegates
so that she does not play any longer herself. As a result, she has to do her decisions based
upon her anticipation of the behavior of her delegates, and the delegates of her delegates,
and so on.
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4.7.2 Discretization
Sorin and Wan [88] (cf. Chapter 5) defined a delegation game associated to integer-
splittable congestion games. In such games, the players have integer weights, and they can
only split their stock into integer weight parts so as to delegate. The process of delegation
will come to an end after a finite number of stages when every player has weight 1. The game
and its equilibria are constructed by induction. More precisely, in a delegation game D(G),
when all the players have chosen their delegation strategy, a delegation game D(G′) played
by their delegates, together with the set of its equilibrium costs E(G′), are supposed to have
already been defined. Then, each player in D(G) uses the costs in E(G′) to compute the sum
of the costs to her delegates, which is her own cost in D(G). In this way, a set of equilibrium
costs of D(G) can be computed. And this is done for all the possible profiles of delegation
strategies in D(G), so that all its equilibrium costs are found. The set of equilibrium costs
of D(G) is denoted by E(G). The induction begins by defining a delegation game where all
the players have weight 1.
More generally, a delegation game can be defined in this way when the stock of each
player is made up of several parts which can be separated from one another, but each part
itself cannot be divided anymore.
This definition cannot be applied immediately in the framework of (arbitrarily) splittable
games, because an atomic player can always delegate, no matter how small her weight is.
To construct an analogue model, one might begin by discretizing the continuous weight.
Explicitly, given a composite game Γ, by fixing a small constant  as the unit weight, an
atomic player’s weight T p is reset to be n with n ∈ N, such that |n−T p| ≤ |m−T p| for all
m ∈ N. Then, one defines an approximate game of Γ, denoted by Γ, which is an -splittable
game. In Γ, an atomic player is allowed to split her weight into several parts such that the
weight of each part is l for different l’s in N∗. The delegation game D(Γ) associated to Γ
and its set of equilibrium costs E(Γ) can thus be defined. By letting  → 0, one can study
the behavior of E(Γ).
4.7.3 Efficiency of the delegation
Because of the specific property of the two-terminal two-parallel-arc networks, every time
an atomic player delegates, the social cost is increased or stays the same at the equilibrium.
However, this is not necessarily the case for other network topologies. Huang [47] provided
an example where there are three parallel arcs with cost functions satisfying A4.1, but when
an atomic player commits her stock to two atomic delegates, the social cost is decreased at
the equilibrium.
Therefore, it will be interesting to study the impact of the behavior of delegation on
the social costs in more general settings. Recall that the price of anarchy [50] and the
price of collusion [37] are the indices which measure, respectively, the impact of the lack of
coordination and the impact of the formation of coalitions on the social cost in congestion
games. To measure the impact of the behavior of delegation, one can define the price of
delegation as the ratio between the worst social cost at a myopic outcome and the equilibrium
social cost in the original game.

Chapter 5
Delegation equilibrium payoffs in
integer-splitting games
This chapter is based on the paper Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting
games in collaboration with Sylvain Sorin.
Abstract. This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game
is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite
integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning
each part to one of finitely many choices. In the associated delegation game, a player divides
her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and
collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation
equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing
these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.
5.1 Motivation
In an N -player routing game, each player holds a certain quantity of stock that she has
to send by one or several directed paths from its origin vertex to its destination vertex. The
cost of using a certain path depends upon the quantity of stock passing through it. Every
player wishes to minimize her cost. If the stocks are unsplittable, a player must send all her
stock through a single path, otherwise she can split it into several parts so as to send them
by different paths. In this work an integer-splittable case will be considered: every player
has a stock of integer weight which can be divided into several parts of integer weight. For
example, a player holding a stock of weight 2 can only split it into two parts, each of weight
1, but not one part of weight 0.5 and another of weight 1.5. If a player has R available paths,
then her pure strategy set is the finite set of the divisions of her stock into R integer weight
parts.
Suppose that, instead of deciding by herself how to send her stock, a player n divides it
into integer weight parts and commits each part to a different delegate. The delegates are
then independent players who ensure the transportation of the stocks committed to them.
The cost to player n is the sum of the costs to her delegates. This procedure is called (integer)
delegation.
Why should a player be interested in delegating her stock? If there is only one player, the
minimum cost that she obtains at the equilibrium of this one-player game is just the social
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optimum cost. If she commits her stock to some delegates, then whatever the outcome is, it
will not be better than the social optimum. Hence she has no incentive to delegate.
However, when there are several players, the situation might be different. Here is an
example which shows the potential advantage of producing delegates.
Example 5.1. Consider the following two-player routing game with integer-splittable stock
where player I has a stock of weight 2 and player II has a stock of weight 1. Both players
have to send their stock from vertex O to vertex D in Figure 5.1. Two paths are available
and each path is just a single arc. The per-unit cost function of the upper path is c1(x) = x,
which means that the cost to each unit on the path is x if the total weight is x. The per-unit
cost of the lower path is c2(x) = 0.1x+ 2.3.
O D
x
0.1x+ 2.3
Figure 5.1
First let us consider a routing game without delegation. Player I has three pure strategies:
(u, u), i.e. to send both units by the upper path, (u, l), i.e. to send one unit by the upper
path and the other the lower path, and (l, l), i.e. to send both units by the lower path.
Player II has two pure strategies: u, i.e. to send her unit by the upper path, and l, i.e.
to send it by the lower path. In the cost matrix of the game in Table 5.1, player I is the
row player and player II the column player. The only pair of pure Nash equilibrium costs
(4.4, 2) is starred. Besides, as the strategy (u, l) is a dominant one for player I, the pure
equilibrium is also the unique equilibrium.
u l
u,u 6, 3 4, 2.4
u,l 4.4, 2 * 3.5, 2.5
l,l 5, 1 5.2, 2.6
Table 5.1
Now suppose that player I splits her stock into two parts, each of weight 1, and commits
them to two delegates called respectively iI and iiI . In the routing game played by the three
players iI , iiI and II, each of them has a stock of weight 1 and has two pure strategies u
and l. The left (resp. right) matrix in Table 5.2 corresponds to the choice of player II.
The three pure Nash equilibria are starred. At two of them, (u, l, u) and (l, u, u), the
pair of the total costs to player I and player II is the same as in the previous model without
delegation: (4.4, 2). At the third one (u, u, l), the pair of total costs to player I and player II
is (4, 2.4). The cost to player I is lower than in the case without delegation. Conclusion:
delegation can be advantageous!
Remark 5.2. Notice that in the three-player game, the equilibrium (u, u, l) exists because
player II is facing the strategy profile (u, u) of the two delegates of player I. But if player I
knew that player II would choose l, she would not delegate but rather assign by herself one
unit weight of stock to u and the other to l so as to get a cost 3.5 instead of 4. Then the best
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u l
u 3, 3, 3 2, 2.4, 2 *
l 2.4, 2, 2 * 2.5, 2.5, 1
u
u l
u 2, 2, 2.4 * 1, 2.5, 2.5
l 2.5, 1, 2.5 2.6, 2.6, 2.6
l
Table 5.2
reply of player II would be u. This underlines the fact that the stability of the equilibria
relies on the independence of the delegates.
Since a delegate is an independent player, she may well delegate her stock in her turn. By
induction, the procedure can continue until all the players/delegates have a stock of weight
1.
This work will establish a rigorous model of integer-splitting delegation game and the
corresponding delegation equilibrium payoffs.
5.2 Basic (integer-splitting) game
5.2.1 Model
Before introducing the notion of delegation, let us first define formally the basic (integer-
splitting) games. For example, the basic game on a network introduced in Example 5.1 is a
routing game with integer-splittable stocks.
Definition 5.3. An basic (integer-splitting) game G(N , P ) is defined by the following ele-
ments.
– P is a non-empty finite set of choices.
– N is a finite set of players.
A player n ∈ N is characterized by three data:
1) her integer weight mn ∈ N∗ = N \ {0},
2) the non-empty set of her available choices Pn ⊂ P ,
3) a vector function ψn = (ψnp )p∈Pn , where ψnp , her per-unit payoff function for choice
p, is a real-valued function defined on [0,M ] ∩ N, where M = ∑n∈N mn.
In particular a player’s type is specified by the pair (Pn, ψn).
– A pure strategy fn of player n is an integer partition of her weight onto Pn. Explicitly,
it is a |Pn|-dimensional vector ( |A| denote the cardinality of a finite set A) with
integer components: fn = (fnp )p∈Pn , fnp ∈ N being the part of her weight that she
assigns to choice p ∈ Pn. The finite set of player n’s pure strategies is thus Fn ={
fn = (fnp )p∈Pn ∈ N|P
n| ∣∣ ∑
p∈Pn fnp = mn
}
.
– F = ∏n∈N Fn is the space of pure-strategy profiles. A profile of pure strategies
f = (fn)n∈N induces a vector ξ(f) =
(
ξp(f)
)
p∈P called aggregated configuration, where
ξp(f) =
∑
n∈N :p∈Pn fnp is the total weight assigned to p. Denote X the set of feasible
aggregated configurations. It is a subset of N|P |.
– The payoff function of player n is defined as follows:
un(f) = un
(
fn, ξ(f)
)
=
∑
p∈Pn
fnp ψ
n
p
(
ξp(f)
)
. (5.1)
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Remark 5.4. One can let the set of available choices for each player be P and then define
ψnp ≡ −∞ for all p /∈ Pn.
Remark 5.5. Every player’s payoff is additive: the payoff associated to the weight that
player n assigns to choice p is counted separately for each choice p ∈ P , then her total payoff
un is the sum of these payoffs.
Remark 5.6. A basic game is an anonymous aggregate game according to the definition
of ψn’s. This means that only the total weight assigned to a certain choice is taken into
account, but not the identity of the players who send them nor the specific decomposition.
G(N , P ) is a finite game: the number of players and the number of strategies for each
player is finite. Hence there exists an equilibrium (in mixed strategies).
Notation. The set of equilibrium payoff vectors is denoted by E
(
G(N , P )). It is a non-
empty subset of R|N |.
In the current analysis we fix a choice set P and consider different profiles of players with
specific available choices in P . The set of players of a basic game G is denoted by NG and
by abuse of notation, |G| will denote its cardinality.
5.2.2 Delegation
Consider a basic game G.
Definition 5.7. A player n in G, with weight mn and type (Pn, ψn), delegates if she is
replaced by two players n′ and n′′ of the same type as her and of strictly positive integer
weights respectively mn′ and mn′′ with mn′ +mn′′ = mn.
Definition 5.8. A basic game G′ is a direct successor of another basic game G if G′ is
obtained by the delegation of one of the players in G.
Remark 5.9. |G′ | = |G|+ 1.
Definition 5.10. A basic game G′ is a successor of another basic game G if there exists a
finite sequence of basic games G0, G1, . . . , Gk such that G = G0, G′ = Gk, and Gl is a direct
successor of Gl−1 for l = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Remark 5.11. |G′ | = |G|+ k.
Definition 5.12. Denote the family consisting of a basic game G and all the successors of
G by ΞG. This set has a natural tree structure with root G. The derived game G¯ of G is the
element in ΞG which is the last on each branch. It thus has the largest cardinality, i.e. each
player in G¯ has weight 1.
Remark 5.13. |G¯| = ∑n∈NGmn.
5.3 Equilibrium payoffs in delegation games
In this section we will define and construct the set of delegation equilibrium payoffs.
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5.3.1 Game form
The game form of the delegation game D(G) associated to the basic game G, i.e. its set
of players and their strategy sets, is defined as follows.
The player set is NG, the same as that of G.
For each player n ∈ NG of weight mn, her strategy set Sn is the finite set of integer-
partitions of mn. Explicitly, for each sn ∈ Sn, there is an integer ln ∈ N∗ such that
sn = {mni }lni=1 ∈ (N∗)ln ,
ln∑
i=1
mni = mn.
The interpretation is that player n creates ln delegates with delegate i having weightmni , i :=
1, · · · , ln. In particular, the strategy set Sn is finite.
Remark 5.14. A profile of strategies {sn}n∈N induces a successor G′ of G if there exists
n ∈ N such that ln > 1, i.e. at least one player delegates: it is the basic game with player
profile defined by
{{mni }lni=1}n∈N . Otherwise, if ln = 1, sn = {mn} for all n ∈ N , the profile{sn}n∈N induces the basic game G.
5.3.2 Set of delegation equilibrium payoffs
The payoff functions and the set of delegation equilibrium payoffs associated to the dele-
gation game D(G), denoted by E(G), are defined by induction on the tree ΞG.
For the derived basic game G¯, let E(G¯) be E(G¯), the set of equilibrium payoffs.
Let Gˆ ∈ ΞG and assume that the set of delegation equilibrium payoffs E(G′) in D(G′) is
defined for all successors G′ of Gˆ. We define E(Gˆ) in three steps.
1) Let e be a selection from E(Gˆ), i.e. e(Gˆ) ∈ E(Gˆ) ⊂ R|Gˆ|.
Let y be a selection from the sets of delegation equilibrium payoffs {E(G′)}G′∈ΞGˆ\{Gˆ}.
In other words, for any successor G′ of Gˆ, y(G′) ∈ E(G′) ⊂ R|G′|. Let Y (Gˆ) denote the
collection of all such selections of {E(G′)}G′∈ΞGˆ\{Gˆ}.
2) For each pair (e, y) ∈ E(Gˆ)× Y (Gˆ), consider an auxiliary game G(Gˆ; e, y) associated
to the game form of D(G). The payoff F k to player k ∈ NGˆ as a function of the strategy
profile s = {sk}k∈NGˆ is defined as follows.
If s induces the basic game Gˆ, F k(s) = ek(Gˆ).
If s induces a successor G′ of Gˆ so that the player profile of G′ is
{{mki }lki=1}k∈NGˆ , then
F k(s) =
lk∑
i=1
yki (G′).
Namely the payoff to player k is the sum of the delegation equilibrium payoffs to her delegates
according to y.
The auxiliary game G(Gˆ; e, y) is a finite game. We denote by E(Gˆ; e, y) ⊂ R|Gˆ| its non
empty subset of equilibrium payoff profiles.
3) The set of delegation equilibrium payoff profiles in the delegation game D(Gˆ) is finally
defined by
E(Gˆ) =
⋃
e∈E(Gˆ), y∈Y (Gˆ)
E(Gˆ; e, y).
Proposition 5.15. The set of delegation equilibrium payoff profiles E(G) is a non-empty
subset of R|G|.
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5.3.3 Consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs
Now we define, for a delegation game D(G), the set of consistent chains of delegation
equilibrium payoffs, denoted by H(G) ⊂ ∏G′∈ΞG R|G′|, and the associated set of consistent
delegation equilibrium payoffs, denoted by E˜(G) ⊂ E(G).
The definition of a consistent chain of equilibrium payoffs h =
(
h(G′)
)
G′∈ΞG is obtained
by induction as in the previous section.
For G¯, let h(G¯) be an arbitrary element in E(G¯).
Let Gˆ ∈ ΞG \ {G} and assume that h(G′) is defined for all successors G′ of Gˆ with
h(G′) ∈ R|G′|. As above, for any selection e of E(Gˆ) ⊂ R|Gˆ|, the auxiliary game G(Gˆ; e, h)
has a non-empty equilibrium payoff profile set E(Gˆ; e, h) ⊂ R|Gˆ|. Choose h(Gˆ) as an element
in ⋃e∈E(Gˆ)E(Gˆ; e, h) ⊂ E(Gˆ). In this way a consistent chain of delegation equilibrium h is
defined for the delegation game D(G). H(G) is the collection of all such chains.
For any h ∈ H(G), h(G) ∈ E(G) is called a consistent delegation equilibrium payoff
profile induced by the consistent chain h. The set of consistent delegation equilibrium payoff
profiles in D(G), denoted by E˜(G), is defined as a subset of E(G), by
E˜(G) = {h(G) }h∈H(G).
Proposition 5.16. The collection of consistent chains of delegation equilibrium payoffs
H(G) is a non-empty set in ∏G′∈ΞG R|G′|.
The set of consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs E˜(G) is a non-empty subset of E(G) ⊂
R|G|.
5.4 Example
In this section a delegation game on a network is studied in detail. A delegation equi-
librium, a chain of consistent delegation equilibrium profiles and the consistent delegation
equilibrium profile that it induces will be obtained. A construction of a non consistent
delegation equilibrium profile will also be provided.
The basic game G takes place in a network composed of two vertices O and D, with two
parallel arcs r1 and r2 connecting O to D. Their per-unit cost functions are respectively
l1(x) = x + 1, l2(x) = 0.1x + 3.6. Two players both hold a stock to send from O to D.
The weight of player I’s stock is 3 and that of player II’s is 2. The profile of the players is
NG = {I|3, II|2}, where the name of a player is her type and the number after the name
of a player is her weight. G has five successors A,B,C,D and G¯. The set of players of the
six basic games and some of their equilibrium cost profiles are given below. The type of a
player depends on the initial possessor of her stock. In each profile, players of the same type
are put in the same pair of brackets.
NG =
{ {I|3}, {II|2} } NA = { {a1|2, a2|1}, {a3|2} }
NB =
{ {b1|1, b2|1, b3|1}, {b4|2} } NC = { {c1|3}, {c2|1, c3|1} }
ND =
{ {d1|2, d2|1}, {d3|1, d4|1} } NG¯ = { {q1|1, q2|1, q3|1}, {q4|1, q5|1} }
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E(G) ⊃ {(10.8, 6.9), (9.9, 7.8)}
E(A) ⊃ {(7.8, 3, 6.9), (6.9, 3, 7.8), (6, 3.9, 7.8), (7.8, 3.9, 6), (6.9, 3.9, 6.9)}
E(B) ⊃ {(3, 3, 3.9, 7.8), (3, 3.9, 3, 7.8), (3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 6), (3.9, 3.9, 3, 6.9)}
E(C) ⊃ {(10.8, 3.9, 3), (10.8, 3, 3.9), (9.9, 3.9, 3.9)}
E(D) ⊃ {(7.8, 3, 3, 3.9), (7.8, 3.9, 3, 3), (6, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9), (6.9, 3, 3.9, 3.9)}
E(G¯) ⊃ {(3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 3, 3), (3.9, 3.9, 3, 3.9, 3), (3.9, 3, 3.9, 3.9, 3), (3, 3, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9)}
Figure 5.2 illustrates ΞG by its tree structure.
G
A
D
G¯
B
G¯
G¯
B
G¯
C
D
G¯
Q
D
G¯
G¯
Figure 5.2
1) In the delegation game D(G¯), select h(G¯) = (3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 3, 3) ∈ E(G¯) = E(G¯). Note
that another possible selection y(G¯) = (3, 3, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9).
2) In the basic game D, select e(D) = (7.8, 3.9, 3, 3) ∈ E(D).
3) In the delegation game D(D), the payoff matrix of the auxiliary game G(D; e, h)
determined by (e(D), h(G¯)) is shown on the left in Table 5.3, while the one determined by
(e(D), y(G¯)) is shown on the right in Table 5.3. Player d1 is the row player. Players d2, d3
and d4 have no actions.
{2} D : (7.8, 3.9, 3, 3) *
{1,1} G¯ : (3.9 + 3.9, 3.9, 3, 3) *
{2} D : (7.8, 3.9, 3, 3)
{1,1} G¯ : (3 + 3, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9) *
Table 5.3: G(D; e, h) and G(D; e, y).
The pure equilibria outcomes are starred. In the auxiliary game on the left, select h(D) =
(7.8, 3.9, 3, 3) ∈ E(D). In the auxiliary game on the right, select y(D) = (6, 3.9, 3.9, 3.9) ∈
E(D).
4) In the basic game C, select e(C) = (10.8, 3.9, 3) ∈ E(C).
5) In the delegation game D(C), the payoff matrix of the auxiliary game determined by
(e(C), h(D), h(G¯)) is shown in Table 5.4. Player c1 is the row player. Players c2 and c3 have
no choice.
Select h(C) = (10.8, 3.9, 3) ∈ E(C).
6) In the basic game B, select e(B) = (3, 3.9, 3, 7.8) ∈ E(B).
7) In the delegation game D(B), the payoff matrix of the auxiliary game determined by
(e(B), h(G¯)) is shown in Table 5.5. Player b4 is the row player. Players b1, b2 and b3 have
no action.
Select h(B) = (3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 6) ∈ E(B).
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{3} C : (10.8, 3.9, 3) *
{2,1} D : (7.8 + 3.9, 3, 3) *
{1,1,1} G¯ : (3.9 + 3.9 + 3.9, 3, 3) *
Table 5.4: G(C; e, h).
{2} B : (3, 3.9, 3, 7.8)
{1, 1} G¯ : (3.9, 3.9, 3.9, 3 + 3) *
Table 5.5: G(B; e, h).
8) In the basic game A, select e(A) = (6.9, 3, 7.8) ∈ E(A).
9) In the delegation game D(A), the payoff matrix of the auxiliary game determined by
(e(A), h(D), h(B), h(G¯)) is shown in Table 5.6. Player a1 is the row player and player a3 is
the column player. Player a2 has no action.
{2} {1,1}
{2} A : (6.9, 3, 7.8) D : (7.8, 3.9, 3 + 3) *
{1, 1} B : (3.9 + 3.9, 3.9, 6) G¯ : (3.9 + 3.9, 3.9, 3 + 3)*
Table 5.6: G(A; e, h).
Select h(A) = (7.8, 3.9, 6) ∈ E(A).
10) In the basic game G, select e(G) = (9.9, 7.8) ∈ E(G).
11) In the delegation game D(G), the payoff matrix of the auxiliary game determined by
(e(G), h(A), h(B), h(C), h(D), h(G¯)) is shown in Table 5.7. Player I is the row player and
player II is the column player.
{2} {1,1}
{3} G : (9.9, 7.8) C : (10.8, 3.9 + 3) *
{2, 1} A : (7.8 + 3.9, 6) D : (7.8 + 3.9, 3 + 3)
{1, 1, 1} B : (3.9 + 3.9 + 3.9, 6) G¯ : (3.9 + 3.9 + 3.9, 3 + 3)
Table 5.7: G(G; e, h).
Select h(G) = (10.8, 6.9). Then the construction of a consistent chain of delegation
equilibrium profiles h is completed, and (10.8, 6.9) is a consistent delegation equilibrium
profile in D(G).
Alternatively, the auxiliary game G(G; e, y) which uses y(D) instead of h(D) has the
payoff matrix in Table 5.8.
The only equilibrium is attained if player I plays {3} with probability 2/3 and {2, 1}
with probability 13 , and player II plays {2} with probability 1/3 and {1, 1} with probability2
3 . The equilibrium cost profile is (10.5, 7.2). This is an equilibrium cost profile in D(G) but
is not constructed by a consistent chain.
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{2} {1,1}
{3} G : (9.9, 7.8) C : (10.8, 3.9 + 3)
{2, 1} A : (7.8 + 3.9, 6) D : (6 + 3.9, 3.9 + 3.9)
{1, 1, 1} B : (3.9 + 3.9 + 3.9, 6) G¯ : (3.9 + 3.9 + 3.9, 3 + 3)
Table 5.8: G(G; e, y).
5.5 Comments and extensions
5.5.1 Nash equilibria
One could define equilibrium payoffs F (G) in the delegation game D(G) by induction
using first an auxiliary game G(G; e, z), where e is a selection of E(G) and, for each successor
G′, z(G′) is a selection of feasible payoff in G′. Then one would require that an equilibrium
σ in the auxiliary game satisfies the coherency condition: for each G′ in the support of
σ, z(G′) belongs to F (G′). However this would assume that off the equilibrium path the
delegate players would play a specific “threat" which is not an equilibrium and is thus difficult
to justify.
5.5.2 Subgame perfection
The induction procedure used to define delegation equilibria is reminiscent of subgame
perfection [84]. However there are important differences. First the tree structure involves
new players and the consistency argument used in subgame perfection (the (same) players
should play an equilibrium at each node of the tree) is replaced by an argument involving the
rationality of the delegates. Moreover, for the notion of consistent delegation equilibrium,
one goes even one step further since one asks for a same perception of the play in the successor
games. One could relate the construction of delegation equilibrium to the usual selection of
subgame perfect equilibria through forward induction: if G′ is reached, play an equilibrium
in G′. Then the notion of consistent delegation equilibria would add a backward induction
property: the behavior in a successor game G′ of G is independent of the way G′ is reached
during the play of G and depends only on G′ (and its successors).
5.5.3 Composite equilibria
The same concepts can be defined in games where each player has a finitely divisible
stock, even in the presence of a set of nonatomic players, using the notion of composite
equilibria [32, 91]. However the general case where each player n can divide arbitrarily her
stock mn composed of finitely (or countably) many atoms mni , i ≥ 1 and a nonatomic part
mn0 with
∑+∞
j=0 m
n
j = mn deserves further study, since the definition of delegation equilibrium
by backward induction is no longer available.
5.5.4 A special case
A special case where there are only two choices in the basic game is studied in [92]
(cf. Chapter 3). In such a setting, all players have the same payoff function. In a basic
game, a player holding a stock of strictly positive weight can arbitrarily divide her stock
into two parts and affect them to two choices respectively, so she is called atomic splittable.
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A player holding an infinitesimal stock is called nonatomic. Under a standard concavity
assumption on the payoff functions, a unique equilibrium exists in each basic game. In a
delegation game, each atomic splittable player can arbitrarily delegate her stock to finitely
many atomic delegates and a set of nonatomic delegates. Her payoff is the sum of the payoffs
to her delegates at the equilibrium of the basic game played by all the delegates. It is shown
that, in a basic game Γ1, if one or several atomic players delegate so that the basic game
after the delegation is Γ2, then the payoff to any player not delegating is reduced or does
not change in Γ2 with respect to Γ1, and the social payoff, i.e. the sum of the payoffs to all
the players, is reduced or does not change in Γ2 with respect to Γ1.
Chapter 6
A dynamical model of a two-scale
interaction
This chapter is based on the paper A dynamical model of a two-scale interaction in
collaboration with Mario Bravo.
Abstract. Assume that a society is composed of a family of populations, where each pop-
ulation consists of two types of individuals: workers and free-riders. A population is char-
acterized by its type, interpreted as the proportion of the workers in it. This paper aims to
model a twofold dynamical phenomenon. On the one hand, populations possessing a larger
proportion of workers are more efficient in terms of reproduction rate. On the other hand,
workers have incentives to become free-riders within each population. A discrete determinis-
tic dynamic model on the distribution of types over the society is proposed. The main result
is that, under some natural assumptions, the discrete dynamics converges to a stationary
distribution which need not be a Dirac mass, and the most efficient populations can disap-
pear at this state. Some numerical simulations are also presented to underline the scope of
this result. A variant of the original model is studied. It considers mutations so that a very
small proportion of free-riders may become workers. Finally, some interesting lines of future
research are discussed.
6.1 Introduction
This work presents a dynamic model of a two-scale interaction in a family of populations
characterized by their types. The type of a population is the proportion of the workers (or
cooperators) within it. The nonworkers are called free-riders. The workers contribute to the
growth of a population, while the free-riders do nothing but exploit these ones’ production.
Therefore, the fitness of a population, namely, the reproduction rate of its members, depends
on its type.
The first interaction is a local one, which takes place within a population. As the free-
riders profit from the workers’ production all by doing nothing, their net gain is greater.
Therefore, either by a strategic interpretation that workers will imitate the free-riders’ be-
havior, or by an evolutionary biological interpretation that free-riders have a higher fitness
and thus a higher reproduction rate, the proportion of the workers in the population will
reduce and, consequently the fitness of the whole population will drop.
The second interaction is a global one, which takes place among the different populations.
Populations with higher types or, equivalently, with a larger proportion of workers, have
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greater fitness, and thus reproduce more quickly.
Two interactions of different scales tie up each other. If there was only one population, the
free-riders would invade the whole society. If the populations’ types, i.e. their compositions,
are fixed, the population with the highest type would win the competition between the
populations. However, when local and global interactions are combined together, it is not
clear which mechanism will get the upper hand.
In biology, a similar phenomenon is studied under the name of group selection or, more
generally, multilevel selection [54, 56, 96–98]. For example, in an ant colony, worker ants
work for the survival of the whole population, while the queen ant does not work and just
reproduces. However, a population made up of only queen ants cannot survive. Similarly,
in a group of meerkats, those who are on guard while the others sleep have a net loss. But
the whole group’s survival will be in danger if all the meerkats sleep.
Similar phenomenon also exists in economics and sociology. In public good games [31],
free-riders always gain more than cooperators in a society, but if the whole society are filled
with free-riders, the public good will be exhausted. The formation of coalition is a largely
studied topic in economics [12, 13, 35], in cooperative game theory and in the network
formation [7, 48, 63], etc.
In this work, this two-scale interaction is studied via a simple deterministic model where
type and time are both discrete. Locally, within each population, the fact that free-riders
have a higher fitness so that the composition of the population changes accordingly can be
interpreted in different ways. For instance, workers imitate the free-riders’ behavior or the
free-riders have a higher reproduction rate, hence the proportion of the free-riders grows after
a renormalization of the population’s size. In our model, this is interpreted by a migration
phenomenon among the populations. Explicitly, within each population, some members leave
to join other populations of lower types. The global comparison among the different types
is modeled via their fitness by assuming that higher types are better fitted to reproduce, i.e.
they have higher reproduction rates.
In nonatomic congestion games [20, 37, 91], this phenomenon appears in the following
way. Assume that a fixed proportion of individuals form a coalition. Each of the remaining
individuals minimizes her own cost independently. In Wan [91] (cf. Chapter 2), two results
are established. On the one hand, the average cost to the coalition, the common cost to
the individual players, and the total cost to the population, all decrease with the size of the
coalition. Thus, the population’s efficiency or its competence, characterized by its total cost,
increases with the size of the coalition. On the other hand, the individuals’ cost is always
lower than the average cost to the coalition, whatever the coalition size is. This provides the
cooperators an incentive to leave the coalition and become free-riders.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 6.2.1, we present a dynamic model where the
state variable is the distribution of the types over the society. In Section 6.2.2, the existence
of rest points in this dynamics, which correspond to stationary distributions, is established.
Section 6.2.3 shows that the process converges to a stationary distribution under some natural
assumptions. To give an idea of this result, suppose that the initial distribution has full
support. Then, the dynamics converges to a particular stationary distribution whose support
has form {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L is determined by the maximal product of a population’s
growth rate and its proportion of non-migrants. Populations of high type but low product of
the growth rate and the proportion of non-migrants may disappear. Numerical simulations
are also provided to conform the above result. Section 6.3 is contributed to a variant of the
original model with mutations. An individual mutates if she leaves her population to join
another one of higher type. It is shown that, if the mutation rates are very small but not
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zero, the stationary state is unique, and it has full support. In Section 6.4, some qualitative
analysis and extensions of the model to the case of a continuum of types are mentioned.
6.2 Basic model
6.2.1 Notation and dynamics
Assume that there are K types of individuals, where K ∈ N∗. Let the set of types be
denoted by K = {1, . . . ,K}. The individuals of type k ∈ K form a population k. The K
populations form a society.
At instant n, the size of population k is denoted by µˆkn, and the size of the society by
Mn =
∑
k∈K µˆkn. The distribution of different types in the society is denoted by a vector
µn = (µkn)k∈K, where µkn = µˆkn/Mn. Thus, µn ∈ ∆K−1, the (K − 1)-dimensional simplex.
The type of a population is characterized by the proportion of the cooperators (or work-
ers) in it, while the remaining members are free-riders. The fitness of the population is
strictly increasing in its type, so that the vector of reproduction rates of the populations
β = (βk)k∈K is such that 0 < β1 < · · · < βK .
The reproduction rate of the society is 〈β, µn〉 = ∑Kk=1 µkn βk, where 〈· , ·〉 denotes the
standard inner product on RK .
For k ∈ K, denote γk = 1 + βk and call it the growth rate of population k. Denote
γ = (γk)k∈K. Then, 1 < γ1 < · · · < γK , and 〈γ, µn〉 = 1 + 〈β, µn〉. One has:
Mn+1
Mn
=
∑K
k=1 µˆ
k
n (1 + βk)
Mn
= 1 +
K∑
k=1
µˆkn
Mn
βk = 1 +
K∑
k=1
µkn β
k = 〈γ, µn〉.
Therefore, the dynamics on the size of the society is
Mn+1 = Mn〈γ, µn〉. (6.1)
At every instant, for any type k ≥ 2, there is a proportion 1 − αk of the individuals in
population k who change their type to k− 1 by joining population k− 1. The remaining αk
of them stay as type k. Let αk ∈ [0, 1] be called the staying rate of population k. Assume
that, the higher the type, the greater the difference between the net gain of a free-rider and
a worker within the population. As a result, the staying rate is non-increasing in k ∈ K, i.e.
α1 = 1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αK ≥ 0. Denote α = (αk)k∈K.
One has the following discrete dynamics on the populations’ sizes:{
µˆkn+1 = µˆkn αk (1 + βk) + µˆk+1n (1− αk+1) (1 + βk+1), 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µˆKn+1 = µˆKn αK (1 + βK).
Together with (6.1), they imply that
µˆkn+1
Mn+1
= µˆ
k
n α
k γk
Mn 〈γ, µn〉 +
µˆk+1n (1− αk+1) γk+1
Mn 〈γ, µn〉 , 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µˆKn+1
Mn+1
= µˆ
K
n α
K γK
Mn 〈γ, µn〉 ,
which yields the following discrete dynamics on the distribution of the types in the society:
µkn+1 = µkn
αk γk
〈γ, µn〉 + µ
k+1
n
(1− αk+1) γk+1
〈γ, µn〉 , 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µKn+1 = µKn
αK γK
〈γ, µn〉 .
(6.2)
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Let us define a mapping F = (F k)k∈K from ∆K−1 to ∆K−1 by
F k(µ) =

µk
αk γk
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
k+1 (1− αk+1)γk+1
〈γ, µ〉 , if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µK
αK γK
〈γ, µ〉 , if k = K.
(6.3)
Then, (6.2) can be written as
µn+1 = F (µn). (6.4)
Proposition 6.1. In the dynamical system (6.4), consider a trajectory {(µkn)k∈K}n∈N. The
following hold.
(1) For all k ∈ K, if µkt > 0 at some instant t ∈ N∗, then µkn > 0 for all n ≥ t.
(2) If there is an L ≤ K and some t ∈ N∗ such that µkt = 0 for all type k ≥ L + 1, then
µkn = 0 for all k ≥ L+ 1 and all n ≥ t.
(3) If there is an L ≤ K and some t ∈ N∗ such that µLt > 0, then µlt+L−l > 0 for all l ≤ L.
Remark 6.2. Given a trajectory {(µkn)k∈K}n∈N with an initial point (µk0)k∈K such that
µL0 > 0 and µk0 = 0 for all type k ≤ L, Proposition 6.1 implies that it is equivalent to study
a trajectory {(νkn)k∈L}n∈N of the dynamical system
νkn+1 = νkn
αk γk
〈γ, νn〉 + ν
k+1
n
(1− αk+1) γk+1
〈γ, νn〉 , 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1,
νLn+1 = νLn
αL γL
〈γ, νn〉 ,
with an initial point (νk0 )k∈L = (µkL)k∈L with full support L = {1, . . . , L}.
6.2.2 Stationary states
Definition 6.3. A vector µ ∈ ∆K−1 is a stationary distribution of K types in the society
if µ is a rest point of the dynamical system (6.4) or, equivalently, if µ is a fixed point of
mapping F .
A society with a stationary distribution of types is said to be at a stationary state.
Suppose that µ = (µk)k∈K is a fixed point of F . Then, by (6.2),
µk = µk α
k γk
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
k+1 (1− αk+1) γk+1
〈γ, µ〉 , 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µK = µK α
K γK
〈γ, µ〉 ,
which yields
µk
( 〈γ, µ〉 − αk γk ) = µk+1 (1− αk+1) γk+1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 (6.5a)
µK
( 〈γ, µ〉 − αK γK ) = 0. (6.5b)
Remark 6.4. There always exists a (trivial) fixed point µ¯ of F , where µ¯1 = 1 and µ¯k = 0
for k ≥ 2.
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The relation (6.5a) implies that if µ is a stationary distribution and µl = 0 for some type
l, then µk = 0 for all type k ≥ l. Therefore, µ1 6= 0, and one deduces the following.
Proposition 6.5. A fixed point µ of F must have a support of the form {1, 2, . . . , L} for
some L ∈ K.
Proposition 6.6. The distribution µ ∈ ∆K−1 is a fixed point of F with support {1, 2, . . . , L}
for some L ∈ K if, and only if, µ is a solution to the following equations:
µk = µk+1 qk, 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1 (6.6a)
µk > 0, 1 ≤ k ≤ L (6.6b)
µk = 0, if L < K, L+ 1 ≤ k ≤ K (6.6c)
〈γ, µ〉 = αL γL, (6.6d)
where
qk = (1− α
k+1) γk+1
〈γ, µ〉 − αk γk , 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1. (6.7)
Proof. It is clear that a solution to the equations (6.6) is a fixed point of F with support
{1, 2, . . . , L}.
For the converse result, apply the equation (6.5a) to L, and one gets µL · 〈γ, µ〉−αL γL(1−αL+1) γL+1 = 0,
which implies that 〈γ, µ〉 = αL γL. One concludes by combining the above results with
(6.5a).
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 6.6. It provides a natural
necessary condition for the existence of stationary distributions and a uniqueness property.
Corollary 6.7.
(1) If F has a non-trivial fixed point µ with support {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L ≥ 2, then,
αk γk < 〈γ, µ〉 = αL γL, 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1. (6.8)
(2) For each L ∈ K, if F has a fixed point with support {1, 2, . . . , L}, then it is the unique
one with this support. In particular, F has at most K fixed points.
Proof. (1) Equations (6.6a) and (6.6b) imply that qk > 0 for k ≤ L− 1. Then, (6.8) follows
from the definition of qk’s in (6.7).
(2) If two vectors µ and η are both fixed points of F with support {1, 2, . . . , L}, then it
follows from Proposition 6.6 that µk/µk+1 = ηk/ηk+1 = qk for k ≤ L − 1, where qk’s are
defined by (6.7). Then, one must have µ = η because ∑Lk=1 µk = ∑Lk=1 ηk = 1.
Remark 6.8. According to Corollary 6.7 and the fact that α1 = 1, if αk γk ≤ γ1 for all
k ≥ 2,then F has a unique fixed point which is the trivial one.
When condition (6.8) is satisfied, the explicit form of the fixed point of F with support
{1, 2, . . . , L} is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 6.9. Suppose that 2 ≤ L ≤ K and
αk γk < αL γL, 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1. (6.9)
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Let µ be a vector in ∆K−1 such that
µk =
{
µL ρk, 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1,
0, L+ 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
where
ρL = 1, (6.10a)
ρk = ρk+1qk, 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1, (6.10b)
qk = (1− α
k+1) γk+1
αL γL − αk γk , 1 ≤ k ≤ L− 1. (6.10c)
Then, µ is a fixed point of F with support {1, 2, . . . , L}.
Proof. It is enough to show that µ is well-defined and, for k ≤ L, µk > 0. The fact that it
is a rest point follows immediately from Proposition 6.6.
For k ≤ L, condition (6.9) ensures that qk > 0, thus ρk > 0.
By definition, µk = µLρk for all k ≤ L, thus 1 = ∑Kk=1 µk = µL (ρ1 + · · · + ρL−1 + 1)
because µ is in ∆K−1. Consequently, µL =
(
ρ1 + · · · + ρL−1 + 1)−1. But µk = µLρk for
k ≤ L and µk = 0 for k ≥ L + 1, this determines the unique rest point of F with support
{1, 2, . . . , L}.
For any non-trivial fixed point µ, the fact that γ1 < · · · < γL implies that there must be
a type l ≥ 2 such that the weighted average value ∑k∈K µkγk is situated between γl−1 and
γl, i.e. γk ≥ 〈γ, µ〉 for all k ≥ l and γk < 〈γ, µ〉 for all k < l. This provides a clue on the
shape of a fixed point.
Proposition 6.10. Suppose that µ is a non-trivial fixed point of F with support {1, 2, . . . , L},
where L ≥ 2. Let l be such that γk ≥ 〈γ, µ〉 for all k ≥ l and γk < 〈γ, µ〉 for all k < l.
Then, for k ≥ l, µk+1 < µk, while, for k ≤ l − 1,
µk+1 > µk, if αk γk + (1− αk+1) γk+1 < 〈γ, µ〉,
µk+1 < µk, if αk γk + (1− αk+1) γk+1 > 〈γ, µ〉,
µk+1 = µk, if αk γk + (1− αk+1) γk+1 = 〈γ, µ〉.
Proof. For k ≥ l, according to (6.7),
µk+1
µk
= 1
qk
= 〈γ, µ〉 − α
k γk
(1− αk+1) γk+1 ≤
(1− αk) γk
(1− αk+1) γk+1 < 1.
This means that, for all the types greater than l, the proportion of a type in the society
decreases with its value. The proof for k < l is similar.
6.2.3 Convergence to stationary distributions
This section is dedicated to the convergence of the dynamical system (6.4). Proposi-
tion 6.11 below shows that not all the stationary distributions can be the limit of such a
process.
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Proposition 6.11. In the dynamical system (6.4), if a trajectory {µn}n∈N with initial state
(µk0)k∈K such that µL00 > 0 for some L0 ≥ L converges to a fixed point µ of F with support
{1, 2, . . . , L}, then
αk γk < αL γL, 1 ≤ k ≤ L (6.11a)
αk γk ≤ αL γL, L+ 1 ≤ k ≤ L0. (6.11b)
Proof. The trajectory {µn}n∈N converges to µ, thus, for any  > 0, there exists an N ∈ N∗
such that, for all n > N , |µ− µn| <  and, consequently, |〈γ, µ〉 − 〈γ, µn〉| < .
For all type k ∈ {L+ 1, . . . , L0}, according to (6.2), for all n > N ,
µkn+1 ≥ µkn ·
αk γk
〈γ, µn〉 > µ
k
n ·
αk γk
〈γ, µ〉+  .
If αk γk > 〈γ, µ〉, one can take an  such that αk γk〈γ, µ〉+ > 1 so that µkn → +∞ as n→ +∞.
This contradicts the fact that µkn tends to 0. Therefore, αk γk ≤ 〈γ, µ〉. One concludes by
combining this result with Proposition 6.1 and condition (6.8).
The following theorem is the main result of this section. It shows that dynamics (6.4)
converges, and its limit distribution combines, in a non trivial way, the two interactions at
different scales.
Theorem 6.12. In the dynamical system (6.4), suppose that 1 ≤ L0 ≤ K. If there is a type
L such that L ≤ L0 and
αL γL > αk γk, 1 ≤ k ≤ L0, k 6= L, (6.12)
then a trajectory {µn}n∈N with initial state (µk0)k∈K such that µL00 > 0 and µk0 = 0 for all
k ≥ L0 converges to a fixed point µ of F with support {1, 2, . . . , L}.
Proof. See the appendix.
6.2.4 Numerical example
Let us see a simple numerical example that underlines the scope of the above result.
Assume that there are K = 50 types. The reproduction rates β and the staying rates α are
given by the following formulae:
βk = β0 + (k − 1)
0.8
K
β,
αk = 1− (k − 1)
2
K2
α,
1 ≤ k ≤ 50 ,
where α = 0.8, β = 2 and β0 = 0.3. Figure 6.1 presents the shape of the vector u = (uk)k∈K,
where uk = αk(1 + βk) = αkγk. The maximum of u is attained by k = 27.
Given that the limit value of the process strongly depends on the initial state, two
simple cases are considered here. In Figure 6.2, the initial state µ0 is taken to be the
uniform distribution, i.e. µ0 = (1/K, . . . , 1/K). In Figure 6.3, the case where µ˜0 =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1/5, 1/5, 1, 5, 1/5, 1/5, 0, . . . , 0) is presented.
Observe that, when the initial condition is µ0, the limit distribution µ has support
{1, . . . , 27} even if the last coordinates of µ are very small with respect to the others. On the
other hand, when the initial condition µ˜0 is considered, the support of the limit distribution
is {1, . . . , 10} because u1 < · · · < u10 and µ˜k0 = 0 for k > 10.
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Figure 6.1: The vector of total growth rates αkγk.
Figure 6.2: Uniform initial condition µ0 Figure 6.3: Initial condition µ˜0.
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6.3 Mutations
6.3.1 Model with mutation
In this section, the rare event that a free-rider becomes a cooperator by mutation is taken
into account.
Assume that, at every instant n, in all population k ≤ K − 1, a proportion k of the
individuals mutate by adopting type k+ 1, where 0 < k < 1. Let K be equal to 0. Among
the remaining 1 − k nonmutants, as before, a proportion αk of them stay as type k, while
the others leave to join population k − 1. Still, one assumes that 1 = α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αK .
The other notations remain unchanged.
Then, the discrete dynamics on the populations’ sizes is
µˆ1n+1 = µˆ1n (1− 1)α1 γ1 + µˆ2n (1− 2) (1− α2) γ2,
µˆkn+1 = µˆkn (1− k)αk γk + µˆk+1n (1− k+1) (1− αk+1) γk+1 + µˆk−1n k−1 γk−1,
2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µˆKn+1 = µˆKn (1− K)αK γK + µˆK−1n K−1 γK−1.
(6.13)
They entail the following discrete dynamics on the populations’ proportions in the society.
µn+1 = F˜ (µn), (6.14)
where the mapping F˜ is defined from ∆K−1 to ∆K−1 by
F˜ 1(µ) =

µ1
(1− 1)α1 γ1
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
2 (1− 2) (1− α2) γ2
〈γ, µ〉 ,
µk
(1− k)αk γk
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
k+1 (1− k+1) (1− αk+1) γk+1
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
k−1 k−1 γk−1
〈γ, µ〉 ,
2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µK
(1− K)αK γK
〈γ, µ〉 + µ
K−1 K−1 γK−1
〈γ, µ〉 .
(6.15)
A fixed point µ = (µk)k∈K of F˜ or, equivalently, a stationary state of the model with
mutation meets the following conditions:
µ1
[〈γ, µ〉 − (1− 1)α1 γ1]− µ2 (1− 2) (1− α2) γ2 = 0,
−µk−1 k−1 γk−1 + µk [〈γ, µ〉 − (1− k)αk γk]
− µk+1 (1− k+1) (1− αk+1) γk+1 = 0, 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
−µK−1 K−1 γK−1 + µK [ 〈γ, µ〉 − (1− K)αK γK ] = 0.
(6.16)
6.3.2 Some properties of stationary states
This part provides some properties of a fixed point of F˜ .
Proposition 6.13. F˜ has a fixed point µ ∈ ∆K−1.
In addition, all the fixed point of F˜ have full support.
Proof. Function F˜ : ∆K−1 → ∆K−1 is continuous, hence the first statement follows im-
mediately from Brower’s fixed point theorem. The second statement is clear because of
(6.16).
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Proposition 6.14. Suppose that µ = (µ1, . . . , µK) is a fixed point of F˜ in ∆K−1, and
ak,k = 〈γ, µ〉 − (1− k)αk γk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K;
ak−1,k = −(1− k) (1− αk) γk, 2 ≤ k ≤ K;
ak,k−1 = −k−1 γk−1, 2 ≤ k ≤ K;
a˜1,1 = a1,1;
a˜k,k =

ak,k − ak−1,k ak,k−1
a˜k−1,k−1
, if a˜k−1,k−1 6= 0,
0, if a˜k−1,k−1 = 0,
2 ≤ k ≤ K.
Then, one has:
(1) 〈γ, µ〉 > maxk∈K(1− k)αk γk;
(2) for all k ≤ K − 1, a˜k,k > 0, and µk = −µk+1 ak,k+1a˜k,k ;
(3) a˜K,K = 0.
Proof. (1) The conditions in (6.16) can be rewritten as
a1,1µ
1 + a1,2µ2 = 0, (6.17)
ak,k−1µk−1 + ak,kµk + ak,k+1µk+1 = 0, k = 2, . . . ,K − 1, (6.18)
aK,K−1µK−1 + aK,KµK = 0. (6.19)
By definition, for all k ≥ 2, ak−1,k < 0 and ak,k−1 < 0. Proposition 6.13 states that
µk > 0 for all k. Then, (6.17)-(6.19) imply that a1,1 = −a1,2 µ2µ1 > 0, ak,k = −ak,k−1 µ
k−1
µk
−
ak,k+1
µk+1
µk
> 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,K − 1}, and aK,K = −aK,K−1 µK−1µK > 0.
Hence, 〈γ, µ〉−(1−k)αk γk = ak,k > 0 for all k and, consequently, 〈γ, µ〉 > maxk∈K(1−
k)αk γk.
(2) The proof is made by induction.
Equation (6.17) implies that µ1 = −µ2 a1,2a˜1,1 .
Suppose that, for some k ≤ K−1, one has shown that µk−1 = −µk ak−1,ka˜k−1,k−1 and a˜k−1,k−1 >
0. Then, according to (6.18),
(
ak,k − ak−1,k ak,k−1a˜k−1,k−1
)
µk + ak,k+1µk+1 = 0 or, equivalently,
a˜k,k µ
k + ak,k+1µk+1 = 0. (6.20)
In (6.20), µk > 0, µk+1 > 0 and ak,k+1 < 0. As a result, a˜k,k > 0 and µk = −µk+1 ak,k+1a˜k,k .
In this way, one has proved that µk = −µk+1 ak,k+1a˜k,k and a˜k,k > 0 for k ≤ K − 1.
(3) By replacing µK−1 by −µK aK−1,Ka˜K−1,K−1 in (6.19), one has (aK,K −
aK−1,K aK,K−1
a˜K−1,K−1 )µ
K = 0 or,
equivalently, a˜K,KµK = 0. But µK > 0, hence a˜K,K = 0.
6.3.3 Uniqueness of the stationary states
In order to study the uniqueness of the fixed points of F˜ , one needs some auxiliary
functions.
Suppose that µ is a fixed point of F˜ . Notice that it exists according to Proposition 6.13.
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First, let us define a K ×K tridiagonal matrix function A(x) = (aij(x))1≤i,j≤K on R by
ak,k(x) = x− (1− k)αk γk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
ak−1,k(x) = ak−1,k, 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
ak,k−1(x) = ak,k−1, 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
ai,j(x) = 0, (i, j) 6= (k, k) or (k − 1, k) or (k, k − 1),
(6.21)
where ak−1,k’s and ak,k−1’s are those defined in Proposition 6.14.
For x ∈ R, define b1,1(x) = a1,1(x) and, for k = 2, . . . ,K,
bk,k(x) =

ak,k(x)− ak−1,k ak,k−1
bk−1,k−1(x)
, if bk−1,k−1(x) 6= 0,
0, otherwise.
Denote R = {x ∈ R | bk,k(x) 6= 0, for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1}. It is not empty because,
according to Proposition 6.14, 〈γ, µ〉 belongs to R.
Next, let us define a K × K-dimensional upper bidiagonal matrix function A˜(x) =(
a˜ij(x)
)
1≤i,j≤K on R in the following way.
a˜k,k(x) = bk,k(x), 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
a˜k−1,k(x) = ak−1,k, 2 ≤ k ≤ K,
a˜i,j(x) = 0, (i, j) 6= (k, k) or (k − 1, k).
(6.22)
Remark 6.15. For all x ∈ R, A˜(x) is obtained from A(x) by a series of element transfor-
mation. Hence, there exists a K ×K invertible matrix P (x) such that A˜(x) = P (x)A(x).
According to (6.17)-(6.19), A(〈γ, µ〉)µ = 0. Because of the previous statement,
A˜(〈γ, µ〉)µ = 0.
Finally, let us define K real-valued functions h1, . . . , hK on the closed interval [0, γK ] as
follows:
h1(x) =
[
x− (1− 1)α1 γ1 ]+, (6.23)
where the notation x+ stands for max{x, 0}; for k = 2, . . . ,K,
hk(x) =

[
x− (1− k)αk γk − ak−1,k ak,k−1
hk−1(x)
]+
, if hk−1(x) > 0,
0, if hk−1(x) = 0.
(6.24)
Define a constant
p¯i = max
1≤k≤K
(1− k)αk γk + 2 max
2≤k≤K
[
(1− k)(1− αk) γk k−1 γk−1 ]1/2. (6.25)
Let us make the following assumption which holds as long as the mutation rates (k)k∈K
are sufficiently small.
A 6.16. p¯i < γK .
Lemma 6.17. Suppose that A6.16 holds. Then, there exists K numbers pi1, . . . , piK such
that 0 ≤ pi1 < pi2 < · · · < piK < p¯i and, for all k ∈ K, the following three conditions of hk
hold:
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(1) hk = 0 on [ 0, pik];
(2) hk is strictly positive and strictly increasing on (pik, γK ];
(3) hk is continuous on [ 0, γK ].
Proof. The proof is made by induction.
Let pi1 be equal to (1− 1)α1 γ1. Clearly, pi1 < p¯i. It is easy to see that, firstly, h1(x) = 0
on [ 0, pi1]; secondly, h1(x) = x − (1 − 1)α1 γ1 > 0 and it is strictly increasing on (pi1, γK ];
thirdly, h1 is continuous on [ 0, γK ].
For later use, define a real-valued function h˜1(x) = x− (1− 1)α1 γ1 on [ 0, γK ].
Now, suppose that, for some k ≥ 2, k− 1 numbers pi1, . . . , pik−1 such that 0 ≤ pi1 < pi2 <
· · · < pik−1 < p¯i are found, and the three conditions of hl hold for all l ≤ k − 1. Let us find
pik such that pik−1 < pik < p¯i and the three conditions hold for hk.
By hypothesis, hk−1 is continuous in a neighborhood of pik−1, hence limx→pik−1+ hk−1(x)
= hk−1(pik−1) = 0 and, consequently, limx→pik−1+− 1hk−1(x) = −∞. Still by hypothesis,
hk−1 is continuous, strictly positive and strictly increasing on the interval (pik−1, γK ], hence
− 1hk−1(x) is continuous, strictly negative and strictly increasing on (pik−1, γK ].
Let us define a real-valued function h˜k on (pik−1, γK ] by
h˜k(x) = x− (1− k)αk γk − ak−1,k ak,k−1
hk−1(x)
. (6.26)
On account of the results in the previous paragraph, h˜k is continuous and strictly increasing
on (pik−1, γK ], and
lim
x→pik−1+
h˜k(x) = −∞. (6.27)
By definition, hk ≡ 0 on the interval [ 0, pik−1] and hk = [h˜k(x)]+ on (pik−1, γK ]. Therefore,
according to the properties of the function h˜k, one has only to show that there exists pik such
that pik−1 < pik < p¯i and h˜k(pik) = 0. Indeed, if this is true, then, for all x in the interval
(pik−1, pik), h˜k(x) < 0, thus hk(x) = [h˜k(x)]+ = 0, while hk = h˜k ≥ 0 on [pik, γK ], and the
equality holds only in pik.
In order to prove the existence of pik, it is enough to show that h˜k(p¯i) > 0. Indeed, when
this is proved, by considering (6.27) and the fact that h˜k is strictly increasing on (pik−1, γK ],
one obtains immediately the existence of a unique pik ∈ (pik−1, p¯i) such that h˜k(pik) = 0.
Denote ξ = 2 max2≤k≤K
[
(1 − k)(1 − αk) γk k−1 γk−1 ]1/2. Let us show, by induction,
that h˜l(p¯i) > ξ/2 for l ≤ k.
First, h˜1(p¯i) = p¯i − (1− 1)α1 γ1 > ξ by the definition of p¯i.
Suppose that h˜l−1(p¯i) > ξ/2 for some l ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Then,
hl−1(p¯i) = [h˜l−1(p¯i)]+ = h˜l−1(p¯i) > ξ/2, (6.28)
and
h˜l(p¯i) = p¯i− (1− l)αl γl− al−1,l al,l−1
hl−1(p¯i)
> ξ− (1− 
l)(1− αl) γl l−1 γl−1
hl−1(p¯i)
> ξ− (ξ/2)
2
ξ/2 = ξ/2,
where the first inequality is due to the definitions of p¯i and ξ, and the second one is due to
the definition of ξ and (6.28).
In this way, one has proved that h˜k(p¯i) > ξ/2 > 0.
Corollary 6.18. Suppose that A6.16 holds. Then,
6.3. Mutations 163
(1) hk(piK) > 0 for k ≤ K − 1, and hK(piK) = h˜K(piK) = 0;
(2) if, for some x ∈ [0, p¯i)∪(p¯i, γK ], hk(x) > 0 for k ≤ K−1 and hK(x) = 0, then h˜K(x) < 0.
Here piK is the real constant given in Lemma 6.17, and h˜K is the function defined on
(piK−1, γK ] by (6.26).
Proof. According to Lemma 6.17, hK(piK) = h˜K(piK) = 0 and, for k ≤ K − 1, piK > pik,
hence hk(piK) > 0. If x ∈ [0, p¯i) ∪ (p¯i, γK ] and hk(x) > 0 for k ≤ K − 1, then x > piK−1 by
Lemma 6.17 (2). Thus, h˜K is well defined at x. If hk(x) = 0, it follows from the proof of
Lemma 6.17 that x < piK and h˜K(x) < 0.
One is ready to write, explicitly, a fixed point of F˜ defined by (6.15) and show that this
is the unique one.
Theorem 6.19. Suppose that A6.16 holds. Then, F˜ has a unique fixed point in ∆K−1.
Proof. Suppose that µ ∈ ∆K−1 is a fixed point of (6.15). Two matrix functions A(x) and
A˜(x) are defined by (6.21) and (6.22), and K real-valued functions h1, . . . , hK are defined
by (6.23) and (6.24).
According to Proposition 6.14,
A(〈γ, µ〉)µ = 0 or, equivalently, A˜(〈γ, µ〉)µ = 0, (6.29)
and a˜k,k(〈γ, µ〉) > 0 for k ≤ K− 1, a˜K,K(〈γ, µ〉) = 0. By the definition of the functions hk’s
and that of h˜k’s in Lemma 6.17, this is equivalent to
hk(〈γ, µ〉) = h˜k(〈γ, µ〉)
{
> 0, if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
= 0, if k = K.
Corollary 6.18 implies that the only number on [ 0, γK ] which meets the above conditions
is piK , the one given in Lemma 6.17. Therefore, 〈γ, µ〉 = piK . According to (6.29), µ is a
solution in ∆K−1 to the following system of equations:{
A˜(piK)x = 0,
〈γ, x〉 = piK .
(6.30)
Let us define a vector ν ∈ ∆K−1 and show that it is the unique solution in ∆K−1 to
(6.30).
Denote ρK = 1. For k ≤ K − 1, denote qk = − ak,k+1a˜k,k(piK) , ρk = qkρk+1. The vector
ν = (ν1, . . . , νK) ∈ ∆K−1 is defined by
µk =
{(∑K
l=1 ρ
l
)−1
, if k = K,
µKρk, if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1.
Indeed, it is not difficult to verify that ν is a solution to A˜(piK)x = 0 or, equivalently, to
A(piK)x = 0. In other words,
a1,1(piK)µ1 + a1,2µ2 = 0,
ak,k−1µk−1 + ak,k(piK)µk + ak,k+1µk+1 = 0, 2 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
aK,K−1µK−1 + aK,K(piK)µK = 0.
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By taking the sum of the above K equations and replacing ak,k(piK) by their definitions
in (6.21), one obtains piK = 〈γ, µ〉.
Besides, the fact that a˜k,k(piK) > 0 for k ≤ K − 1 and a˜K,K(piK) = 0 implies that the
rank of the upper bidiagonal matrix A˜(piK) is K−1. Therefore, the dimension of its solution
space is 1. As a result, ν is the only solution to (6.30) in ∆K−1.
Finally, one has the following estimation of the average growth rate at the unique sta-
tionary state of the society.
Corollary 6.20. Suppose that A6.16 holds, and µ = (µ1, . . . , µK) ∈ ∆K−1 is the unique
fixed point of F˜ . Then, max1≤k≤K(1− k)αk γk < 〈γ, µ〉 < p¯i.
Proof. It follows immediately from Proposition 6.14, Lemma 6.17 and Theorem 6.19.
6.4 Qualitative analysis and extensions
6.4.1 Critical points in the parameters
In the initial model without mutation, it is shown that the limit point of a trajectory
is determined by the parameters α and γ as well as the initial state. The highest type L
in the support of the limit state is such that αLγL is the largest among all the αkγk’s for
k in the support {1, . . . , L0} of initial state. In other words, when the initial state is fixed,
the support of the limit state is uniquely determined by α and γ. If α and γ evolve in a
continuous way (while keeping the increasing or decreasing order of their elements), there
are critical points of α and γ where the support of the limit state changes abruptly.
To cite a simple example, let us consider the case where K = 2. Theorems 6.11 and 6.12
entail the following result.
Corollary 6.21. Suppose that {µn}n∈N is a trajectory in the dynamical system (6.2) with
K = 2. If the initial state µ0 is such that µ20 > 0, then
(i) if α2 < γ1/γ2, {µn}n∈N converges to (1, 0);
(ii) if α2 > γ1/γ2, {µn}n∈N converges to
( (1−α2) γ2
γ2−γ1 ,
γ2 α2−γ1
γ2−γ1
)
.
This corollary shows that, when γ1 and γ2 are fixed, γ1/γ2 is a critical point for α2. At
this point, the support of the limit changes.
6.4.2 Towards a model with continuous types
Extended model
One can consider a more general model where an individual in population k may leave
it to join any population with a type smaller than k, instead of only population k − 1.
Formally, αk is the staying rate of type k for k ∈ K, and 1 = α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αK . At
every instant n, in population k, a proportion αk of the individuals stay as type k at the
next instant n+ 1 and the rest 1− αk of them change their types. Among those who leave,
a strictly positive proportion φkl join population l, for all type l ≤ k − 1, and
∑k−1
l=1 φ
k
l = 1.
The other notations remain unchanged.
By the same arguments as before, one can show that the discrete dynamical system on
the distribution of the types in the society is
µn+1 = G(µn), (6.31)
6.5. Appendix 165
where G is a mapping from ∆K−1 to ∆K−1 defined by
Gk(µ) =

µk
αk γk
〈γ, µ〉 +
K∑
l=k+1
µl
(1− αl)φlk γl
〈γ, µ〉 if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
µK
αK γK
〈γ, µ〉 if k = K.
(6.32)
A fixed point µ = (µk)k∈K of G or, equivalently, a stationary state of the generalized
model satisfies
µk
( 〈γ, µ〉 − αk γk ) = K∑
l=k+1
µl (1− αl)φlk γl, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1 (6.33a)
µK
( 〈γ, µ〉 − αK γK ) = 0. (6.33b)
The existence of fixed points and the convergence of the dynamical system to a fixed
point in this generalized model are analog to those of the original one. They are given here
without proof.
Theorem 6.22. Suppose that 1 ≤ L ≤ K and αk γk < αL γL for all k ≤ L− 1. Let µ be a
vector in ∆K−1 such that µk = µL ρk for all k ≤ L− 1 and µk = 0 for all k ≥ L+ 1, where
ρL = 1 and, for all k ≤ L− 1, ρk = ∑Ll=k+1 ρlqlk, qlk = αlk γlαL γL−αk γk .
Then, µ is a fixed point of G with support {1, 2, . . . , L}, and it is the only rest point with
this support.
Theorem 6.23. In the dynamical system (6.31), suppose that 1 ≤ L0 ≤ K. If there is a
type L such that L ≤ L0 and
αk γk < αL γL, 1 ≤ k ≤ L0, k 6= L, (6.34)
then a trajectory {µn}n∈N with initial state (µk0)k∈K such that µL00 > 0 and µk0 = 0 for
k ≥ L0 + 1 converges to a fixed point µ of G with support {1, 2, . . . , L}.
The model with mutations can be equally extended to the case where a mutate individual
in population k may join any population instead of the population k + 1 only.
Continuous types
The above extensions of the discrete model might be the first step towards an extension
to a model with continuous types. Explicitly, by discretizing a closed interval of types [0, 1] as
well as the reproduction rate function β, the staying rate function α, transition rate functions
φ and the mutation rate function  on it, one might get a continuous-type dynamical system
as the limit of a sequence of discrete-type dynamical systems.
6.5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6.12. Without loss of generality, let {1, 2, . . . , L0} be the support of the
initial state µ0 ∈ ∆K−1 (see Remark 6.2). Let µ ∈ ∆K−1 be the fixed point of F with
support {1, 2, . . . , L}, where L is given by (6.12) and L ≤ L0. Then, µLn > 0 for all n ∈ N∗.
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For all type k ≤ L0 and k 6= L, denote θk = αk γkαL γL and ρkn = µkn/µLn for n ∈ N∗. Notice
that θk < 1.
The rest of the proof is made up of two parts.
1) This part proves that, if L < L0, then ρkn → 0 for all k ∈ {L+ 1, . . . , L0}.
1.1) For L0,
ρL0n =
µL0n
µLn
=
µL0n−1 α
L0 γL0
µLn−1 αL γL + µL+1n−1 (1− αL+1) γL+1
≤ ρ
L0
n−1 α
L0 γL0
αL γL
= ρL0n−1 θL0 ≤ ρL00 (θL0)n.
Therefore, ρL0n → 0 as n→ +∞ because θL0 < 1.
1.2) Suppose that, for type k ∈ {L + 1, . . . , L0}, ρkn → 0 as n → +∞. Then, for all  > 0,
there exists N ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ N , ρkn <  · α
L γL
(1−αk) γk · 1−θ
k−1
2 . Consequently, for all
n > N ,
ρk−1n =
µk−1n
µLn
=
µk−1n−1 α
k−1 γk−1 + µkn−1 (1− αk) γk
µLn−1 αL γL + µL+1n−1 (1− αL+1) γL+1
≤ ρ
k−1
n−1 α
k−1 γk−1 + ρkn−1 (1− αk) γk
αL γL
= ρk−1n−1 θk−1 + ρkn−1
(1− αk) γk
αL γL
< ρk−1n−1 θ
k−1 + 2 (1− θ
k−1)
< ρk−1N (θ
k−1)n−N + 2 (1− θ
k−1)
(
1 + θk−1 + · · ·+ (θk−1)n−N−1)
< ρk−1N (θ
k−1)n−N + 2 .
There exists N ′ > N such that ρk−1N (θk−1)n−N < 2 for all n ≥ N ′ because θk−1 < 1.
Thus, ρk−1n < . This implies that ρk−1n → 0 as n→ +∞.
It follows from the fact that 0 < µLn ≤ 1 and ρkn = µkn/µLn → 0 that µkn → 0 as n→ +∞.
By induction, this is the case for all k ∈ {L+ 1, . . . , L0}.
2) This part proves that ρkn → ρk for all type k < L, where ρk’s are defined by (6.10a).
2.1) Take a strictly positive constant  such that 0 < 11−θL−1 − α
L γL
(1−αL) γL <
1
1−θL−1 . Consider
a function f(x) = (1−x)
2
1−θL−1(1−x) defined for x ≥ 0. Clearly, f is decreasing close to x = 0 and
f(0) = 11−θL−1 . Therefore, there exists 0 > 0 such that
f(0) >
1
1− θL−1 − 
αL γL
(1− αL) γL . (6.35)
Because ρL+1n → 0, there exists N0 ∈ N such that, for all n ≥ N0,[
1 + ρL+1n−1
αL+1 γL+1
(1− αL) γL
]−1
> 1− 0. (6.36)
Furthermore, because θL−1 < 1, there exists N1 > N0 such that, for all n ≥ N1,
ρL−1N0 (θ
L−1)n−N0 < , (6.37)[
θL−1(1− 0)
]n−N0 < 0. (6.38)
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Thus, for all n ≥ N1,
ρL−1n =
µL−1n
µLn
=
µL−1n−1 α
L−1 γL−1 + µLn−1 (1− αL) γL
µLn−1 αL γL + µL+1n−1 (1− αL+1) γL+1
=
ρL−1n−1 α
L−1 γL−1 + (1− αL) γL
αL γL + ρL+1n−1 (1− αL+1) γL+1
=
[
ρL−1n−1 θ
L−1 + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
]
·
[
1 + ρL+1n−1
(1− αL+1) γL+1
αL γL
]−1
(6.39)
On the one hand, (6.39) implies that
ρL−1n < ρ
L−1
n−1 θ
L−1 + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
< ρL−1n−2 (θL−1)2 +
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
(1 + θL−1)
< ρL−1N0 (θ
L−1)n−N0 + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
(
1 + θL−1 + · · ·+ (θL−1)n−N0−1)
= ρL−1N0 (θ
L−1)n−N0 + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
1− (θL−1)n−N0
1− θL−1
< + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
1
1− θL−1 = + ρ
L−1,
where the last inequality is due to (6.37). Hence,
ρL−1n < + ρL−1, n ≥ N1. (6.40)
On the other hand, it follows from (6.39) and (6.36) that
ρL−1n >
[
ρL−1n−1 θ
L−1 + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
]
(1− 0), n ≥ N1,
which implies that, for n ≥ N1,
ρL−1n
1− 0 >
ρL−1n−1
1− 0 θ
L−1(1− 0) + (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
>
ρL−1N0
1− 0
[
θL−1(1− 0)
]n−N0
+ (1− α
L) γL
αL γL
(
1 + θL−1(1− 0) + · · ·+
[
θL−1(1− 0)
]n−N0−1)
>
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
1− [θL−1(1− 0)]n−N0
1− θL−1(1− 0) >
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
1− 0
1− θL−1(1− 0) ,
where the last inequality is due to (6.38).
Consequently, for n ≥ N1,
ρL−1n >
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
(1− 0)2
1− θL−1(1− 0) =
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
f(0)
>
(1− αL) γL
αL γL
[
1
1− θL−1 − 
αL γL
(1− αL) γL
]
= ρL−1 − ,
where the second inequality is due to (6.35).
Combining this result with (6.40), one deduces that ρL−1n → ρL−1 as n→ +∞.
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2.2) Assume that, for some k < L, ρkn → ρk. As before, take  > 0 small enough so that
0 < 11−θk−1 −  α
L γL
ρk (1−αk) γk <
1
1−θk−1 . Consider a function g(x) =
(1−x)2
1−θk−1(1−x) . As before,
there exists 1 > 0 such that
g(1) >
1
1− θk−1 −

2
αL γL
ρk (1− αk) γk .
It is not difficult to see that, for all y such that
0 ≤ y < α
L γL
2ρk (1−αk) γk
1−θk−1 −  αL γL
,
one has [
1
1− θk−1 −

2
αL γL
ρk (1− αk) γk
]
(1− y) > 11− θk−1 − 
αL γL
ρk (1− αk) γk .
Let 2 be a constant such that
0 < 2 < min
{

2
αL γL
(1− αk) γk (1− θ
k−1), ρk  α
L γL
2(1−αL) γL
1−θk−1 −  αL γL
}
.
On account of the fact that ρL+1n → 0 and ρkn → ρk, there exists N2 ∈ N such that∣∣ρkn − ρk∣∣ < 2 and ρL+1n < 11−1 αL γL(1−αL+1) γL+1 for all n ≥ N2, and thus[
1 + ρL+1n
(1− αL+1) γL+1
αL γL
]−1
> 1− 1.
The rest of the proof follows exactly the same lines as above to prove that ρk−1n → ρk−1.
2.3) On has already shown that, for k ∈ {L+1, . . . , L0}, ρkn → 0, and, for k ∈ {1, . . . L−1},
ρkn → ρk. Therefore, µLn → 1/S and, consequently, µkn → ρk/S for all k ≤ L − 1, where
S , 1 +∑L−1k=1 ρk. By the definition of ρk’s and Proposition 6.9, this limit of the trajectory
is precisely µ, the rest point of the dynamical system with support {1, . . . , L}.
Chapter 7
Replicator dynamics in game
theory
This chapter is based on the paper Replicator dynamics in game theory in collaboration
with Mario Bravo and Sylvain Sorin.
Abstract. This work focuses on the replicator dynamics: its origin, deduction, form, prop-
erties, interpretation and applications in different contexts in game theory. Three main
frameworks are treated: nonatomic population games with/without self-interaction within
each population, N -player finite games and N -player splittable games with finitely many
choices.
7.1 Introduction
Let S be a finite set of alternatives. The replicator dynamics describes the evolution of a
vector (xs)s∈S in the simplex ∆(S) = {x = (xs)s∈S ∈ R|S| |xs ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S, ∑s∈S xs =
1}. In the following different contexts in game theory, (xs)s∈S has different interpretations
and the replicator dynamics has different properties.
1) A population of nonatomic players (or, equivalently, individuals) is represented by the
unit interval [0, 1], endowed with the Lebesgue measure (Schmeidler [82]). Each individual
corresponds to a point in the interval, thus has weight zero. She chooses an action (or has
a type) from a finite set S. The proportion of the individuals associated to s ∈ S is xs. The
payoff (or fitness) of an action (or type) depends on the composition of the entire population
x = (xs)s∈S (Maynard Smith [55]). This corresponds to the self-interaction case. This model
can be extended to N -population games. Each individual in population i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N}
selects an action (or has a type) from a finite set Si. Her payoff (or fitness) depends, in
addition, on the composition of each population, i.e. on the vector x = (xi)i∈N , where
xi = (xis)s∈Si ∈ ∆(Si).
2) In a model of two populations of nonatomic players, x and y stand for the composi-
tions of the two populations. The payoff (or fitness) to an action (or a type) within a
population is a function of the composition of the other population. This is the case with
external-interaction. A typical example corresponds to the random matching between the
two populations (Taylor [89]). This model can also be extended to multi-population case.
From now on, population always means “non atomic" population.
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3) In an N -player game (N ≥ 2) with finitely many actions, S is the action set of one of the
players, and x = (xs)s∈S describes her mixed action. Explicitly, xs is the probability with
which she plays the action s ∈ S. Her payoff for playing s depends on the strategies of the
others but not on the probabilities with which she plays other actions, i.e. not on x. This
model is thus with external-interaction. It will also be studied in a more general setting,
leading to the so-called unilateral replicator dynamics.
4) In an N -player splittable game (N ≥ 1), each player splits a stock in several parts and
distributes each part on some facility s from the finite set S. A player’s action is specified
by a vector x = (xs)s∈S , where xs is the proportion of her stock allocated to the facility s.
The payoff to her stock on the facility s depends on the stocks sent there by all the players
and, in particular, on xs. Hence, this framework allows for self-interaction.
In the sequel, these four contexts will be presented one after the other.
7.2 Nonatomic population games with self-interaction
7.2.1 One-population case
First, let us recall the basic one-population game where the players are playing the field
(Maynard Smith [55, 57]).
Each individual from the interval [0, 1] chooses an action s from a finite set S. The
proportion of the individuals choosing strategy s is denoted by xs. The vector x = (xs)s∈S
is called the state of the population. The payoff function is F = (F s)s∈S : ∆(S) → R|S|, so
that the payoff to s at state x is F s(x). Let this one-population game be denoted by G(S, F ).
Definition 7.1. A Wardrop equilibrium of the game G(S, F ) is a state x ∈ ∆(S) such that
∀s ∈ S, xs > 0 ⇒ F s(x) ≥ F t(x), ∀ t ∈ S. (7.1)
The notion of Wardrop equilibrium is widely used in traffic analysis and congestion games
since the seminal work of Wardrop [94].
The following proposition shows that a Wardrop equilibrium can be characterized as a
solution of a variational inequality problem.
Proposition 7.2. In a one-population game G(S, F ), x ∈ ∆(S) is a Wardrop equilibrium if
and only if 〈
y, F (x)
〉 ≤ 〈x, F (x) 〉, ∀y ∈ ∆(S). (7.2)
Here, 〈·, ·〉 denotes the standard inner product in a Euclidean space.
When F is linear, i.e. F (x) = Ax with A ∈ R|S|×|S|, the following pairwise random
matching game model is used to interpret the payoff function in this one-population linear
game denoted by G(S,A).
Consider an auxiliary two-player symmetric matrix game where S is the finite set of ac-
tions for both players, and the payoff matrix is A = (Asr)s,r∈S . In other words, when the line
player plays strategy s and the column player plays strategy r, the former’s payoff is Asr and
the latter’s payoff is Ars. Suppose that the individuals in the population are simultaneously
matched, two by two, to play game A. As xr is the proportion of the individuals choosing
strategy r, the average payoff to strategy s is ∑r∈S Asrxr = esAx since the population is
large and the matching is random. Here, es denotes the s-th unit vector.
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Definition 7.3. A strategy x ∈ ∆(S) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric
matrix game A = (Asr)s,r∈S if
yAx ≤ xAx, ∀y ∈ ∆(S).
The following fact links Definition 7.1 and Definition 7.3.
Proposition 7.4. In a one-population linear game G(S,A), x ∈ ∆(S) is a Wardrop equi-
librium if, and only if, it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the symmetric matrix game
A.
Now, let us consider the evolution of the state of the population at time t, i.e. xt.
The one-population replicator dynamics is defined by the following differential equation:
x˙st = xst [F s(xt)− 〈xt, F (xt) 〉 ], ∀ s ∈ S. (7.3)
When F is linear, the replicator dynamics (7.3) takes its classical form (Taylor and Jonker
[90]):
x˙st = xst [ esAxt − xtAxt ], ∀ s ∈ S. (7.4)
The first interpretation of the replicator dynamics is a pure evolutionary biological one
as in Taylor and Jonker’s seminal paper [90]. This paper first introduced the replicator
dynamics into game theoretical models of population evolution. The total size of the subset of
individuals of type s is ξs, thus the frequency of type s in the population is xs = ξs/∑r∈S ξr.
Assume that the average growth rate of ξst is F s(xt), the average fitness of type s, i.e.
ξ˙st = ξstF s(xt). A simple computation shows that xt is governed by (7.3). In other words,
the logarithmic time derivative of xs, i.e. x˙s/xs, is the difference between the average fitness
F s(xt) of type s and the population’s average fitness 〈xt, F (xt) 〉.
7.2.2 Stationary configurations and ESS
A rest point of (7.3) is an equalizer of the fitness of the types present in the population.
Let it be called a stationary state. It satisfies:
F s(x) = constant, for all s ∈ S such that xs > 0. (7.5)
Proposition 7.5. In a one-population game, a Wardrop equilibrium is a rest point of the
replicator dynamics (7.3), while an interior rest point is a Wardrop equilibrium.
For the sake of completeness, let us recall some notions concerning the stability of dy-
namical systems.
Definition 7.6. In the dynamical system z˙t = g(zt),
(i) z is Lyapunov stable if for every neighborhood U of z, there exists a neighborhood V of
z such that, if z0 ∈ V, then zt ∈ U for all t > 0;
(ii) z is attracting if there exists a neighborhood V of z such that, if z0 ∈ V, then zt → z
as t→ +∞;
(iii) z is asymptotically stable if it is Lyapunov stable and attracting. If, furthermore, V is
the entire space, then z is globally asymptotically stable.
Besides, a function V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics if it is decreasing along
trajectories. More precisely, denote Wt = V (zt). If W˙t = 〈∇V (zt), g(zt)〉 ≤ 0, then V is a
Lyapunov function.
172 Chapter 7. Replicator dynamics in game theory
The following results are often referred to as folk theorems in evolutionary game theory.
For proofs and more details, see [14, 43, 44, 64, 95].
Theorem 7.7. Suppose that G(S,A) is a one-population linear game, where A is its auxiliary
two-player symmetric matrix game. Then, the following hold.
1. A strict symmetric Nash equilibrium of A is an asymptotically stable rest point of the
replicator dynamics (7.4) in G(S,A).
2. If a stationary state x in G(S,A) is the limit of an interior orbit, i.e. an orbit xt in
int ∆, for the replicator dynamics (7.4), then x is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of A.
3. If a stationary state x is a stable rest point in the replicator dynamics (7.4) in G(S,A),
then it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of A.
Theorem 7.7 can be extended to the case where payoff functions F are not linear. The
reader is referred to Hofbauer and Sigmund [44, Section 3.1] for more references.
ESS Another important notion in one-population linear games is that of evolutionarily
stable strategies (Maynard Smith and Price [58], Maynard Smith [57]).
Definition 7.8. In a one-population linear game G(S,A), x ∈ ∆ is an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS for short) if, for all y ∈ ∆, either yAx ≤ xAx, or yAx = xAx and xAy < yAy.
The fundamental relationship between ESS and the replicator dynamics is given by the
following theorem.
Theorem 7.9. If x ∈ ∆ is an ESS in one-population linear game G(S,A), then it is an
asymptotically stable rest point of the replicator dynamics (7.4).
If x ∈ int ∆ is an ESS, then it is a globally asymptotically stable rest point for (7.4).
As a matter of fact, Theorem 7.9 is a consequence of the following proposition (cf.
Hofbauer et al. [41]).
Proposition 7.10. In a one-population linear game G(S,A), x ∈ ∆(S) is an ESS if and
only if V (z) = ∏s∈S(zs)xs is locally a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics (7.3).
The notion of ESS extends to the case where F is nonlinear. The main idea is to linearize
payoff functions at a neighborhood of an ESS. The reader is again referred to Hofbauer and
Sigmund [44, Section 2.6 and Section 3.1] for a concise review.
7.2.3 Extension to the N-population case (N ≥ 2)
For a population i ∈ N = {1, . . . , N}, Si is its finite set of actions and ∆(Si) is its
state space. Let us denote S = ∏i Si and X = ∏j ∆(Si). In an N -population game with
self-interaction [26, 83, 89], the payoff for a population i ∈ N is defined through a function
F i : X → R|Si|. In other words, F is(x) is the payoff to an individual in population i who
chooses s ∈ Si, when the state of all the populations is x = (xj)j∈N , where xj ∈ ∆(Sj).
The following is a straightforward extension of the one-population model.
A population’ state x is a Wardrop equilibrium if
∀i ∈ N , ∀s ∈ Si, xis > 0 ⇒ F is(x) ≥ F it(x), ∀ t ∈ Si.
The N -population replicator dynamics on X is given by
x˙ist = xist [F is(xt)− 〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 ], ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.6)
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7.2.4 Application: nonatomic network congestion games
One-population case
An important class of population games with nonlinear payoffs is that of congestion
games and, in particular, those taking place in a network, called network congestion games
or routing games. As an example, let us consider a one-population routing game G(S, c)
where the common origin O and the common destination D of all the players are linked by
a finite set S of parallel arcs.
A population (of nonatomic individuals of total weight 1) travels from O to D by the
arcs in S. A choice of a player is an arc s ∈ S. The proportion of players choosing arc s,
xs, is also the total weight on it. The common cost to all individuals choosing s, when the
population state is x = (xs)s∈S , is given by cs(xs). This means that the cost of any arc s
depends only on the total weight on s, but not on the congestion on the other arcs. Assume
that cs, the per-unit cost function of arc s, is defined on a neighborhood of [0, 1], and it is
continuous, nonnegative and non-decreasing. In general, the function c(x) = (cs(xs))s∈S is
not linear in x. This game is a playing-the-field population game.
The game described above turns out to be a population potential game (cf. §7.8.2), since
the the gradient of the function
f(x) =
∑
s∈S
∫ xs
0
cs(y) dy (7.7)
is equal to c(x). This function was first proposed by Beckman et al. [9] to prove the existence
of a Wardrop equilibrium, which is a minimum of f on ∆(S).
The function f is also a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics (7.3), by replacing
F by −c.
For a proof of the following result, see, for instance, Sandholm [81].
Theorem 7.11. For the replicator dynamics in G(S, c), the limit set of xt ∈ ∆(S) is a
closed, connected set of stationary states for any initial condition. If z ∈ int ∆(S) is a limit
point of xt, then it is a Wardrop equilibrium.
In fact, this result holds for a general population potential game (see §7.8.2 for references).
N-population case (N ≥ 2)
In an N -population network congestion game, the individuals of different populations
may have different origin/destination pairs, and different cost functions for the same arc.
Consider an N -population congestion game Gn(N , (mi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ) (the subscript n for
nonatomic) taking place in the same network as in §7.2.4. Population i ∈ N has weight
mi. Suppose that a proportion xis of the individuals in population i choose arc s ∈ S, and
xi = (xis)s∈S ∈ ∆(S) is the population i’s state. Denote X = ∆(S)N and M = ∑i∈N mi.
At a state x ∈ X, the per-unit cost of arc s to the individuals in population i is
cis(∑j∈N mjxjs), where cis is of class C1, nonnegative and defined on a neighborhood of
[0,M ]. Thus, ci(x) = (cis(∑j∈N mjxis))s∈S .
In this case, x ∈ X is a Wardrop equilibrium if
∀ i ∈ N , ∀ s ∈ S, xis > 0 ⇒ cis(x) ≤ cir(x), ∀ r ∈ S, (7.8)
and the equation of the replicator dynamics on the populations’ state xt is
x˙ist = xist [ 〈xit, ci(xt) 〉 − cis(xt) ], ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.9)
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7.3 N-population games with external-interaction (N ≥ 2)
In an N -population game with the same notations as in §7.2.3, let the state of all the
populations except i be denoted by x−i ∈ ∏j 6=i ∆(Sj). If the payoff to an action s used in
population i depends only on x−i but not on the population i’s state xi, the game is with
external-interaction.
7.3.1 Two-population case
From the biological evolutionary point of view, an individual of type s from population
1 has fitness Asr facing an individual of type r from population 2, while the latter has
fitness Bsr facing the former. The fitnesses Asr and Bsr are determined by two matrices
A,B ∈ R|S1|×|S2|. The average fitness of type s in population 1 is a linear function of the
state x2 of population 2, i.e. F 1s(x2) = esAx2. Similarly, F 2r(x1) = x1Ber. Let this
two-population linear game be denoted by G(S1, S2, A,B).
Notice that the process of random matching between two populations here differs from
the process of random matching within one population mentioned in §7.2.1.
The relation between Wardrop equilibria of the two-population game G(S1, S2, A,B) and
its auxiliary two-player bimatrix game denoted by (A,B) is similar to the one-population
case.
Proposition 7.12. In a two-population linear game G(S1, S2, A,B), (x,y) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2)
is a Wardrop equilibrium if, and only if, it is a mixed Nash equilibrium in the auxiliary two-
player bimatrix game (A,B).
The replicator dynamics in the two-population game G(S1, S2, A,B) is:{
x˙1st = x1st
[
esAx2t − x1tAx2t
]
, ∀ s ∈ S1,
x˙2rt = x2rt
[
x1tBer − x1tBx2t
]
, ∀ r ∈ S2. (7.10)
The link between the rest points of the dynamics (7.10) and the Wardrop equilibria of
G(S1, S2, A,B) or, equivalently, the Nash equilibria of its auxiliary bimatrix game (A,B)
goes exactly as in the one-population case (cf. Hofbauer [38, 39]). Furthermore, an analog
of Theorem 7.7 exists in this setting (see Chapter 3 in Cressman[25] for details).
In the case where S1 = S2 = S and A = B, by comparing (7.4) and (7.10), it is clear that,
if x is a Wardrop equilibrium of the one-population game G(S,A), then (x,x) is a Wardrop
equilibrium of the two-population game G(S, S,A,A). However, G(S, S,A,A) can also have
equilibria that do not lie on the diagonal set D = {(z, z) | z ∈ ∆(S)} ⊆ ∆(S) × ∆(S) or,
equivalently, the bimatrix game (A,A) may have nonsymmetric mixed Nash equilibria. An
example is the 2× 2 complementarity-type game in Table 7.1.
s t
s (0, 0) (1, 1)
t (1, 1) (0, 0)
Table 7.1: Complementarity-type game
Observe that the strategy profile x1 = (0, 1),x2 = (1, 0) and the strategy profile x1 =
(1, 0),x2 = (0, 1) are nonsymmetric equilibria, while the strategy profile x1 = (1/2, 1/2),x2 =
(1/2, 1/2) is a symmetric equilibrium.
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In general, the two replicator dynamics (7.4) and (7.10) can have very different asymptotic
and stability properties. For instance, equation (7.10) is volume-preserving (Hofbauer [38])
and, consequently, it cannot have an interior asymptotically stable point, while interior ESS
are globally stable for (7.4) (Hofbauer and Sigmund [44]).
7.3.2 N-population case (N ≥ 2)
For the general case where N ≥ 2, the replicator dynamics is
x˙ist = xist
[
F is(x−it )− 〈xit , F i(x−it ) 〉
]
, ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ s ∈ Si. (7.11)
This extension was first studied by Ritzberger [72] and Ritzberger and Weibull [73].
Besides, from a mathematical point of view, the case N = 2 and the case N ≥ 3 can
show quite different dynamical behavior. The reader is referred to Plank [70] for explicit
examples.
7.4 Unilateral version and N-player finite games
7.4.1 Unilateral replicator dynamics
The unilateral version of the replicator dynamics can be stated in the following way. Let
S be a finite set, and (Ut)t≥0 a bounded measurable process from R+ to R|S|. The unilateral
(or U -based) replicator dynamics (Hofbauer et al. [45]) is given by:
x˙st = xst
[
U st − 〈xt , Ut 〉
]
, ∀ s ∈ S. (7.12)
Proposition 7.13 ([45]). Let Vt =
∫ t
0 Usds. Then, the process xt = (xst )s∈S ∈ ∆(S), defined
by
xst =
exp(V st )∑
r∈S
exp(V rt )
, ∀ s ∈ S, (7.13)
follows the unilateral replicator dynamics (7.12).
A biological interpretation. From a biological point of view, (7.12) can be interpreted in
the same vein as before for the evolution of a type in its environment. At time t ≥ 0, type
s ∈ S has a fitness U st coming from an interaction with a changing environment.
Learning and game theoretical interpretation. Equation (7.12) also appears in the
framework of a learning procedure (Sorin [87], Hofbauer et al. [45]). Assume that an agent
is facing an unknown process (Ut)t≥0. Her finite action set is S. At time t ≥ 0, she selects
an action st ∈ S based on the past history {Uτ , τ ≤ t}. Then, she is informed of the whole
vector of payoffs Ut = (U st )s∈S ∈ R|S|, where U st is the payoff to the action s if it had been
played. The outcome is U stt .
7.4.2 N-player finite game
Let us consider an N -player finite game Γ
(N , (Si)i∈N , (Gi)i∈N ) where the set of players
is N = {1, . . . , N}, the finite pure-strategy set of player i is Si, and her payoff function
is Gi : S → R, where S = Πj∈NSj . By a usual abuse of notation, Gi is also used for
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her expected payoff when the players use mixed strategies, i.e. Gi(xi,x−i) = Ex(Gi) with
xi ∈ ∆(Si) and x−i ∈ ∏j 6=i ∆(Sj). Explicitly
Gi(xi,x−i) =
∑
s=(sl)l∈N∈S
(∏
j
xjs
j )
Gi(s).
Then, by setting U it = Gi(·,x−i) for all i ∈ N , Proposition 7.13 leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.14. In the N -player finite game Γ
(N , (Si)i∈N , (Gi)i∈N ) repeated in con-
tinuous time, if every player adopts the strategy (7.13), then the evolution of their mixed
strategies is described by the replicator dynamics
x˙ist = xist
[
Gi(s,x−it )−Gi(xi,x−i)
]
, ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.14)
Remark 7.15. This dynamics is exactly the same as the one in the N -population linear
games with external-interaction (7.11), with F is(x−i) = Gi(s,x−i).
7.4.3 Application to congestion games
Let us take a finite congestion game as an example. The game takes place in the same
network as in §7.2.4. There are N players, each of whom has weight 1. Each player has to
go from O to D by one of the arcs in S, i.e. S is their common set of pure strategies. This
game belongs to the class of Rosenthal congestion games [74], which is a subclass of atomic
unsplittable congestion games, where the players cannot split their weight on several paths.
This is by opposition to the atomic splittable congestion games which will be discussed in
§7.5. The cost function ls of arc s is an increasing function defined on N ∩ [0, N ] so that
ls(u) is the common cost of arc s to all the u players on it.
When the action profile is s = (si)i∈N , the cost to player i is defined by ci(s) = lk(uk(s)),
where k = si, and uk(s) = #{j ∈ N | sj = k} is the number of players on k when the pure
strategy profile is s. As above, when the players use mixed strategies (xi)i∈N , the expected
cost to player i is denoted by ci(xi,x−i). Denote F is(x−i) = −ci(s,x−i).
Proposition 7.14 shows that, if the above congestion game is repeated in continuous time,
and if all the N players use (7.13) to determine their mixed strategies at every moment, then
the profile of strategies x = (xi)i∈N follows the replicator dynamics (7.14).
Besides, a Lyapunov function is given by
Λ(x) = E
[∑
s∈S
Zs∑
u=1
ls(u)
]
, (7.15)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variables Zs = ∑i∈N Xis with
Xis being independent Bernoulli variables such that P(Xis = 1) = xis, for all s ∈ S. This
function was found by Cominetti et al. [21] in a different context.
7.5 N-player splittable games
In §7.2.3, the replicator dynamics (7.6) is presented in the framework of a N -population
game with self-interaction. This section will show that the same equation appears in a class
of N -player games where the strategy space of each player is a simplex in a Euclidean space.
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Here, let us take a specific class called atomic splittable congestion games as an example.
Consider the same network as in §7.2.4, i.e. vertex O and vertex D being connected by a
finite set S of parallel arcs. Suppose that player i ∈ N holds a stock of strictly positive
weight mi that she has to send from O to D. To this end, she can divide the stock into |S|
parts of arbitrary positive weight provided that their sum is mi, and then send each part
through one of the arcs. Hence, each player has a continuum of pure strategies. Indeed, for
each player i ∈ N , the set ∆(S) is her action set: xi = (xis)s∈S ∈ ∆(S) means sending a
fraction xis of her stock by arc s. The space of pure strategy profiles is thus X = ∆(S)N .
Denote M = ∑i∈N mi. Let this game be denoted by Ga(N , (mi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ) (the subscript
a for atomic).
Similar to the N -population nonatomic routing game, given a profile of strategies x =
(xi)i∈N ∈ X, the per-unit cost of arc s to player i is cis(∑i∈N mixis) with the same hypothe-
ses on the functions cis’s as in §7.2.4. Furthermore, for all i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, cis is assumed
to be convex. The cost to player i is
vi(x) =
∑
s∈S
mixis cis
(∑
j∈N
mjxjs
)
.
Definition 7.16. In an atomic splittable congestion game Ga
(N , (mi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ), the
marginal cost function of arc s ∈ S to player i ∈ N is defined on a neighborhood of ∆
by
c˜is(x) = cis
(∑
j∈N
mjxjs
)
+mixis (cis)′
(∑
j∈N
mjxjs
)
The following result can be found in Haurie and Marcotte [36] or Harker [32]. It states
that Nash equilibria are characterized by the solutions of a variational inequality problem.
Proposition 7.17. In Ga
(N , (mi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ), a profile of strategies x is a (pure) Nash
equilibrium if, and only if,
∀ i ∈ N , ∀ s ∈ S, xis > 0, ⇒ c˜is(x) ≤ c˜ir(x), ∀ r ∈ S. (7.16)
By comparing the above condition and the characterization of Wardrop equilibria (7.8) in
N -population routing games, one observes that the two conditions are the same, except that
the arc costs in (7.8) are replaced by the marginal costs in (7.16). The similarity between
(7.8) and (7.16) gives rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 7.18. A repartition x ∈ X is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game Ga
(N ,
(mi)i∈N , (ci)i∈N
)
if, and only if, it is a Wardrop equilibrium of the game Gn
(N , (mi)i∈N ,
(c˜i)i∈N
)
.
Remark 7.19. Although the two equilibria are described by the same vector x ∈ X, the
interpretations of x = (xi)i∈N are different:
In the population game, each individual holds independently a stock of infinitesimal
weight. Thus, xi is the repartition of these independent individuals (or, equivalently, the
total stocks that they hold) in population i on different arcs.
In the atomic splittable game, an atomic player holds a stock of finite weight. Hence, xi
is the repartition of player i’s stock on different arcs, i.e. it is her pure strategy.
The interpretation is also different from the N -player routing game in §7.4.3, where
xi = (xis)s∈S is a mixed strategy of player i, with xis being the probability with which she
selects s.
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According to Proposition 7.18, one can write the following replicator dynamics for the
atomic congestion game with splittable stocks:
x˙ist = xist [ 〈xit, c˜i(xt) 〉 − c˜is(xt) ], ∀ s ∈ S, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.17)
One cannot expect to find a Lyapunov function for (7.17). Indeed, a potential function
like (7.7) exists if, and only if, the Jacobian matrix of c˜ is symmetric. This condition is hard
to verify in general, except in some specific cases.
For example, if the per-unit cost functions of the arcs are affine and common to all the
players, i.e. cis = asx + bs for all i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, then a Lyapunov function exists (cf.
Altman et al. [4]).
Remark 7.20. One can introduce a more general class of N -player games, where the pure-
strategy space of player i is ∆(Si) with Si a finite set. The payoff function of player i is
defined as T i(x) = ∑s∈Si xisF is(x), where x = (xj)Nj=1 is the strategy profile, xj = (xjs)s∈Sj
is player j’s strategy, and F is is a real-valued continuously differentiable function defined a
neighborhood of ∏Nj=1 ∆(Sj). Then, Propositions 7.17 and 7.18 still hold if one replaces c˜is
by ∂T
i(x)
∂xis
.
7.6 Extension: composite games
Consider a game played by N atomic players in N = {1, . . . , N} and M nonatomic
populations in M = {1, . . . ,M}. For all i ∈ N ∪M, Si is a finite set. The pure strategy
set of the atomic player i ∈ N is ∆(Si), while the action set of a nonatomic player in
population j ∈ M is Sj . Denote the vector x = (xi)i∈N∪M, where xi is the pure strategy
of the atomic player i for i ∈ N , and xj is the state of the population j for j ∈ M.
Denote X = ∏i∈N∪M∆(Si). The payoff function of the atomic player i ∈ N is defined
as T i(x) = ∑s∈Si xisF is(x), where F is is a function of class C1 defined a neighborhood
of X. The payoff function for a nonatomic player in population j ∈ M who plays action
s ∈ Sj is F js, a function of class C1 defined a neighborhood of X. This game is called a
composite game. Let it be denoted by Gc
(N ,M, (F i)i∈N , (F j)j∈M). For all i ∈ M ∪ N ,
denote F i = (F is)s∈Si .
In the congestion game framework, a composite game is played by atomic splittable
players (cf. §7.5) and nonatomic players (cf. §7.2.4). This model was first studied by
Harker [32].
Definition 7.21. In the composite game Gc
(N ,M, (F i)i∈N , (F j)j∈M), a point x ∈ X is a
composite equilibrium if the following two conditions hold:
1. for all i ∈ N , xi minimizes T i(xi,x−i) on ∆(Si), where x−i = (xj)j∈N∪M\{i};
2. for all j ∈M and all s ∈ Sj , if xjs > 0, then F is(x) ≥ F it(x) for all t ∈ Sj ,.
Similar to Wardrop equilibria in §7.2 and Nash equilibria in §7.5, a composite equilibrium
is characterized as a solution of a variational inequality problem.
Proposition 7.22. In a composite game Gc
(N ,M, (F i)i∈N , (F j)j∈M), x ∈ X is a composite
equilibrium if and only if{〈
yi, ∇iT i(x)
〉 ≤ 〈xi, ∇iT i(x) 〉, ∀yi ∈ ∆(Si), ∀ i ∈ N ;〈
yj , F j(x)
〉 ≤ 〈xj , F j(x) 〉, ∀yj ∈ ∆(Sj), ∀ j ∈M,
where ∇iT i(x) =
(∂T i(x)
∂xis
)
s∈Si.
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The replicator dynamics in this model isx˙ist = xist
[ ∂T i(xt)
∂xis
− 〈xit, ∇iT i(xt) 〉
]
, ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N .
x˙jst = x
js
t
[
F js(xt)− 〈xjt , F j(xt) 〉
]
, ∀ s ∈ Sj , ∀ j ∈M. (7.18)
As in the atomic unsplittable case, a Lyapunov function does not exist in general, except
in some particular cases. For example, if there is a finite set S such that Si = S for all
i ∈ N ∪ M, and there are positive constants as, bs for all s ∈ S, and strictly positive
constants mi for all i ∈ N ∪ M, such that, for all s ∈ S, F is(x) = mi(asξs + bs) for
all i ∈ N , F js(x) = asξs + bs for all j ∈ M, where ξs = ∑i∈N∪Mmi xis, then a Lyapunov
function for the replicator dynamics (7.18) exists. Consequently, a convergence result similar
to Theorem 7.11 holds.
7.7 Summary
So far, two forms of the replicator dynamics, (7.19) and (7.20), have been analyzed.
x˙ist = xist [F is(xt)− 〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 ], ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.19)
x˙ist = xist
[
F is(x−it )− 〈xit , F i(x−it ) 〉
]
, ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.20)
They mainly appear in the following three contexts.
(i) N -population games with or without self-interaction.
(ii) N -player games where the pure strategy spaces are simplices in a Euclidean space (for
example, N -player splittable congestion games).
(iii) N -player finite games (for example, N -player unsplittable congestion games).
These three categories are related with each other in the following way.
(1) In (i) and (ii), the variable xis stands either for the proportion of the individuals of type
s in the population i, or for the proportion of the stock sent by player i on the facility
s. In both cases, self-interaction is possible, since the fitness or the payoff to s ∈ Si
can depend upon the whole vector x and, in particular, upon xi. The corresponding
replicator dynamics is (7.19).
(2) In (i), the fitness of a given type s in population i can be independent of xi ∈ ∆(Si) (cf.
§7.3). This property of external-interaction is also present in (iii), since xis refers to the
probability of player i to play action s ∈ Si so that the payoff to s depends only on x−i.
The corresponding replicator dynamics is (7.20).
(3) In both (ii) and (iii), the model refers to an N -player game, hence there is no population
involved.
Population games with self-interaction is more general than population games with
external-interaction. In the case of multilinear F , the second model reduces to the N -
player case with finite strategies, hence all general results in the case of population games
with self-interaction extend to N -player finite games.
7.8 Appendix: Potential games
7.8.1 Definitions
Two types of potential games are to be defined.
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First, consider the N -player game Γ
(N , (Si)i∈N , (Gi)i∈N ) defined in §7.4.2. Monderer
and Shapley [62] introduced the following notion of N -player potential games.
Definition 7.23. An N -player game Γ
(N , (Si)i∈N , (Gi)i∈N ) is a finite potential game (FPG
for short) if there exists a real function Φ defined on S = ∏i∈N Si such that, for all player
i ∈ N , for all si, ti ∈ Si and, for all s−i ∈ S−i = ∏j 6=i Sj , one has
Gi(si, s−i)−Gi(ti, s−i) = Φ(si, s−i)− Φ(ti, s−i).
Such a function Φ is called a potential function of Γ.
Note that, in this definition, set Si is not necessarily finite.
Remark 7.24. A particular class of finite N -player potential games contains the partnership
games, see, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund [42], where all players have the same payoff
function.
Next, consider the N -population game Gn
(N , (Si)i∈N , (F i)i∈N ) defined in §7.2. The
following definition is introduced by Sandholm [79].
Definition 7.25. An N -population game Gn
(N , (Si)i∈N , (F i)i∈N )) is a population potential
game (PPG for short) if there exists a real-valued function f of class C1, defined on a
neighborhood of X, such that
∂f
∂xis
= F is(x), ∀ s ∈ Si, ∀ i ∈ N . (7.21)
Such a function f is called a potential function of Gn(N , (Si)i∈N , (F i)i∈N )).
Remark 7.26. Consider an N -player finite game Γ where all the players have the same
payoff function G : X → R. For all i ∈ N and s ∈ Si, let function F is : X−i → R
be defined as F is(x−i) = G(s,x−i). Then, the real-valued function f defined on X by
f(x) = G(x) = ∑s xisG(s,x−i) (for all i ∈ N ) is a potential function for the population
game defined by the payoff functions F is.
7.8.2 Properties
In a game where a potential function exists, either a FPG or a PPG, the potential
function can play two roles in the analysis of the game: first, as a tool to show the existence
of equilibria in both cases; second, as a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics.
Equilibrium aspects
Proposition 7.27. Consider an N -player FPG Γ with potential function Φ. If an action
profile s ∈ ∏i Si is a maximizer of Φ, then s is a Nash equilibrium of Γ. In particular, every
FPG possesses a pure Nash equilibrium.
Note that the inverse statement is not true, i.e. a pure Nash equilibrium is not necessarily
a maximizer of Φ. The reader is referred to Rosenthal [74] for a counter-example.
Remark 7.28. Neyman [65] obtains a characterization of correlated equilibria (Aumann [6])
in the case where the action spaces are convex and the potential Φ is of class C1 and concave.
Precisely, any correlated equilibrium is a combination of pure action profiles that maximize
Φ.
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A Rosenthal congestion game (§7.4.3) is an N -player FPG. Indeed, a potential function
is:
Φ(s) =
∑
s∈S
us(s)∑
k=0
ls(k). (7.22)
This congestion game is first introduced by Rosenthal in [74], where he used the function
(7.22) to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
Remark 7.29. In general, the multilinear extension of the potential function Φ in an N -
player finite potential game is not a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics (7.20)
which describes the evolution of the mixed strategies of the players. In the particular con-
gestion game described in §7.4, a Lyapunov function exists (equation (7.15)).
In N -player atomic splittable congestion games, if Φ is a potential function in the sense
of Definition 7.23, then
Φ
(
xi,x−i
)
− Φ
(
yi,x−i
)
= vi
(
xi,x−i
)
− vi
(
yi,x−i
)
=
∑
s∈S
mixiscis(mixis +
∑
j 6=i
mjxjs)−
∑
s∈S
miyiscis(miyis +
∑
j 6=i
mjxjs)
for all xi,yi ∈ ∆i, and all x−i ∈ ∏j 6=i ∆j .
A potential function does not exist except for some particular cases. For example, if,
for all arc s ∈ S, all the players’ cost functions for s are affine and are equivalent up to a
constant, i.e. cis(x) = asx + bis, for all i ∈ N , or, if all the atomic players have the same
amount of stock to send from the same origin to the same destination and they have the
same cost functions, i.e. the players are identical (Cominetti et al. [20]), then a potential
function exists.
The following result, established in Sandholm [79], is an analog of Proposition 7.27 for
PPG.
Proposition 7.30. Consider an N −PPG Gn
(N , (Si)i∈N , (F i)i∈N ) with potential function
f . Then, x is a local maximizer of f on X if, and only if, it is a Wardrop equilibrium of the
game.
Dynamical aspects
In a FPG and a PPG, the potential is a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics.
The following result applies to the finiteN -player case or theN -population case with external
and multi-linear interaction.
Proposition 7.31. In a FPG, the potential Φ is Lyapunov function for the replicator dy-
namics.
Proof. Let ft = Φ(xt). Then, f˙t = ΣiΦ(x˙it,x−it ) by linearity. On the one hand, for all
i ∈ N , Φ(x˙it,x−it ) = Σsx˙ist Φ(s,x−it ) = Σsxist [Φ(s,x−it ) − Φ(xt)]Φ(s,x−it ). On the other
hand, 0 = Σsxist [Φ(s,x−it ) − Φ(xt)]Φ(xt). By adding the previous two equations, one has
Φ(x˙it,x−it ) = Σsxist [Φ(s,x−it ) − Φ(xt)]2. Therefore, f˙t = Σisxist [Φ(s,x−it ) − Φ(xt)]2, and
the minimum 0 is reached, and only reached, on the stationary states of the replicator
dynamics.
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The following theorem is a particular case of the results in Sandholm [79], where a more
general class of dynamics are considered.
Theorem 7.32. Consider an N − PPG, Gn
(N , (Si)i∈N , (F i)i∈N ), with potential function
f . Then, the following hold for the replicator dynamics (7.6):
1. f is a global Lyapunov function;
2. the limit set of a trajectory (xt)t≥0 is a closed, connected set of rest points.
Proof. One has
f˙(xt) =
∑
i,s
xist [F is(xt)− 〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 ]2 +
∑
i,s
xist [F is(xt)− 〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 ]〈xit, F i(xt) 〉.
But, for each i ∈ N , ∑s xist [F is(xt) − 〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 ]〈xit, F i(xt) 〉 = 0. The conclusion
follows.
Remark 7.33. Naturally, Theorem 7.11 is a corollary of Theorem 7.32.
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